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Abstract 
 
Information is the essence of democracy and the lynchpin of power-ownership. Possession and 
control of information allows us to demarcate who controls or influences the political system. 
Freedom of Information (FOI), rooted in Enlightenment values, contains within it a key principle of 
democracy that there must be access to information (and knowledge) for all equally. My approach in 
my 25-year journalistic career has been to use FOI as a means of testing the promise and practice of 
democracy. It serves here as a ‘canary in the coalmine’ to measure how well citizens can access the 
political system. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this exegesis is to reflect on my published material resulting from reporting and 
investigating the public’s right to know. Specifically it uses a lens of power and democratic theory to 
think about a body of work that includes articles from the author’s 25-year career; three books: Your 
Right to Know (2004, 2007), The Silent State (2010, 2011) and The Revolution Will Be Digitised (2011, 
2012), and a year-long investigation as a member of the Independent Surveillance Review Panel that 
led to our report, A Democratic Licence to Operate (RUSI, 2015), on state surveillance. The published 
works I have put forward for this PhD by prior publication detail my investigations into the state, 
particularly the secret state, and the ways in which access to information impacts power relations 
between citizens and those entrusted with governance. Additionally I explore the way technology 
affects information flows between citizen and state both as a means of opening up government but 
also as a tool for surveillance.  
 This exegesis will examine these issues in two parts. In Part One, I explore the existing 
academic literature on democratic theory, political science and information theory. Part Two is a 
summary of my work including detail on the methodologies I used and my unique contribution in 
the fields of politics and journalism.  
 I demonstrate that access to information is an intrinsic value, essential for the fulfilment of 
human potential and the proper functioning of democracy, and that investigative journalism plays a 
crucial role in testing and ensuring that democratic rhetoric is matched in reality. Investigative 
journalism plays a vital democratic role as a “tribune of the commoner, exerting on her or his behalf 
the right to know, to examine, and to criticise” (de Burgh, 2000: 315). While there are several themes 
in my work they all revolve around a central interest: the relationship between citizen and state, 
specifically looking at the inequality of power between the two. I link democracy, freedom of 
information, privacy and surveillance through this central organising principle as they all reflect the 
power dynamic in action. I see transparency as “essentially a power-reducing mechanism”, 
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(Grimmelikhuijsen, 2013: 583), a means for citizens to hold the powerful to account if the powerful 
are transparent, or to control citizens when they are made transparent. 
 I used mixed methodologies in my work, primarily research and reporting. In particular I 
made extensive use of the UK's new Freedom of Information Act passed in 2000 but in force only 
in 2005. From that date until mid-2010, I filed approximately 500 FOIs and wrote more than 60 
newspaper and magazine articles (approximately 45,000 words) about democracy and/or FOI.  
 My approach has been to use FOI as a means of testing the promise and practice of 
democracy. It serves here as a ‘canary in the coalmine’ to test how well citizens can access and 
participate in the political system. My method has been to focus on those with and exercising power 
and hold them to account for the power they wield.  An important mechanism for this 
accountability is transparency, but perhaps more accurately described as the ‘right to know’ which 
holds within it the added aspect of accountable and democratic culture. Information is the essence 
of democracy and the lynchpin of power-ownership. Possession and control of information allows 
us to demarcate who controls or influences the political system. Freedom of Information is rooted 
in Enlightenment values, and contains within it a key principle of democracy that there must be 
access to information (and knowledge) for all equally.  
 Too often freedom of information is looked upon in a utilitarian way - a means to an end - 
and the end is defined not by citizens but by those in power. I use and conceptualise FOI in a 
different way. First, as a research tool it is a symbolic and 'political' act, a form of empowerment, 
and I used it as such to enlighten both myself and society. It may exist in “the humdrum world of 
administrative laws” but it is a “foundational element of democratic participation and 
accountability” (Fenster, 2015). Secondly, FOI is an indicator of democratic reality as opposed to 
rhetoric. Based on my wide use of FOI and responses, I contend that the UK is an elitist political 
system that is in need of substantial democratic reform. It is not a government for the people by the 
people, but rather a government for the elite by the elite. Westminster is a “hermetically sealed 
theatre of politics” (Richards and Smith, 2015: 48) that “legitimates the concentration of nearly all of 
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the power in the Executive, very little in the legislature, and practically none at all with the people; a 
kind of ‘retrospective’ democracy at best” (Tant, 1993: 30). There are two main types of democracy: 
‘participatory’ or ‘direct’ democracy involves the direct participation of all citizens who vote on 
decisions that affect their lives; and ‘indirect’ or ‘representative’ democracy in which the people elect 
a representative to decide matters on their behalf. As technology has created new ways for citizens 
to have their rights and interests represented in the polis this has led to a “clash between twenty-first 
century expectations, technologies and transparency challenging a nineteenth-century model of 
democracy and participation” (Richards, and Smith 2015: 46). Political theorist John Keane 
identified a new form of democracy that utilises technology to enable greater public influence and 
participation in politics, which he calls ‘monitory democracy’. This involves “surveys, focus groups, 
deliberative polling, online petitions and audience and customer voting” among other things (Keane, 
2008:10). These methods of participation and accountability often run parallel but outside the 
traditional mechanisms of party-based representation and institutional oversight and as such I 
believe FOI can be counted as one of these methods in this new form of participatory democracy. 
Contribution to knowledge  
 Ted Gup suggests it would be a “terrific investment of reportorial resources, not to mention a 
valuable public service” to dedicate an entire beat to secrecy. That was essentially my ‘beat’ from 
2004 to 2015. Gup accurately summarised the results of reporting in this beat: “If nothing else, it 
would produce some remarkable stories, and it might just help the public grasp the wider 
implications of unchecked secrecy” (Gup, 2010: 26). My work at the interface of technology, politics 
and journalism has led to transformative policy and legal changes in the UK.  I used the UK’s FOI 
law to map and monitor public bodies for the first time in a citizen-friendly way. My FOIs flagged 
up current and future problems such as secrecy in food safety regulation, the postcode lottery for 
criminal justice, the amounts police spend on public liability claims and propaganda. I took two 
important FOI cases through the legal appeals process: one seeking the minutes to a BBC Board of 
Governors Meeting after the Hutton Inquiry (Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Heather Brooke v IC and the 
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BBC (2007) EA/2006/0011; EA/2006/0013), and my notable legal victory against the House of 
Commons for details of MPs’ expenses (Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information 
Commissioner & Heather Brooke, Ben Leapman, Jonathan Michael Ungoed-Thomas [2008] EWHC 1084 
(Admin) (16 May 2008). This victory in the UK High Court fundamentally changed law and policy, 
and for the first time in its history Parliament had to account to an outside body over how MPs’ 
claimed expenses.  The court ruling and subsequent leak of the data led to a number of high-level 
political resignations as well as full-scale reform of the parliamentary expense regime and passage of 
the Recall of MPs Act 2015. A new government was elected in May 2010 on a mandate of 
transparency in part due to the scandal.  
 Seeing the disruptive effects of digitising parliamentary records gave me a deep understanding 
of the impact of digitisation on political power. I saw how new technologies would make it easier to 
leak important information and broadcast it to the world. Freedom of information exists on a 
continuum with mega-leaks at the far end. I identified the most pressing issues of the emerging 
digitised world: digitisation and why it is revolutionary, hackers and hackerspaces, the law in a 
globalised world, the role of journalism in an information free-for-all, information ownership, 
privacy, anonymity and internet surveillance, and national security and wrote about them in The 
Revolution Will be Digitised. As a direct result of my reporting, I was leaked a copy of the US 
diplomatic cables. The leaked information and subsequent articles (see appendix) changed public 
views about politics, diplomacy and corruption. I argue it gave people a greater understanding of the 
reality of all three and contributed in some measure to the Arab Spring. 
 Security services are adamant that digital technology and communications have led to a vast 
number of emerging threats not just international terrorism but industrial, military and state 
espionage, organised criminality, and child sexual exploitation. When he was Prime Minister, David 
Cameron supported expanded surveillance powers for the police and intelligence agencies. “As 
prime minister, I would say to people, 'Please let's not have a situation where we give terrorists, 
13 
criminals, child abductors, safe spaces to communicate.”1 When she was Home Secretary Theresa 
May put it even more bluntly: “this is quite simply a question of life and death, a matter of national 
security. We must keep on making the case until we get the changes we need.”2 Bulk and mass 
surveillance has been the state’s ‘answer’ to the problem of digital technology and online criminality 
and the disclosures by Edward Snowden reveal that intelligence agencies did not wait for a 
democratic mandate to set up these surveillance systems, which led to concerns they were operating 
outside the law. When the citizen not the state is made transparent, transparency can become a tool 
of oppression. I contributed to one of the key independent investigations (RUSI, 2015) set up by the 
government to investigate the intelligence agencies and mass surveillance after the Snowden 
revelations and I outline this work in Chapter 10.  
Challenging an Elitist Political System 
  I have lived equal parts of my live in the US and UK. I moved to London after completing a 
double BA degree in international politics and journalism at the University of Washington and 
working as a political and then crime reporter for local newspapers. I completed an MA in English 
Literature at the University of Warwick and then worked for various British media organizations 
before becoming a freelance writer of articles and books as well as teaching journalism at City 
University London. My transatlantic experience enabled me to ‘live’ the reasons underlying the 
American Revolution. I came to understand why the founders abolished Crown Copyright and writs 
of assistance and mandated freedom of speech in the form of the First Amendment. Proprietorial 
copyright was still being used up until 2010 to stop citizens in Britain from publishing official 
information, which I document in my books and later chapters. Without an equivalent of the First 
Amendment, British people are routinely prosecuted or injuncted for speaking inconvenient truths, 
while journalists must contend with a multitude of laws that criminalize publication from the 
                                                        
1 ‘Cameron: Surveillance powers will deny terrorists ‘safe space'. BBC. 2 November 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-34697535 (Accessed 7 July 2016) 
2 ‘Theresa May: There is no surveillance state’. BBC. 24 June 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-28006739 2 ‘Theresa May: There is no surveillance state’. BBC. 24 June 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-28006739 
(Accessed 7 July 2016) 
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Official Secrets Act to reporting restrictions and contempt of court. It is difficult to measure and 
compare the impact and costs of secrecy because it requires proving a negative. Instead research has 
focused on failures of openness, for example the Society of Professional Journalists organise ‘FOI 
audits’3 in the United States and academic Greg Michener is pioneering Transparency Audits4. I 
hope to collaborate with Michener in future to conduct a democracy audit of the UK. As it is, I note 
that in my American media law classes we learned how laws gave us the power to report; in media 
law taught to journalism students in Britain the focus is on the numerous laws and regulations that 
restrict reporting.  
 I was determined in my work not only to investigate but also push for real democratic 
reforms. My journalism had a purpose, which was to expose and test what I identified as an 
entrenched system of secrecy and elite rule. I set out to challenge this belief: that a set group of 
people - an elite - knew best what is best for the rest, for the entire polis. The triumph of elitism is 
not just that is shapes the outcomes of proposed reforms but that it shapes what the reformers 
themselves imagine possible. I believe it is precisely because I was not immersed in this milieu that I 
had vastly different expectations about the role of government and citizenship and this inspired my 
determined challenge to the political system.   
Toward democratic reform  
 Democracy is based on informed citizens (Dahl, 1989:93). Without access to information we 
cannot be informed, and a society without informed citizens cannot be called a democracy. In 
modern democracies, the people hold government accountable not just on election day but 
continuously (Schudson, 2015: 25). The rise of ‘monitory’ democracy (Keane, 2009) has faced active 
resistance in the UK from an elitist political system where executive dominance is prized and public 
consent is retrospective. I used FOI as a way to ‘monitor’ government in a more dynamic and 
democratic way.  I have brought into the public domain a great deal of previously secret information 
and thus added to our ability to debate and better understand various issues.  
                                                        
3 See http://www.spj.org/foitoolkit.asp 
4 See http://transparencyevaluation.net 
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Getting information is only the beginning. Transparency in government must be 
accompanied by the public’s right to be heard and to influence government policy. The first 
objective is to get the facts, for without facts we are powerless to oppose government 
decisions or bring about change. The next step it to open up the decision-making process so 
we finally have a government accountable to those it serves. (Brooke, 2007: 8). 
 
I will begin by looking at the existing academic literature in my chosen fields. Part One is comprised 
of five parts: definitions of transparency, its origin, why it matters, its relationship to privacy, and 
surveillance. 
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Part One: Literature Review 
 
Transparency, openness, access to information and democracy are the focus of a number of 
disciplines and a growing theoretical and empirical literature. Here I will concentrate primarily on 
the literature of political science and political theory as my journalism is predominately focused on 
power and the role it plays in how information flows or does not, and how this flow impacts the 
informed citizen. Additionally, I draw on some of the literature from information science, a 
burgeoning field of academia in its own right. In the first chapter I explore what transparency is, 
what it is not, its value as an instrument or right and its link to power.  
18 
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Chapter 1. What is Transparency? 
 
What is Transparency? Towards a Definition 
Transparency has become a consensual and administrative norm in public life according to many 
scholars (Schudson, 2015; Fenster, 2015; Meijer, 2012, Hood, 2006). The word “transparent” has its 
origin in the late 16th century via Old French from medieval Latin: transparere, from trans- 
‘through’ + parere ‘appear’. The etymological meaning of the word is ‘shining or showing through’. 
In relation to objects it is light that is shining through. In the political sense the objects are 
organisations and/or the people within them and what shines through are their thoughts, emotions, 
actions or behaviours. Transparency thus requires both an object and an observer. It is bound up 
with ideas of democracy. Democracy scholar Robert Dahl lists as one of the five criteria for 
measuring democracy ‘enlightened understanding’, that is the ability of citizens to be meaningfully 
informed about matters up for debate or decision (Dahl, 1989: 122). He also includes the availability 
of ‘alternative information’ as one of his seven factors for polyarchy: “Citizens have a right to seek 
out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are 
protected by laws” (Dahl 1989: 221). Dahl describes polyarchy as necessary to large-scale 
democracy, notably in a modern nation state (Dahl, 1989).  
 Transparency “tells a transformative narrative” as it “enables – and, indeed forces [a] virtuous 
chain of events” towards more accountable and democratic government (Fenster 2015: 151). In one 
of the most extensive reviews of open government academic literature, Albert Meijer and his 
colleagues defined government openness as “the extent to which citizens can monitor and influence 
government processes through access to government information and access to decision-making 
arenas.” (Meijer et al, 2012:13). They identified the ‘building blocks of openness’ as transparency and 
participation (Meijer: 11). The Meijer team analysed 103 articles on open government and found the 
common terms used in relation to transparency were “freedom of information, Internet, active 
dissemination of information, access to document and usability of websites” (Meijer: 11).  They 
quote Curtin and Medes (2011) who refer to these building blocks as respectively ‘vision’ and ‘voice’ 
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based on Albert Hirschman’s concepts ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ as the options available to 
consumers/citizens.  The concept extends into the private sector to include information that helps 
citizens/consumers regulate markets, companies, products and services. 
 Hood defines transparency as denoting “government according to fixed and published rules, 
on the basis of information and procedures that are accessible to the public…” (Hood, 2001:701). 
Such governmental transparency is often created by Freedom of Information (FOI) or Right to 
information (RTI) policies which allows citizens to access official information through a system of 
controlled and independent oversight (Birkenshaw, 2006b).  Schudson uses the term ‘disclosure’ for 
the actual practices of transparency mandated by lawmakers and though the term ‘right to know’ is 
also acceptable he believes it reflects “more of a cultural current rather than a specifically legal 
claim” (Schudson, 2015: 18). FOI “is only a mechanism…a bureaucratic legalistic procedure for 
obtaining information, the (ultimate) object is 'open government'. Freedom of Information is the 
only way (we can think) of imposing this on a government that doesn't want it." (Frankel 5interview 
cited in Tant, 1993: 244).  
What Transparency Is Not 
 Another way to define transparency is to look at what it is not. The Dictionary of Economics states 
that: “[Transparency] is contrasted with opaque policy measures, where it is hard to discover who 
takes the decisions, what they are, and who gains and who loses.” (Black 1997: 476 cited in Meijer, 
2012: 26). Yet secrecy isn’t simply the absence of knowledge or information. After all, at least one 
person must know something for it to be a secret. The absence of knowledge isn’t secrecy but 
ignorance. If we think about ‘access to information’, transparency is about the breadth of access 
whereas secrecy is about its limits. Secrecy and openness both require information to be shared, the 
crucial factor is the exclusivity of the sharing (Pozen, 2010).  
 Bureaucracies and secrecy have a mutually beneficial relationship. The sociologist Max Weber 
wrote about the important role of secrecy in bureaucracies: “Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the 
                                                        
5 Maurice Frankel, director of the UK’s Campaign for Freedom of Information. See: https://www.cfoi.org.uk 
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superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret" 
(Weber, 1958: 233). Stiglitz also sees the incentives officials have for secrecy. It allows them to hide 
mistakes, gives them leverage with special interests, and gives incumbents in power an advantage 
over newcomers making the possibility for change or transition more unlikely thus leading to 
concentrations of power (Stiglitz, 1999). “Secrecy is the bedrock of this persistent form of 
corruption, which undermines confidence in democratic governments in so much of the world” 
(Stiglitz, 1999: 11). Secrecy is thus corrosive; it is “antithetical to democratic values, and it 
undermines democratic processes. It is based on a mistrust between those governing and those 
governed; and at the same time, it exacerbates that mistrust.” We only have to look at the last 
century to see the results of secrecy says Stiglitz: “In country after country, it is the secret police that 
has engaged in the most egregious violations of human rights” (Stiglitz, 1999:2). 
Critiquing Transparency  
 Transparency has taken on a “quasi-religious significance” (Hood, 2006: 2), though like an 
article of faith, it is more often preached than practiced. Also like faith, some academics believe its 
promise does not match its reality. Etzioni, for example, writes that: 
“the critical question is whether transparency constitutes a reliable mechanism of promoting 
good governance and sound markets under most circumstances—or whether it is a rather 
weak means that itself relies on other forms of guidance and can supplement regulation but 
not serve a main form of guidance.” (2010:391) 
 
Hood believes transparency has become “pervasive in the jargon of business governance as well as 
that of governments and international bodies…used to saturation point” (Hood, 2006:2). It can be 
argued that the rhetoric of transparency has become, as Hood says, a “pervasive cliché of modern 
governance” but in practice that is definitely not the case as I will show in Part Two of this thesis.  
 This universal aspect of transparency - the way it can be embraced both by Wikileaks founder 
Julian Assange and UK Prime Minister David Cameron - shows how the word means different 
things to different people. Ann Florini in the introduction to The Right to Know notes that while the 
word is widely used it is rarely well defined (1998:4). British philosopher Onora O’Neill points out 
that an emphasis on transparency “encourages us to think of information as detachable from 
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communication” and thus it becomes natural to view disclosure as a thing directed by those who 
control the supply of information (O’Neill, 2006:6). In such an environment, transparency can be 
achieved without actually communicating anything meaningful to the citizen. In a similar vein, 
Stubbs and Snell call FOI an ‘empty signifier’ in that you can pour into it whatever you wish 
(Stubbs, 2014). Claire Birchall also makes the point that when all political parties support 
transparency it has, in effect, become meaningless (Birchall, 2014). She notes that we live in an age 
of transparency rhetoric rather than transparency practice.  
 One of the problems with the widespread acceptance of transparency rhetoric is that not only 
does the word become meaningless, more worryingly, it can come to mean what the powerful want 
it to mean. The underlying democratic principles of the concept become detached from its meaning. 
This is evidenced in the way the UK Government can claim to be in favour of transparency while 
simultaneously seeking ways to curtail it in practice, for example by appointing in 2015 only 
politicians critical of the Act to a review and setting terms reference to decrease the Act’s power for 
citizens.6  It is precisely because of such ongoing and continued actions by governments to restrict 
the public’s right to know and the continued wilful withholding by governments of meaningful 
information to citizens, that I believe it is premature to say that transparency is “a pervasive cliché of 
modern governance” (Hood, 2006:2). Indeed in some areas, namely security and intelligence, secrecy 
is not only entrenched but is also expanding.    
Transparency as Instrument or Right?  
 Academics view transparency as either a secondary ‘instrumental’ value or a value in itself. 
Heald argues that it should be viewed instrumentally and that “attempts to elevate it to intrinsic 
value should be resisted.” (2006b: 1) There are clear benefits of transparency in especially secretive 
systems, he believes, but once systems are relatively transparent (he doesn’t specify what criteria 
must be met to reach this point) then the costs of transparency become apparent and trade-offs 
                                                        
6 The Commission sought evidence on deliberative space, collective responsibility, risk assessments, Cabinet veto, 
burdens on public authorities and enforcement and appeals. By contrast it could have asked for evidence on the citizen 
experience of FOI: abuse of the public interest extension, failure to provide advice and assistance to requesters, failure 
to abide by the law, the privatisation of public services, imbalance of resources in the appeal process.
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must be made between transparency and other, possibly more important, values of trust, 
accountability, autonomy, confidentiality, privacy, fairness and legitimacy. The ‘instrumental’ use of 
transparency is predominantly focused on its use as a mechanism to build or increase public trust in 
government, often as a means of increasing public acceptance of official policies or increasing 
participation (Curtin and Meijer 2006; Heald 2006b; Coglianese 2009; Worthy 2010; 
Grimmelikhuijsen 2012a; O’Neil 2006). 
  There are a number of problems with this utilitarian argument for transparency. First, 
legitimacy or trust built upon a foundation of enforced ignorance is illusion at best.  Secondly, 
viewing transparency as a ‘fix-it’ for broken governments or broken trust in governments is to 
ignore the importance of reality, or for that matter the democratic principle of a citizen’s right to see 
reality. Third, it may not even work in this way. Bauhr and Grimes (2014: 295) point out that 
“several of the elements” within the idealised cycle of how FOI work are “tenuous”. 
 Transparency is the process by which we observe reality: it shows what is there. If corruption, 
greed and immorality are the reality, we trust what we see; however, precisely because of this, our 
trust in the people or institutions thus exposed may be lessened. I believe it is dangerous to 
democracy to view transparency in utilitarian terms for when government defines the parameter of 
transparency’s success as ‘trust in government’ and then trust in government does not follow, those 
in power (who rarely like FOI to begin with) have a convenient excuse to undermine or abolish it. 
This is precisely what the UK government has attempted to do in numerous reviews since the Act’s 
implementation. Those who view transparency in a utilitarian way often judge it to be ‘overvalued’ 
(Etzioni, 2010: 389). But behind this belief is an elitist assumption: that those with power are 
entitled to decide what the public should know. Politically, openness has also become a convenient 
action, an “apparently simple solution to complex problems—such as how to fight corruption, 
promote trust in government, support corporate social responsibility, and foster state 
accountability” and a “visible response to public disquiet” with “attractive, palliative qualities for 
politicians and CEOs who want to be seen to be doing rather than reflecting” (Birchall 2014, 77).  
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 Contrasting the utilitarian argument is another concept that I find has more merit: that the 
‘right to know’ is a fundamental human right (Banisar, 2005; Birkinshaw, 2006a,b; Florini, 2007a, 
McDonagh, 2013). Birkinshaw states that “within the framework of internationally agreed concepts 
of human rights, FOI deserves to be listed with those rights.” (Birkinshaw, 2006b: 2). His argument 
rests on a strong legal basis. In its Resolution of the General Assembly December 1946, the United 
Nations signed up to the idea that: “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is a 
touchstone for all freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” (United Nations 1946). 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights agreed in 1948 by the UN Assembly gives 
people, “the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of any frontiers.” Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 grants a right to freedom of 
expression: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers” (emphasis mine). While this has not been interpreted as granting a right to government 
information, combined with other acts such as right to life (Article 2), access to justice (Article 6) 
and family and private life (Article 8) there is a growing argument that it should. And outside of 
Europe, this right is gaining ground. In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in 
Claude Reyes v Chile7, that it follows from the Article 13 right to ‘seek’ and ‘receive’ ‘information’ 
that individuals have a right to request state-held information and for the state to provide it. Other 
international human rights policies focus on building participatory and representative models of 
democracy, which by definition requires that if citizens are to meaningfully participate they need to 
be informed and thus require access to information. In 2015 the United Nations General Assembly 
agreed on a new Sustainable Development Goal (target 16.10) that urges countries to ensure public 
access to information. 
 One of the strongest arguments for the intrinsic value of FOI was put forward by renowned 
economist and academic Joseph Stiglitz in a lecture given at Oxford in 1999 titled On Liberty, The 
                                                        
7 19/2006, IACtHR Series C 151 (2006); 16 IHRR 863 (2009) 
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Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life. Stiglitz equated free speech 
with freedom of information; both are intrinsic and essential rights in a democracy. 
“Free speech is both an end in itself—an inalienable right that governments cannot strip 
away from the citizenry—and a means to other equally fundamental goals…I want to push 
the argument one step further, and argue that there is, in democratic societies, a basic right 
to know, to be informed about what the government is doing and why.”  (Steiglitz,1999:2).  
 
Proponents of this argument say that the right to know, like the right to speak, is necessary for the 
realisation of all other rights and so, for example, India’s FOI campaign has as its slogan: “the right 
to know is the right to live.” 
Transparency and Power 
 Here we come to a crucial aspect of transparency: its relation to power both in its exercise and 
as an identifier of who has it and who does not. It is not an empty cliché to say that knowledge is 
power. The powerful know this and expend vast resources attempting to gather information and 
control its flow.  
 “Power is more than communication, and communication is more than power. But power 
relies on the control of communication, as counterpower depends on breaking through such 
control. And mass communication, the communication that potentially reaches society at 
large, is shaped and managed by power relationships, rooted in the business of media and the 
politics of the state. Communication power is at the heart of the structure and dynamics of 
society.” (Castells, 2013:3) 
 
Castells writes in Communication Power about how information dissemination challenges hierarchies.  
He recalls a seminal experience as a youth, leafleting a movie cinema in Franco’s Spain:  
 “I did not know then that the message is effective only if the receiver is ready for it (most 
people were not) and if the messenger is identifiable and reliable…social and political change 
has always been enacted, everywhere and at all times, from a myriad of gratuitous actions, 
sometimes uselessly heroic (mine was certainly not that) to the point of being out of 
proportion to their effectiveness: drops of a steady rain of struggle and sacrifice that 
ultimately floods the ramparts of oppression when, and if, the walls of incommunication 
between parallel solitudes start cracking down, and the audience becomes ‘we the people’.” 
(Castells: 2013: 2) 
 
This echoes earlier thoughts from O’Neil and others that for information to be meaningful it must 
meet certain criteria. I agree with O’Neill that transparency is meaningless when it becomes 
detached from actual communication to an audience. Transparency works when it gives citizens 
information they can use, in a way they can use it. Transparency is not just about data dumps or the 
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government deciding what can be released under ‘open data’ policies. It requires both proactive 
disclosure but also forcing the state to answer difficult questions from the public. For it to mean 
anything it must give power to the citizen: provide answers to the questions they ask and not merely 
spoon-feed them anodyne or propagandist information. “Whether and how new information is used 
to further public objectives depends upon its incorporation into complex chains of comprehension, 
action, and response.” (Weil, Fung et al, 2006: 157). Kosack and Fung (2014: 71) describe a 
‘transparency action cycle’ (see diagram below) with the most important dynamics that must be in 
place before a transparency policy or law can improve services.  
Source: Kosack & Fung (2014:17) 
 
 Those who want to know have the best idea what is most meaningful to them. However, it is 
not the citizen but the state that gets to decide about FOI disclosure.  In addition, the government's 
control of the legislative process gives it another potent and powerful weapon against change as 
evidenced during my campaign to disclose MPs’ expenses  (see Chapter 9 of this thesis).  The 
fundamental democratic question about access to government information is summarised by Stiglitz: 
“Is it the private province of the government official, or does it belong to the public at large?” 
(Stiglitz, 1999: 8). His view is that information gathered by public officials at public expense is 
owned by the public. This is a philosophy that I share and was the guiding principle of my 
journalism.  
 Thomas Paine described pre-Enlightenment government as “an assumption of power, for the 
aggrandizement of itself,” whereas the Enlightenment proposed instead a political system that was 
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“a delegation of power, for the common benefit of society.” (Israel, 2010: 91). That promise never 
appeared more real then with the introduction of new technologies that reduced the cost of 
distributing information to near zero and connected people across the planet. Digitisation has 
enabled information about politics, government decision-making, policies and outcomes to be made 
available in new formants on an unprecedented scale. The internet and social networks mean that 
information can be spread far and wide, often in real time. (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
Meijer (2009) calls this phenomenon ‘computer-mediated transparency’ and it is now an “essential 
part of modern-day government transparency” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2013: 575). The research on the 
impact of e-government and open data is still at an early stage (Andersen et al 2010) and the 
powerful haven’t always adapted to the pressure to be transparent with open arms. 
Grimmelikhuijsen notes that citizens’ demands for openness and information have “pushed spin 
control towards the centre stage of government” (2011: 36).  
 Technology has created new ways for citizens to have their rights and interests represented in 
the polis. “Party-centered representative democracy has now been substantially supplemented (but 
not replaced) with multiple forms of representing the public and holding governments accountable” 
writes Schudson in The Rise of the Right to Know (2015: 230). This new type of democracy has been 
given different names: ‘post-representative’, ‘trans-legislative’ (as a description of wider 
representation that is no longer exclusively centred in elections and legislatures) and what the 
Australian political and media scholar John Keane describes as ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane, 2009).  
Keane sees an evolution of democracy starting with the ‘assembly democracy’ of ancient Greece to 
‘representative democracy’ of the 18th century and now ‘monitory democracy’. 
 “If assembly democracy is linked to the spoken word and representative democracy to print 
culture, today’s democracy - what Keane calls ‘monitory democracy’ - emerges with the rise 
of multimedia society.”  (Schudson: 234). 
Digital technology, the internet and social networks have created all kinds of new ways for citizens 
to monitor and participate in government. 
“In the era of monitory democracy, the constant public scrutiny of power by hosts of 
differently sized monitory bodies with footprints large and small makes it the most energetic, 
most dynamic form of democracy ever.” (Keane, 2009: 743) 
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Democratic governments around the world are struggling to adapt to this potent new form of 
democracy. In the next chapter I look at the origin and nature of transparency and its relationship 
with politics.  
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Chapter 2: The Origins of Transparency 
 
Rise of the Right to Know 
Scholar Michael Schudson’s thesis in his book The Rise of the Right to Know is that openness is a 
modern invention, a “key element in the transformation of politics, society and culture from the late 
1950s through the 1970s” (Schudson, 2015: 5). It was coincident with, though not caused by, the 
civil rights movement and a general reaction against traditional social hierarchies along with an 
expansion of higher education that had within it a critical and egalitarian ethos. Specific American 
advocates ensured the right to know became institutionalised through law but the real impetus was 
cultural. Schudson gives numerous examples of how openness became a cultural phenomenon in 
the media, popular culture, economy and everyday life: The creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; the publication of the Kinsey reports in 1948 and 1953 on adult sexual behaviour; 
Daniel Ellsberg’s release of the Pentagon Papers to newspapers in 1971; the Automobile Disclosure 
Act of 1958 requiring itemised pricing stickers on car windows; the Automobile Safety Act and 
Truth in Packaging (1966) both spearheaded by consumer rights campaigner Ralph Nader, and the 
way doctors communicated with patients. In 1961 the Journal of the American Medical Association 
found only 12 per cent of doctors would tell their patient if they had cancer. By 1979 this figure had 
risen to 98 per cent (Schudson, 2015: 11).  
 Other academics view transparency as one of the oldest ideas in political thought (Hood, 
2006), stemming from beliefs in intrinsic equality (Dahl, 1989). If we accept Hood’s definition of 
transparency from The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, then the concept has certainly been around 
at least since Classical Greece. Pericles of Athens is famous for his remarks of around 430 BC in 
which he speaks of citizens’ right to know: “Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all 
able to judge it.” (Popper, 2003: 199, citing Thucydides, II 37-41). What Dahl calls ‘intrinsic equality’ 
Popper calls ‘Equalitarianism’ which he defines in The Open Society and Its Enemies as the ideology or 
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demand that citizens of the state should be treated impartially, without regard to birth, family, wealth 
and given no natural privileges.  
Transparency & the Enlightenment 
 Political transparency was an important part of the Reformation movement as a means to 
combat the culture of secrecy inherent in the Roman Catholic Church.  The English Revolution in 
the 1640s inspired a number of important political texts re-energising Classical Greek ideas about 
democracy and intrinsic equality, notably John Milton’s defence of free speech in Areopagitica (1644) 
and John Locke’s defence of natural rights in Two Treatises of Government (1689). The concept gained 
strength in the Enlightenment due to that movement’s philosophy that the world was knowable and 
the way to know it was to gather information and study it. Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act of 
1766 was the first FOI law and began a Scandinavian tradition of press freedom and access to 
information. In the 1770s and 1780s a ‘veritable deluge of subversive literature’ appeared in Europe, 
Britain and the New World (Israel, 2010: 87). These works took many forms - philosophical, 
satirical, literary, journalistic - but all contained a growing aversion to cultural and political 
oppression, leading to what Enlightenment scholar Jonathan Israel calls ‘a revolution of the mind’, 
that is a radical revolution in human knowledge and awareness.  
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham both cite transparency as a way of keeping those 
in power honest (Hood & Heald, 2006). Hood believes Bentham is the first to use ‘transparency’ in 
its modern governance-related sense in the English language. In Writings on the Poor Laws in the 
1790s, Bentham wrote: “I do really take it for an indisputable truth, and a truth that is one of the 
corner-stones of political science - the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.” ([1790s] 
2001:277). However this sounds more like surveillance than FOI, which I discuss in the surveillance 
chapter.  
 In The Social Contract Jean-Jacques Rousseau focused on the transparency of state officials to 
citizens rather than the other way around. Public servants, he argued, should do their business “in 
the eyes of the public”. These public servants should be named and known by the people, the better 
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to be accountable to them. “I should like you to permit no office-holder to move about incognito, 
so that the marks of a man’s rank or position shall accompany him wherever he goes…”(Hood, 
2006: 4 citing Rousseau ([1772/1782] 1985:72). Such clarity on who is working on behalf of the 
public is very different from the culture of official anonymity that exists in modern-day Britain 
(Brooke, 2011: 95-117).  
 Not everyone was enamoured by Enlightenment values, even those professing to be its 
advocates. Voltaire and Frederick the Great were typical of those who believed in a narrow, elitist 
Enlightenment where the existing social order remained unchanged. Countering this was a Radical 
Enlightenment exemplified by the Bavarian professor Adam Weishaupt who argued in 1786 that 
enlightening the few only to keep the majority in ignorance was tyranny under a different name. 
Only  “Aufklärung um andere wieder aufzuklären, giebt Freyheit” - enlightenment to enlighten 
others generates freedom. (Israel, 2010:85 citing Adam Weishaupt, Apologie der Illuminaten [Frankfurt 
and Leipzig, 1786] 46). I view this statement as one of the principle foundations for freedom of 
information: that all people, regardless of privilege, resource or power have the right to information 
that enables their enlightenment. It also follows from this statement that universal education is 
essential so that people can better identify and represent their own interests. As French philosopher 
Paul-Henri Thiry (Baron) d’Holbach wrote in 1772: “it is only by showing [people] the truth that 
they will come to know their most vital interests and the true motives which should incline them 
towards what is good.” (Israel: 198 citing d’Holbach, Le Bon-Sens, vi–viii, 7).   
 While British intellectuals supported the Enlightenment, few could bring themselves to 
condemn the existing social order of rank, privilege and aristocracy. Many thought the British 
political system superior even to the nascent United States democracy, with conservative 
Enlightenment thinker Adam Ferguson, for example, boasting that the English constitution was 
better than the American one and “does actually bestow upon its subjects higher degrees of liberty 
than any other people are known to enjoy.” (Israel, 2010: 41 citing Adam Ferguson, Remarks on a 
pamphlet lately published by Dr Price [London, 1776], 13). The facts, however, presented a different 
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picture: Britain had at the time an electorate of just 300,000 men out of 7 million (Israel: 59). Rather 
than fight for the enlightenment of the common man, the British became “helpless prey to the 
depredations of ministers of state” wrote the radical John Jebb in a letter of September 1785 (Israel: 
59). It is interesting to note these elitist attitudes as I encountered similar ones during my campaign 
to open up parliament.  
 While rebuffed in England, the radical enlightenment ideology found a fertile home in the 
American colonies. Thomas Paine argued in Common Sense (1776) that all men are created equal and 
what an absurdity it was for Americans to pledge allegiance to a distant king. In July of that year 
Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence accusing King George III of tyranny 
and violating Americans’ “self-evident…rights [to] Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”. 
Jefferson made what at the time was an extraordinary claim: that the power of kings came not from 
god but the consent of the people, and that people only granted consent insofar as kings delivered 
on the promise of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. After the revolution, the 13 American 
colonies adopted the most democratic constitutions ever seen, outlawing rank and title and other 
inherited privileges. The House, Senate and President would all be chosen, directly or indirectly, by 
citizens. Undoubtedly the American revolution inspired the French of 1789, but Israel’s thesis is that 
both had their roots in the intellectual ‘revolution of the mind’ that culminated in a new model of 
government: constitutional, based on universal rights including free speech and a free press, and the 
consent of the governed.  
Right to Know in the American Political System 
 The United States has been “the traditional proponent of transparency” (Florini, 2007: 9). 
Schudson traces the phrase ‘right to know’ to James Wilson who used it during the American 
Constitutional Convention to argue for an official record of House and Senate proceedings: “The 
people have a right to know what their agents are doing or have done, and it shouldn’t be the option 
of the legislature to conceal their proceedings.” (Schudson, 2015: 5 and O’Brien, 1981: 38). But the 
phrase did not appear in popular rhetoric until 1945 when the executive director of the Associated 
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Press, Kent Cooper, used it in a speech: “Citizens are entitled to have access to news, fully and 
accurately presented. There cannot be political freedom in one country, or in the world, without 
respect for ‘the right to know’.” The New York Times, reporting on the speech noted Cooper’s  
“good new phrase for an old freedom” and that “such freedom is not merely a right. It is a necessity 
for every country which intends to utilize to the full the creative powers of its citizens. In the long 
run it is the well-informed peoples who will be free.” (‘The Right to Know’, New York Times, 23 Jan 
1945). While the right to communicate information was specified in the in the First Amendment of 
the Bill or Rights ratified in 1791, the first federal ‘FOI’ law was the 1946 Administrative Procedures 
Act. Soon after, the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) created its first committee on 
FOI in1948. It was the combined power of the press and Congressional desire to stem 
Administrative secrecy that led, eventually, to passage of the US Freedom of Information Act. This 
act, “weak as it was when passed in 1966, was a landmark development of a more open society.” 
(Schudson, 2015: 30). However, domestically, it quickly came to be seen as a ‘paper tiger’ and a 
‘relatively toothless beast’ (Wald, 1984: 658; Roberts, 2006: 55). The Watergate scandal that let to 
President Richard Nixon’s resignation marked a ‘symbolic catalyst for a new law’ (Worthy, 2014a) 
and in 1974 the law was amended and strengthened.  
US FOIA & the ‘Openness Revolution’ 
 The importance of the US law can’t be overestated. The US had produced “a small miracle for 
the world”, that became the model for global FOI laws (Schudson, 2015: 62). It marked the 
beginning of what is called the ‘Openness Revolution’ and while FOI may have begun as a means to 
reign in the growing state’s administrative power (Schudson, 2015; Florini, 2007), it soon expanded 
as a necessary means of ensuring other rights, most notably in the FOI campaigns of India and 
South Africa where secrecy bred such corruption that the most vulnerable were being deprived of 
life’s essentials such as food, water and work. In the 1990s only about a dozen countries had FOI 
laws but by 2006 there were 70 countries and in 2012 there were 93 (Mendel 2008; Vleugels 2009, 
Florini, 2007). 
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 Additionally, the American system of corporate disclosure was, by the 1990s, seen as the best 
economic model, which added to transparency’s caché. While recent corporate scandals have cast 
doubt on the adequacy of these measures, no one seems keen to adopt the secrecy of markets in 
Russia or China, but rather to introduce greater transparency.  The World Bank and IMF also 
adopted disclosure policies as a means to fight against corruption, and the leading anti-corruption 
organisation in the world was set up in 1993 with the name Transparency International. If secrecy 
was the ailment, transparency was increasingly seen as the cure, a “simple solution to complex 
problems” with “attractive palliative qualities for politicians and CEOs who want to be seen to be 
doing rather than reflecting.” (Birchall 2014:77). As such it can have appeal across the political 
spectrum and be seen as a “pan-ideological good”8 in the words of Jim Harper from the American 
libertarian CATO Institute. 
 The latest incarnation of freedom of information came with digitisation and the ‘Open Data’ 
movement. Open data leads to new collaborations between citizen and state (Lathrop and Ruma, 
2010a) though not always beneficial to the citizen. The techno-utopianism of early thinkers 
(including myself) has more recently been tempered with greater skepticism. Lathrop and Ruma 
(2010a) edited a volume of mostly optimistic papers that viewed technology as democratic saviour.  
“Much of the optimism,” writes Lawrence Quill, “can be reduced to one important factor: 
technology.” (Quill, 2014:88). I myself espoused such a view when I wrote in The Revolution Will Be 
Digitised: “Instead of re-engineering the Internet to fit around unpopular laws and unpopular leaders, 
we could re-engineer our political structures to mirror the Internet” (Brooke, 2011). Internet skeptic 
Evgeny Morozov took issue with my contention: “Last time I checked, much of this proverbial 
‘Internet’ was built by for-profit companies with the explicit objective of making money, not 
defending human rights. Why should we be reengineering our political institutions with this model 
in mind?” (Morozov, 2012: 125). Ever the skeptic, Morozov also points out the ‘empty signifier’ 
quality that open data shares with FOI so that a government can provide ‘open data’ on neutral 
                                                        
8 Quoted in M. Triplett, Media-ite. 2010. ‘Transparency Group taking government openness to the people’. (March 18). 
Retrieved from http://www.mediaite.com/online/transparency-group-taking-government-openness-to-the-people/ 
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uncontroversial topics such as train timetables even as it remains deeply undemocratic and secretive. 
He notes that the Hungarian cities of Budapest and Szeged provide online machine-readable transit 
schedules. It is government data and it is open - but few would agree this makes the Hungarian 
government open. It is quite the opposite with an executive keen to demolish FOI and free press. 
So we should beware of cheerleading open data as it allows ‘some governments to claim progress 
where there is none, while stalling on important reforms’ (Morozov: 2013:96). 
  Some academics describe the government as merely a ‘platform’ for open data in the way 
Amazon is a platform for retailers (O’Reilly, 2010). I am skeptical of this idea as it appears to be a 
way for powerful actors to pretend powerlessness and thus avoid taking responsibility or being held 
to account for the power they posses. The information theorist Manuel Castell is keenly aware of the 
role communications technology has on institutions. He defines the network society as “a social 
structure constructed around (but not determined by) digital networks of communication.” (Castells, 
2013: 4). The structure of this network means, “the exercise of power relationships is decisively 
transformed in the new organisational and technological context derived from the rise of global 
digital networks of communication as the fundamental symbol-processing system of our time.” In 
other words: the revolution will be digitised. 
Right to Know and the British Political System 
 Although I initially trained as a journalist in the United States, the majority of my investigative 
work was conducted in the UK so it is worth providing some context about the right to know as it 
exists within the British political system. An assessment of Britain’s political culture also sheds light 
on why Westminster has been so resistant to the Freedom of Information Act.  There is a 
fundamental conflict between FOI and the British political system that has neither been fully 
acknowledged nor resolved.  I argue that the democratic value of parity between ruler and ruled is at 
odds with the British political tradition. FOI embodies popular participatory and accountable 
democracy, which is the very opposite of the top-down, narrow and elitist British political system.9   
                                                        
9 I do not have space for a deeper analysis of the British political tradition here but this can be found in chapters two 
and three of Tant’s book as well as Anthony Birch’s Representative and Responsible Government (1979), The British Political 
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 The Westminster system is characterised by a strong central bi-partisan consensus, what 
Moran (2003) refers to as a system of ‘club regulation’ among the UK’s political elite but also of 
what Vincent (1998) identifies as the principle of ‘honourable secrecy’. Former MP and now political 
academic Tony Wright notes that “dominant traditions on both left and right in Britain for most of 
the twentieth century liked strong government: the left because it delivered state power for 
progressive purposes; the right because it was the guarantor of order and authority” (2009:324). 
Wright summarises three types of democracy: 
 “The first is the ability to kick the rascals out, the democratic bottom line and never to be 
underestimated. The second is the ability to kick them while they are in, in a continuous 
process of accountability. The third is the ability of people to contribute actively to their own 
self-government.” (325) 
 
Of the first he says the British ‘do rather well’, the second is done well by the media but less so 
institutionally, and the third not done much at all.  It is this third part that encompasses what Keane 
described as monitory democracy as referenced in the previous chapter. Among the many ways 
citizens can represent their interests is by using FOI as a means to gain knowledge and thus lobby 
on a more even footing with those making policies and decisions. What is evidenced from my work 
is how obstructive the Westminster system has been to monitory democracy in the form of citizens 
using FOI.  
 In British history “citizenship has more often appeared as something granted from on high to 
subjects rather than something gained from below as in the American, Dutch and French 
experiences…” writes Bernard Crick (2000: 6). In his Essays on Citizenship he states, “We in England 
have had considerable difficulties about the very concept of citizenship, let alone peculiar 
inhibitions” (3). He sees these as stemming from the fact that the English are in fact still subjects 
rather than citizens. “Put simply, a subject obeys the laws and a citizen plays a part in making and 
changing them” (4). As such, “sociologically and socially England is still in many ways a profoundly 
undemocratic society…certainly when compared to the United States.” (2000: 193).  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Tradition (1983), and John Dearlove and Peter Saunders’ Introduction to British Politics (1984). An interesting investigation 
into elitism in British culture is also found in John Carey’s The Intellectuals and the Masses (1992). 
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 England’s narrow and elitist understanding of democracy is inherited from a history in which 
political disputes were in the main limited to the claims of competing elites with the role of the 
public ‘essentially a passive, legitimizing one’ (Tant, 1993: 58). There have been challenges, but they 
were not successful. Battles have raged in British politics about who qualifies as an elite, but not how 
we are governed and whether elitism is acceptable in a modern democracy. The franchise of 
authority was expanded from king to aristocrat and later to some 'ordinary' people but Britain is still 
a ways from placing sovereignty in the people. Instead sovereignty has moved from monarch to a 
parliament acting with royal prerogative. It has always been the government’s role to weigh 
particular interests: “Government and only government was arbiter of the ‘national interest’” (Tant, 
1993: 6). As such, the people’s representatives have autonomy, freedom and discretion to make 
decisions ‘on behalf’ of the people. Constituents’ views are neither sought nor listened to. It is 
government’s independent task to consider options and decide policy. Any questioning of those 
decisions is to be done by parliament not ordinary people. Accountability to the people is 
retrospective, at elections. In the meantime, government is accountable to the people’s 
representatives not to the people directly. What has evolved in Britain is a political system based on 
pre-democratic elitist concepts of representation, where the notion of ‘responsible’ (rather than 
responsive) government is dominant. (Tant, 1993: 2). This is ‘government knows best’ and it’s clear 
why in such a system there is little value placed on informing the public. This also accounts for the 
British government's particular sensitivity to the sovereignty of parliament and ministerial 
responsibility, which I encountered in my battle for MPs’ expenses. “In the British context, 
parliament has come to be seen as virtually the sole representative institution of democracy” 
(Tant,1993: 23). I agree with Geoffrey Robertson that concepts such as ‘ministerial accountability’ 
and ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ are nothing more than constitutional fictions designed to avoid 
accountability while pretending to do the opposite (Robertson, 1989: 130).  
 It was for all these reasons that FOI had a tough fight becoming a law in 2000 and faced a 
further five-year delay before coming into force in January 2005.  Still there are politicians and a few 
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academics criticise who believe there is too much transparency and that the reason people are 
disengaged from parliament is due to the media or a too-demanding citizenry. Matthew Flinders, for 
example, believes the problem in Britain is not too little democracy but too much and it is ‘binding 
the hands of politicians’. He says:  
“Could it be that if politics is failing it is easy to blame the politicians? Could it be actually 
that the public is to blame? I cannot help thinking that the public is fickle; they want pain 
free solutions to complex problems where none exist. They don’t want politicians; they want 
supermen and superwomen that will find the magic wand, the technological fix, the pain free 
solutions.” (Flinders, 2014, ‘ The problem with democracy’, TEDx Houses of  Parliament , 
Accessed March 2016: http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/The-Problem-With-Democracy-
Matt)    
 
He believes the existing British system despite its failings remains the ‘least worst’ form of 
government and thus rejects demands for any major democratic overhaul. Flinders makes much of 
the ‘boldness’ of his argument but all he is really arguing for is maintenance of the status quo, which 
is the least bold argument there is. Tant, writing more than 20 years earlier is much bolder 
concluding that “fundamental change must therefore be attempted through the overthrow of the 
system itself or within this, at best, incremental context” (Tant, 1993: 91). Through my work it 
became obvious that parliament was incapable of reforming itself and instead reform had to be 
forced upon it. Richards and Smith (2015) provide a robust critique of Flinders’ arguments. I would 
only add that arguments about the ‘burden’ of transparency and accountability reveal the author’s 
own elitism and a disdain for the ordinary citizen’s right to be informed and involved in politics.  
Flinders’ critique of monitory democracy in Defending Politics (2012) is really a defence of English 
elitism. I argue throughout this thesis that if there is a crisis in British politics it is a result not of too 
much democracy but rather far too little: a clash between “twenty-first century expectations, 
technologies and transparency challenging a nineteenth-century model of democracy and 
participation” (Richards & Smith, 2015: 46). I will go further and say that democracy as defined in 
the ‘traditionalist’ manner in Britain is so narrow and limited that it is contrary to any real sense of 
what the word actually means. Next I will look in more detail at transparency’s intrinsic democratic 
value, its instrumental value and how it is changing society.   
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Chapter 3: Why Transparency Is Important 
 
The importance of transparency can be viewed in three main ways: as an intrinsic value, an 
instrumental value and as a quality that is changing society. 
Transparency as an Intrinsic Democratic Value 
   Florini notes, “there are few more important struggles in the world today than the battle over 
who gets to know what.” As such, it should come as no surprise that FOI, as the political 
manifestation of transparency, is “an essential first step in the exercise of political and economic 
power” (Florini, 2007: 2) The reason FOI has become a “good overall indicator of public sector 
transparency” (Stubbs & Snell, 2014: 143) is because of its intrinsic value to enable freedom of 
expression and democracy.  
 The right to know is important because it makes societies more democratic, and the more 
democratic a society the happier are the people in it (Orviska et al, 2012, Owen, 2008, Dorn et al 
2007, Inglehart et al, 2008). To take just one study as an example: In 1999 Bruno Frey and Alois 
Stutzer analysed a survey of 6,000 people across Switzerland to see how direct democracy and 
autonomy in the 26 cantons affected their happiness. They found people were happier in democratic 
polities because they valued the political participation possibilities in a constitutionally guaranteed 
process and that the more decentralised the political decisions, that is the closer they were to the 
citizens, the happier people were. They also found that ‘good government’ contributed to happiness. 
There is a growing body of academic research linking democracy with life-satisfaction and it is for 
this reason the United Nations stated on the cover of its 2002 Development Programme that 
“democracy has proven to be the system of governance most capable of . . . securing and sustaining 
well-being” (UNDP, 2002, cover text). Satisfaction with democracy exists primarily as it provides 
opportunities for people to participate in the political process and have their interests heard and 
represented.  
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 Happiness is not the sole metric for valuing democracy.  Other factors include fairness, justice 
and self-actualisation. The democratic process promotes maximum freedom, personal development 
and opportunity to satisfy political concerns and for all these reasons it has become “virtually the 
only political model with global appeal” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: 264). If it is desirable that human 
beings be moral beings, then moral autonomy must be respected. We need the opportunity to make 
our own choices in life. To restrict or prohibit opportunities for people to live under laws of their 
own choosing and participate in making those laws is to “limit the scope of moral autonomy” (Dahl, 
1989: 91). Furthermore, if the qualities of good citizenship are to be developed by a society then, 
argues Dahl, “it is necessary if not sufficient that the people govern themselves democratically.” In 
order to do so they must have access to the information that allows them to be informed citizens, 
capable of participating in the decision-making process (Dahl 1989: 93). Peter Hennessy highlighted 
the role of access to information in a democracy in his evidence to the Justice Committee in 2012. 
He described FOI as “the completion of the circle” that began with extending the voter franchise: 
“It has to be seen as part of completing the virtues of the franchise in an open society” (HoC, 2012: 
23). It thus follows that the rise of the right to know correlates to an increase in democracy. In 
America and many developing countries FOI was part of a deepening of democracy. Schudson 
describes the rise of the right to know in America: “American politics and society in this era became 
more fully democratic than they were before, and that for all the hazards and shortcomings of 
transparency, its expansion has made our politics more worthy of the name ‘democracy’.” 
(Schudson, 2015: 5). Florini adds that: 
‘As democratic norms become entrenched more widely around the world, it is becoming 
apparent that a broad right of access to information is fundamental to the functioning of a 
democratic society. The essence of representative democracy is informed consent, which 
requires that information about government practices and policies be disclosed. And in 
democracies, by definition, information about government belongs to the people, not the 
government.” (Florini, 2007: 3) 
 
 Many of the arguments against freedom of information are actually arguments against 
democracy, revealing a prejudice and/or preference for elite or aristocratic rule. Plato provided a 
model of an elitist government, which he called “guardianship” in The Republic that endures down 
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the millennia. An elite is someone working for government and ruling organisations, “critical 
intermediaries between the state and the populace, organizing political, economic, religious and 
educational actives, reinforcing existing beliefs and behaviour and recruiting and training new elite 
members.” (Goldstone, 2014: 13). Dahl recognised that, “hierarchy is democracy’s most formidable 
rival; and because the claim of guardianship is a standard justification for hierarchical rule, as an idea 
guardianship is democracy’s most formidable rival” (Dahl 1989: 52).  
Information Elitism 
 Those who advocate guardianship believe the average person is unqualified to govern. They 
have a low view of the common man, both intellectually and morally. Instead, they believe only an 
‘elite’ possess the special knowledge and skill necessary to govern. For the philosopher Plato, the 
elite were philosopher kings. For Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin they were members of the vanguard 
communist party, entitled - even required - to rule due to their special knowledge. For B.F. Skinner, 
a behavioural psychologist, psychologist kings were the answer (Skinner, 1971). What all these 
divergent actors have in common Dahl states is that “each in its own way poses an alternative to 
democracy and challenges the assumption that people are competent to govern themselves” (Dahl, 
1989: 55). 
 Dahl explores the idea that such potentially superior politically competent people exist. If they 
do, their special status must rest on two propositions: 1) that knowing the public good is a science 
that can be measured, so we can judge that certain people are more or less adept at identifying it, 
and 2) that this knowledge can only be obtained by a minority of adults. Plato himself was unable to 
explain why the ‘royal science’ he admired in The Republic could only be learned by an elite of 
philosopher kings, and the argument has failed to withstand examination. Dahl determines that 
sound policy judgements require both moral understanding (virtue) and instrumental (or technical) 
knowledge, but that the one does not entail the other.  A technocrat may have expert knowledge but 
they “are not more qualified than others to make the essential moral judgments. They may be less 
so” (Dahl, 1989: 69). Even more noteworthy is the fact that policy-making is done by taking what 
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has gone before and making predictions about what will happen in the future. Because the future is 
unknown to all humans, no one can have superior knowledge of it. Political judgments cannot be 
based on rational certainty. Instead they are “based on assessments of risk, uncertainty, and trade-
offs” (Dahl, 1989: 75). They require making choices about alternatives where the outcomes are 
based only on probabilities. Often, even the probabilities are unknown. So logically, elites are no 
better at governing that the rest of humanity.  
 The reason the guardianship model is anathema to democracy is that authority is not 
delegated, but permanently alienated from the public. If elites are seen as having a ‘natural’ right to 
rule, it follows that the populous ‘naturally’ must follow. In such circumstances those without voice 
are likely to have their interests unrepresented. For as John Stuart Mill noted in 1861: 
“The rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded 
when the person interested is himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for 
them…Human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they 
have the power of being, and are, self-protecting.” J.S. Mill10 
 
Instrumental effects of transparency 
 The other way to value transparency and FOI is instrumentally. The majority of empirical 
research takes an instrumentalist approach, mostly because the symbolic and principled aspects of 
FOI such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘happiness’ or ‘self-actualisation’ lie in a less measurable realm 
than the instrumental effects. The downside of this is that it is like examining racism only in terms 
of economic while ignoring the fundamental issue of human rights, justice and fairness.  
 Meijer et al’s (2010) study of transparency research found that most studies examine 
transparency for its instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Even in the studies where transparency 
is the main conceptual framework, and the substantive value is at its highest, the majority of 
research - 78.6% compared to 19.6% - focused on the functional aspects of transparency. This is 
evidence of a preference amongst academics for what can be measured more precisely over what 
cannot: the functional, utilitarian value of transparency over its democratic substantive value. On the 
                                                        
10 Mill, John Stuart. [1861] 1958. Considerations on Representative Government Ed. C.V. Shields. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Cited in Dahl, 1989: 76. 
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other hand it may be that the substantive value of transparency to democracy is so obvious as to be 
taken for granted by academics and thus not emphasised (Flanagan, 2007). This is not to completely 
negate the utility value of transparency. Transparency clearly has some useful by-products. Open 
government will reduce conspiracy theories according to a report from the think tank Demos 
(Bartlett & Miller, 2010). Birchall finds that transparency is a more ‘enlightening, honourable mode 
of disclosure’ than narrative interpretive forms of disclosure (Birchall, 2014: 77).  
 In the past decade a series of detailed studies have sought to map to what extent transparency 
has met goals of improving governance and democracy amid a global explosion of new access laws 
(Roberts, 2006; Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006). National studies have examined the use 
and impact of FOI laws in countries, focusing on the effects within public bodies of being opened 
up, in countries as diverse as New Zealand (White, 2007), South Africa (Darch and Underwood, 
2005), Brazil (Michener, 2015), and China (Weibing, 2010). A series of large-scale projects examined 
the way India’s Right to Information law of 2005 has worked in a sometimes hostile environment 
(NCPRI/Raag 2011; NCPRI/CES 2014; Sharma 2015).  
 Focus has also moved to regional and local government in the UK, USA, South Africa and 
South America (Hazell, Worthy and Glover, 2010; Worthy, 2010b; Piotrowksi, 2010; Berliner, 2015) 
all the way up to supranational bodies such as the European Union (Curtin et al, 2014). The 
emphasis has been frequently on the impact of new transparency systems on the operation of public 
institutions and organisation behaviour. Some of the most recent studies seek to better delineate and 
identify the conditions under which transparency improves governance (Kosack & Fung, 2014, and 
the Transparency for Development research project). 
 Some of the most common ‘utilities’, such as the economic or political advantages of 
openness, can work in tandem with intrinsic values as Stiglitz exemplifies (below). Problems arise, 
however, when the instrumental value is entirely detached from the intrinsic value in much the way 
authoritarian regimes create a veneer of democracy to give an illusion of legitimacy. In China, for 
example, FOI was adopted for its instrumental rather than intrinsic value, as an administrative 
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reform to increase efficiency and productivity and decrease corruption. When FOI becomes an 
‘empty signifier’ I view that as a problem to be fixed rather than a model for the future as Stubbs & 
Snell (2014) seem to imply. In these cases, the implementation of an ‘instrumental-only’ FOI law 
could actually be a way of undermining democracy and human rights from within and thus we are 
right to be skeptical of such laws.  
 Three main utility arguments are commonly made about the value of transparency according 
to Meijer et al (2010): 
1. Economic -  a free and open market requires access to information and transparency in order 
to work efficiently (Crombez, 2003, Florini, 1998, Garcia Lorenzo, 2003, Stiglitz, 1999).  
2. Political - Similar to the economic argument but the state is considered ‘the market’ and 
citizens the actors seeking to participate in it. (de Licht 2014, Worthy 2010, Piotrowski and 
Borry, 2010). Within this area, researchers attempt to measure such things as public trust, 
good governance, legitimacy, and participation.   
3. Legal - if we are to act within the law we need to know what the law is. It is the ‘code’ of our 
society.  (Lessig, 1999, O’Neill 1998) 
Economic effects of transparency 
 Stiglitz comes to freedom of information from an economist’s standpoint noting that 
imperfections of information lead to agency problems. He adapts Albert Hirschman’s ideas of ‘exit’ 
and ‘voice’ as the tools used to discipline organisations. As most public organisations are 
monopolies, there is no chance to ‘exit’. If we don’t like the way the local police force is operating 
we can’t go to another. Hence greater importance must be given to ‘voice’ to identify and fix 
organisational issues. In economics it is widely accepted that “better, and more timely, information 
results in better, more efficient, resource allocations” (Stiglitz, 1999: 15). Therefore to restrict access 
to official information is to forgo making the best, most efficient use of resources. But the main 
economic argument against secrecy is that it is so strongly linked to endemic corruption, which 
45 
negatively impacts investment and economic growth. Openness means the public can be assured 
that decisions were made in the public, not private, interest (Stiglitz, 1999).  
There is also the paradox of stability. Too much effort made to control information flows for the 
sake of stability - for example in dictatorships, authoritarian or totalitarian regimes - may give the 
appearance of stability but the cost is catastrophic future instability. This is precisely the loop 
parliament was in when it refused gradual reform or the release of information about the expenses 
system.  
“Just as the economy is likely to be more stable with frequent small adjustments in exchange 
rates than few large ones, so too is the economy more likely to be stable with a steady flow 
of information. With a flow of information, less attention would be paid to any single piece 
and there would be smaller revisions in posterior distributions.“ (Stiglitz, 1999: 21)  
 
Political effects of transparency 
 Transparency has become an accepted cure for all manner of political problems from 
corruption and poor performance to injustice, inefficiency and even voter apathy. (Fung, Graham, 
and Weil 2007; Roberts 2006). While such empirical studies were few there are now a growing 
number examining the effects of transparency (Etzioni 2010: 394). Researchers focus on three main 
functional effects: increased legitimacy, trust and participation.  
 I will begin with increased legitimacy as that has been the main driving force behind the 
transparency rush (de Licht, 2014: 112). De Licht believes this promise “is in fact based mainly on 
intuition” (2014: 112), though it seems more based on Dahl’s ‘intrinsic equality’, that the more a 
polis represents equally the interests of all, the more legitimate those people will find it. De Licht 
tests the hypothesis that transparency generates legitimacy for public and political institutions using 
Tom R. Tyler’s (2006: 375) definition of legitimacy as “a psychological property of an authority, 
institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, 
proper, and just.” She finds that the “common notion of a straightforward positive correlation 
between transparency and legitimacy is rather naïve. The effect is highly dependent on the context 
and may indeed be negative as well as positive.” (2014: 112). In terms of faith in the decision-making 
process, she finds a strong causal relationship, however the transparency need not be ‘fishbowl 
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transparency’. If decision-makers carefully explain their reasoning afterward, even if the decision was 
made behind closed doors, there is an increase in legitimacy.  
 There are three theories about decision-making and legitimacy:  
1. Agency Theory - within a rational choice framework, when the principal (citizen) can “see for 
itself” how well the agent completes its tasks this gives them confidence in delegating 
powers to the agent, reduces suspicion and therefore increases the legitimacy of the agent. 
2. Deliberative Democracy Theory - transparency may contribute to a better understanding of 
the reasons behind a decision and, therefore, to higher levels of legitimacy for both decisions 
and decision makers. It can lead to a better quality of argument and toleration for alternative 
views (de Licht, 2014: 114). Previous studies have found that people prefer decisions made 
based on deliberation rather than bargaining (Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996) 
and thus transparency is seen to have a civilising affect as it shifts decision-making from 
bargaining to deliberation (de Licht, 2014: 122). 
3. Procedural Fairness Theory - how a decision comes about contributes to legitimacy. Decisions 
made in smoke-filled back rooms are considered to be less legitimate than those debated in 
the open. De Licht cites social psychology research (Ambrose, 2002; Napier and Tyler, 2008; 
Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Tyler 2000, 2006; Tyler et al. 1997) indicating people are more 
likely to accept decisions arrived at by a procedure considered fair, and are more satisfied 
with authorities and institutions using such procedures regardless of the outcome (de Licht 
2014: 115).  
   De Licht’s findings showed: 
 “fairly strong support for a positive link between transparency and legitimacy to be found in 
several general theories of decision making…There is a good theoretical reason to believe 
that transparency can generate legitimacy. The more open the decision-making process, and 
the more information the participants get concerning the reasoning behind the chosen 
policy, the higher the procedure acceptance. (2014:124)  
 
Grimes (2012) looked at existing research on the role of civil society in holding public officials to 
account and stopping corruption. She found certain factors were decisive: political competition, 
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government transparency, and press freedom. If these factors are absent, even a rich civil society 
would not be effective (p380). 
 What if the public never use the law some scholars ask (Roberts, 2006; Worthy, 2010b)? 
Studies are divided between those who see laws as having an effect by their very existence (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 2002) and others that laws need to be used (Meijer et al, 2012). The former argue 
that the mere presence or potential of a law creates better outcomes through ‘anticipated reactions’. 
 Another of transparency’s promised effects is to increase participation in politics. The idea 
here is that in order to be informed citizens we first need information and only then can we 
meaningfully engage in politics. Information empowers citizens as rational actors. The rational actor 
theory supposes that if people are given enough information they will make good choices and 
decisions (Florini, 2007). This omits people’s ability to process the information and take reasonable 
action as a result. There is a good deal of psychological research showing that humans do not make 
decisions based solely on reason but rather a mixture of ‘wired in,’ congenital, systematic cognitive 
biases. (Etzioni, 2010: 398, referencing the work by Daniel Kahneman among others). As O’Neill 
stated earlier, knowledge requires more than simply the disclosure of information. Thus we find in 
the corporate world, “disclosure documents . . . are written by corporate lawyers in formalized 
language to protect the corporation from liability rather than to provide the investor with 
meaningful information,” (O’Neill cited in Ripkin, 2006: 186) It is for these reasons, among others 
that Etzioni concludes that strong transparency cannot replace regulation.  
 Grimes (2012) found that as transparency increases, so does the “strength of the relationship 
between civil society density and government probity.” She notes a similar pattern with press 
freedom; “increasing press freedom incrementally strengthens the connection between a vibrant 
associational life and good government”.  Her findings corroborate the hypothesis of Dahl and 
others that public oversight and the right to demand access to government documents are “needed 
preconditions for societal accountability to occur. Government transparency in the form of access 
to information laws can enable societal actors to substantiate grievances regarding abuses and in so 
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doing present a more plausible call for investigative and punitive actions on the part of formal 
institutions of accountability.” (Grimes, 2012: 398) 
Trust & Transparency 
 Trust is also a factor in participation and legitimacy. In my view, this is the least relevant or 
useful. Transparency is a condition that allows us to better see reality as it is. Therefore it is a 
mistake to try and measure its success in such a way that the condition for seeing reality supersedes 
reality itself.  It would be like determining the value of spectacles by whether or not they showed the 
viewer more beauty. The value of the glasses is simply to see clearly.  It is also incorrect to assume 
trust is an absolute good. We might argue that humanity’s greatest progress came not through trust 
but skepticism, that is to say, distrust. The Enlightenment, and specifically the scientific method, 
rejected “truths”, even those handed down by authority if they could not be experienced with one’s 
own senses or verified through evidence. In politics, too, there was an Enlightenment view that 
skepticism was superior to trust, hence the famous quote attributed to Thomas Jefferson (among 
others) that “the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.”11 It cannot be a bad thing that we no longer 
place blind faith in authority figures as so many abuse scandals occurred precisely because deference 
was valued over equality or accountability. Nevertheless, there are plenty of academics and 
politicians who prefer to focus on transparency as a means to increase public trust in government 
rather than the reality that transparency exposes. The value must be on citizens’ ability to see reality.  
 Alasdair Roberts (2006) believes transparency has little effect on trust because other factors 
are more important. He found trust did not increase in either Canada or the United States after 
adoption of FOI laws but noted that such a causal conclusion could be spurious (Roberts 2006: 
119), and to me this seems highly likely. Worthy (2010b) studied the effects of the UK FOIA and 
found that it had “made government more open and, in certain situations, more accountable. It has 
not achieved many of the wider democratic goals its supporters hoped because the goals were not 
                                                        
11 The quote is most often traced back to John Philpot Curran: "The condition upon which God hath given liberty to 
man is eternal vigilance; which condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of his crime and the 
punishment of his guilt.11"See the Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia: 
http://wiki.monticello.org/mediawiki/index.php/Eternal_vigilance_is_the_price_of_liberty_Quotation and also Suzy 
Platt, ed., Respectfully Quoted (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1993), 200.  
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realistic and the political environment presents too many obstacles.” (p563) The Justice Committee 
(2012) also felt it was incorrect to set a goal of increasing trust for FOI.  Grimmelikhuijsen (2013) 
summarises trust in government as comprised of competence, effectiveness, benevolence and 
honesty. He finds in a 2011 study that objective copy on a government website may not increase 
trust as much as positive propaganda. To my mind this is yet another reason why trust is the wrong 
metric to gauge FOI effectiveness. In a 2013 study Grimmelikhuijsen finds that transparency has “a 
subdued and sometimes negative effect” on trust in government (2013: 577). He presents what he 
calls transparency optimists and pessimists. The former are those who believe transparency will 
increase trust in government (he cites Bok, 1997; Cook et al, 2010 as examples); the latter are those 
who believe transparency either has no effect or a negative effect on trust (he mentions O’Neill, 
2002, Bannister and Connolly, 2011 and I would also add Schudson, 2015). Grimmelikhuijsen 
(2013) studied the effects of transparency and trust on South Korea versus the Netherlands (2013) 
and found transparency had a greater negative impact on South Koreans than the Dutch which he 
attributed to the fact that South Korean culture is paternalistic with a ‘high power distance’ between 
leaders and citizens, where power inequalities in society are accepted and seen as normal (p 579). 
Precisely because they are so dependent and vulnerable to government, the South Koreans were 
more unsettled by information that showed their leaders to be anything other than omniscient or all-
powerful. The Dutch by contrast took such information in stride, seeming to view their leaders as 
fallible human beings just like them. The Netherlands is a more established democracy with a ‘low-
power distance’. Power is decentralised and citizens value being independent and having equal 
rights. Grimmelikhuijsen concludes that if trust is the metric, then transparency “fits less in cultures 
that possess higher power distances” (p583) which is yet another reason why trust is not the correct 
metric. It is precisely in those political systems of high-power distance where transparency is most 
necessary and needed. The reason the South Koreans reacted more negatively to transparency is 
because their perceptions were further from actual reality. Enforced ignorance had given them the 
delusion that their leaders were omniscient and superior - a ‘natural elite’ - and this myth kept them 
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subordinate. Here we see the Radical Enlightenment aspect of transparency. It is “essentially a 
power-reducing mechanism”, a means to hold the powerful to account (p 583). 
 More recent studies show that increased trust through transparency is an overly optimistic 
proposition. “The main lesson is that public officials and political leaders should expect no wonders 
from transparency. It is no magic or universal cure for trust in government.” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 
2013: 584) To sum up: a good reality may lead to a good public perception of reality. A poor reality 
is likely to lead to a poor public perception of reality. Thus officials and politicians would do better 
to focus more on improving reality itself and less on manipulating how that reality is perceived by 
the public.  
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Chapter 4: Privacy 
 
Privacy and Freedom of Information 
It strikes some people as odd that with my track record for opening up governments and publishing 
previously secret state data, that I should be actively involved in Privacy International12, an NGO 
that campaigns for privacy rights. I have been an advisor to that group since 2004 and a Trustee 
since 2013. A greater understanding of both topics makes it clear that these two rights are more 
complementary than in conflict. “They are both laws designed, in part, to ensure the accountability 
of the state” (Banisar, 2011: 16) and for this reason the Council of Europe recommend that the roles 
of FOI and privacy are “not mutually distinct but form part of the overall information policy in 
society” (Banisar, 2011: 9 citing Council of Europe 1986). Some states implement the two rights 
using one law, as is the case with Mexico and Thailand, whereas others have two separate laws. 
Where the laws are separate, conflict can arise if the laws are not designed in harmony with one 
another as shown in the diagram below.  
  
 The UK provides an example of a state with two laws: the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
and the Data Protection Act 1998. Additionally, in December 2015, a new EU General Data 
Protection Regulation was finalised along with a new Data Protection Directive that covers law 
enforcement, and in November 2015 the UK Government published a new Investigatory Power Bill 
covering surveillance, interception and the use of bulk personal datasets. In the current UK FOI 
law, personal information is exempt but only in the sense that its release is covered by the data 
                                                        
12 Privacy International is an organization that fights for people’s privacy as a human right. See: 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/5 
Source: Banisar, 2011: 9 
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protection principles outlined in the DPA 1998. The primary principle is that of ‘fairness’ which 
includes such factors as how the information was obtained, the data subject’s expectation of privacy, 
the effect of disclosure, consent, and, importantly, the public interest. The final point means that 
even if the data subject refuses consent and believes some harm might occur, disclosure is warranted 
if it is in the public interest. It was on these grounds that I fought my legal case for parliamentary 
expenses. In fact, much of my work – particularly the title and theme of The Silent State (2011) – 
focuses on the inversion of the rights to information and privacy: with the private citizen going 
about their private business made transparent through state surveillance while the powerful state 
cloaks itself in opacity and public officials use the privacy exemption to avoid public accountability.  
 The European Ombudsman warned as early as 2001 that the EU data protection rules were 
“being used to undermine the principle of openness in public activities13”. The UK Information 
Commissioner, too, issued guidance in 2004 warning that public bodies were using the DPA 
incorrectly: “The purpose of the Data Protection Act is to protect the private lives of individuals. 
Where information requested is about the people acting in a work or official capacity then it will 
normally be right to disclose” (FOI Awareness Guidance No. 1: Personal Information, 200414). 
Australian freedom of information expert Nigel Waters noted a similar pattern: “There is a 
continued problem of privacy exemptions in FOI law being misused and getting privacy a bad 
name. This makes a major contribution to the widespread jaundiced media view of privacy law, even 
though it is not actually privacy law that is to blame.” (Cited in Banisar, 2011: 16). The EU 
Ombudsman concluded that many public officials believe they have a fundamental right to 
participate anonymously in public activities, however, “Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights does not establish such a right. Furthermore, any such right would be incompatible 
with the principle of openness and the right of public access, because to conceal the identities of 
                                                        
13 European Ombudsman, 2001, The misuse of data protection rules in the European Union. Case: 713/98/(IJH)GG. 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/correspondence.faces/en/3538/html.bookmark. Last accessed 15 March 
2016 
14 This guidance was replaced to include my case High Court victory for MPs’ expenses. (See 
 https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1213/personal-information-section-40-and-regulation-13-foia-
and-eir-guidance.pdf 
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those participating in public activities would deprive the citizen of the possibility to understand and 
monitor those activities effectively15.”  
 This view is certainly endemic among UK public officials from my experience, which I 
document in Part Two. Former U.K. Cabinet Secretary Sir Richard Wilson, the highest-ranking U.K. 
civil servant, articulated this belief in 2002, testifying, “I believe that a certain amount of privacy is 
essential to good government16.” It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the privacy exemption 
has been, and remains, the most commonly cited by public bodies according to the U.K. Ministry of 
Justice (FOI Statistics: Implementation in Central Government 201517).  
 The publication of registries and civic information is also affected by views on privacy. In the 
second part of this thesis I discuss the vastly different journalism practices and cultures between the 
US (where I trained and initially worked as a reporter) and the UK where I subsequently lived and 
worked. I will argue that US journalism is practiced in a more professional, empirical manner due in 
large part to the volume of registries and civic information that can be legitimately accessed by the 
public. As a crime reporter in the US, I could listen to emergency services dispatch, see all arrest 
bookings and police incident reports, all of which are illegal to access in the UK due primarily to 
stated privacy concerns. To me, it was odd that in a country where suspicionless surveillance is 
endemic, the state had decided citizens weren’t ‘allowed’ to know the details of the crimes that were 
happening around them. While there are certainly privacy considerations to be made they must be 
balanced with expectations of privacy and the best interest of society. The net result in the US has 
been that the American public are able to see the machinery of government in a way that is simply 
not possible in the UK. Additionally, because British journalists cannot legitimately access such civic 
records and information, they are necessarily reliant instead on sources, innuendo, rumour and leaks. 
Their reporting is often not grounded on facts that can be independently verified. I will argue that 
                                                        
15 European Ombudsman, 2001, The misuse of data protection rules in the European Union. Case: 713/98/(IJH)GG. 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/correspondence.faces/en/3538/html.bookmark Last accessed 15 March 
2016). 
16 Testimony of Sir Richard Wilson before the Select Committee on Public Administration, U.K. House of Commons, 
July 11, 2002. 
17 These are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-foi-statistics. 
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one of the ways to professionalise journalism and make it more fact-based and empirical is to 
increase the amount of civic information easily accessible to the public in a timely way. We are 
already seeing this with a beta trial of Companies House, which provides instant and free access to 
the companies register.  
What is Privacy? 
 Andrew McStay in his book Privacy and Philosophy contends that privacy is a “basic and primal 
premise” (p1) that has no finite meaning but rather is a “rallying word for a cluster of interests” (p2). 
It “modulates and informs the principles of connection with others” (p159) in terms of control, 
dignity and respect for self/others. As such privacy comprises both openness and seclusion. It may 
be implemented differently in different communities but as a way of establishing norms of 
interaction with others, he argues – and I agree - it is universal (p159). It is, he writes, an “emergent 
protocol that contributes to the governance of interaction among people and objects” (p4). It does 
not have substance but it does have real affects on behaviour, psychology, organisations and 
individuals. McStay argues that liberalism gave privacy its modern form focused on consent and for 
this reason he argues that the ethical onus for modifying or altering privacy norms must make the 
case for such change and obtain the full consent of community members. “To do otherwise is an act 
of force” (159). Privacy is always open for redefinition but as McStay says we should examine 
carefully the “motives of those who seek to redefine privacy protocols.” (160). 
 Another modern definition of privacy was developed in the 1890s, a time of great 
technological change. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their famous article, ‘The Right to 
Privacy’ in 1890 which is credited with the creation of modern privacy law, especially in the United 
States. It framed discussion of privacy throughout the 20th century (Solove, 2002: 1100). Warren 
and Brandeis defined privacy as “the right to be left alone” and their article was noteworthy for 
attempting to translate the harm of privacy invasion into tort law. Unlike loss of income or even 
reputation, the harm from privacy invasion was psychological rather than material, a fact which 
remains a difficulty in legislating against privacy invasion today. Courts find it difficult to define both 
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the invasion and the harm. However, in the 1928 the US Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United 
States [277 U.S. 438 (1928)] Brandeis, by then a Supreme Court Judge, wrote a robust dissent 
disagreeing with the Court’s ruling that wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
protecting against unwarranted search and seizure because it was not a physical trespass on the 
home.  He argued that the framers of the US Constitution “conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.” (id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting.) His dissent set a benchmark for privacy law and policy, 
changing the way people think about privacy and setting in motion a movement to develop privacy 
as a ‘right’. Today privacy is considered a qualified, fundamental human right, articulated in all of the 
major international and regional human rights instruments, including the: 
• United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, Article 12: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor 
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks.” 
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, Article 17: “1. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. 2. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
 According to Privacy International and Banisar (2011) over 130 countries have constitutional 
statements regarding the protection of privacy, in every region of the world. Over 100 countries 
have some form of privacy and data protection law. More than 60 countries have comprehensive 
data protection acts based on the fair information practices and most of these laws follow the 
structure of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data and the European Union (EU) Data Protection Directive 
(recently updated as mentioned earlier). The UK adopted its first Data Protection Act in 1984. This 
was replaced in 1998 in order to implement EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. In 2000, the 
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FOIA was adopted and the data protection commissioner became the information commissioner in 
charge of overseeing both acts. Personal data is defined in the UK Act as: “data which relate to a 
living individual who can be identified—(a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other 
information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data 
controller” (Data Protection Act 199818 c. 29 Part I Section 1). 
 Today’s privacy advocates define privacy more as a set of attributes (or as McStay calls them 
‘affective events’) rather than a static state. Gus Hosein, the CEO of Privacy International defines it 
as:  
“an essential way we seek to protect ourselves and society against arbitrary and unjustified 
use of power, by reducing what can be known about us and done to us, while protecting us 
from others who may wish to exert control…Privacy helps us establish boundaries to limit 
who has access to our bodies, places and things, as well as our communications and our 
information.” (2015). 
 
David Banisar, Senior Legal Counsel for Article 19 and author of the World Bank’s report The Right 
to Information and Privacy defines privacy as being “essential in protecting an individual’s ability to 
develop ideas and personal relationships” and that it is “commonly recognised as a core right that 
underpins human dignity and such other values as freedom of association and freedom of speech” 
(Banisar, 2011: 6). Privacy scholar Daniel Solove writes of privacy as a “ sweeping concept” that can 
encompass many things including freedom of thought, control over one's body, solitude in one's 
home, control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one's 
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations - essentially the Brandeis right to be left 
alone (Solove, 2002:1089).  
 Privacy is contextual and dynamic rather than static (Solove, 2002; Cohen, 2013). In Your Right 
to Know, I write that privacy is not a fixed concept but operates on a continuum “with private 
individuals going about their private lives having the greatest expectation of privacy, and public 
officials conducting the public’s business having the least” (Brooke, 2007: 280). Bakir and McStay 
advanced a similar idea with their visibility slider (2015). What is considered private and/or personal 
                                                        
18 Accessible at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/1 
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information varies among cultures and even among individuals within the same culture, affected by 
cultural norms and past experiences. Some cultures place the needs of the collective above the needs 
of the individual, while in Germany, for example, there is great sensitivity to individual privacy due 
to past abuses by the state.  Even so the dynamic aspect of privacy and the difficulty of showing 
tangible ‘harm’ from its invasion continues to make it challenging in both legal and legislative arenas.  
 Cohen (2013) believes the difficulty is exacerbated due to the way legal scholarship, starting 
with Brandeis, conceptualised privacy as a form of protection for the liberal self. 
“So characterized, privacy is reactive and ultimately in-essential. Its absence may at times 
chill the exercise of constitutionally protected liberties, but because the liberal self inherently 
possesses the capacity for autonomous choice and self-determination, loss of privacy does 
not vitiate that capacity.” (Cohen, 2013: 1905). 
 
Instead, she argues that the ‘self’ is not a fixed rational actor but rather dynamic and socially 
constructed, hence privacy is essential in the formation of this emergent subjectivity away from the 
state and corporate desire to “render all individuals fixed, transparent and predictable” (Cohen: 
1905). Solove (2002) also views privacy as dynamic with the self operating in a social environment. 
His practical suggestion for thinking about privacy is to look at instances where privacy invasion 
interferes with or destroys certain practices we want to protect. Instead of trying to conceptualise 
privacy as a fixed thing, it is better to focus on the specific practices we want to protect and specific 
invasions that interfere with them. What most advocates and scholars agree should be protected are 
the formation of personal beliefs, identify and opinion - all practices of self determination which are 
so essential in a democracy. I used this model when making arguments for privacy protection while 
participating on the Independent Surveillance Panel that examined state surveillance.  
Privacy and technology 
 Privacy and technology are interconnected. Brandeis and Warren were spurred to write their 
article on privacy due to the arising threat they saw from new technologies. In the information age, 
privacy has evolved to address new issues related to new technologies, such as the collection, use, 
and sharing of personal data in networked information systems. In the early days of digitisation and 
the internet, the benefits of these new technologies dominated discussion. Writers such as Clay 
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Shirky, Jeff Jarvis and Tim Wu produced numerous books, articles and talks extolling the virtues of 
the digital revolution. Internet skeptic Evgeny Morozov calls this tendency to glorify new 
technology, “techno-utopian solutionism” (Morozov, 2013). Gradually it became apparent that the 
technology that was supposed to ‘set us free’ could also help lock us up. As I wrote in The Revolution 
Will be Digitised: ‘We have the technology to build a new type of democracy but equally we might 
create a new type of totalitarianism.” (Brooke, 2012: xi). Morozov made a similar observation in The 
Net Delusion (2011) about the resilience with which authoritarian and secretive, hierarchal regimes 
were countering the promised digital ‘Age of Openness’. Cyber utopians “did not predict how useful 
it [the Internet] would prove for propaganda purposes, how masterfully dictators would learn to use 
it for surveillance, and how sophisticated modern system of Internet censorship would become.” 
(Morozov, 2012: xiv). Technology is and always will be amoral. It is up to us how we use it. As 
Morozov notes, technology “penetrates and reshapes all walks of political life, not just the ones 
conducive to democratisation.” (xiv). 
 Dahl made a similar observation about technology: “It can be used to damage democratic 
values and the democratic process, or it can be used to promote them. Without a conscious and 
deliberate effort to use the new technology of telecommunications in behalf of democracy, it may 
well be used in ways harmful to democracy.” (Dahl, 1989: 339). As other critics have subsequently 
pointed out, it is perfectly possible to bend technology to suit the needs of bureaucracies and power.  
Thus the same technology invested with so much promise by democracy advocates, also became the 
means to fulfil dreams of omniscience as discussed in the next chapter. While Silicon Valley was on 
a mission to organise the world’s information, American and British intelligence agencies were 
attempting to “master the internet”. More than at any other time in history, the state can match its 
desire to know “with the means to collect, monitor, and (even) predict the behaviours of their 
subjects/citizens.” (Quill, 2014: 10). Whether or not this makes ‘us’ safer depends on who this ‘us’ 
refers to and how we define safety and freedom. The idea that we can identify bad people from 
algorithms is simplistic. McStay posits that a variety of innovations in data analyses have increasingly 
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given machines “a verisimilitude of knowing” by means of their predictive capacities with veracity 
measured in “the extent to which they can pass-off understanding” by predicting what we might 
click or purchase (McStay, 2014: 87). He writes that while we can assume for now that “machines do 
not understand being-in-the-world” their evolving capacity to preempt and map ‘being-in-the-world’ 
raises questions about the nature of self and knowledge (McStay, 2014: 154). Ambitious projects 
such as the Brain Activity Map aim to map the activity of every neuron in real time and if 
successfully funded could be as ground-breaking as the Human Genome Project. Even so, biologist 
Edward O. Wilson maintains that even if the project succeeds, the ‘self’ can never be known 
because it is an illusion, confabulated by the physical brain. To know the mind of an individual 
would require opening up all memories both conscious and unconscious and taking into account 
random chance and the:  
“legions of communicating cells, which shift in discordant patterns that cannot even be 
imagined by the conscious minds they compose. The cells are bombarded every instant by 
outside stimuli unpredictable by human intelligence. Any one of these events can entrain a 
cascade of changes in local neural patterns, and scenarios of individual minds changed by 
them are all but infinite in detail. The content is dynamic, changing instant to instant in 
accordance with the unique history and physiology of the individual.” (Wilson, 2014: 169-70) 
 
  There is an argument, made primarily by those in the intelligence services or senior officials, 
that if most of the ‘looking’ is done by computers, there is no privacy invasion. Former director of 
the UK signals intelligence agency GCHQ David Omand routinely made this case: “These 
computers are not conscious beings: they will only select that which they are lawfully programmed 
to select. To describe this process as monitoring all our communications or ‘the surveillance state’ or 
a ‘snooper's charter’ is wholly misleading and a perverse reading of the situation.” (Omand, 2013). In 
the U.S. courts have often interpreted the Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure) as applying only when information is exposed to possible human observation, 
rather than copied or processed by a computer (Deeks, 2015). However, European courts are 
increasingly ruling that surveillance starts from the moment information is collected. The European 
Court of Justice condemned interception systems that provide states with ‘generalised access’ to the 
content of communications in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014 IEHC 310]. This 
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has been followed by the European Court of Human Rights decision in Zakharov v. Russia19 and 
Szabó and Vissy v Hungary20, which took a similar view of surveillance and its impact on privacy. 
Additionally in his first report the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy, Joseph Cannataci, argued 
strongly that, “legislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a generalised basis to 
the content of electronic communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the [EU] Charter.” 21 
 A substantial difficulty in measuring the success and/or proportionality of mass/bulk 
surveillance is the lack of transparency or accountability about information processing practices 
(both corporate and state) so claims are not testable. In The Revolution Will be Digitised I argue the 
safety promised by mass government surveillance is more comforting illusion than reality and it also 
has a number of downsides both for democracy and human autonomy. Cohen argues that effective 
privacy protection requires “regulatory scrutiny of information processing activity on both sides of 
the public-private divide” (Cohen 2013: 1931). 
 Technology has the ability to magnify power in general but rates of adoption vary. Small 
groups and individuals can adapt faster to new technology than large institutions, and so for a time, 
technology was able to empower small groups and individuals in relation to the state. Noted security 
engineer Bruce Schneier22 estimates that it took about a decade for traditional power to adapt to new 
technologies but once they did, their vast powers were magnified exponentially. Tom Steinberg, the 
creator and founder of civic technology organisation My Society, writes in his essay ‘The Pill versus 
the Bomb: What Digital Technologists Need to Know About Power’: 
“few people are less happy these days than privacy campaigners. The fact that everyone 
carries sensor laden mobile phones makes national security agencies more powerful than they 
were before. Even where privacy protecting technologies exist, they cannot be said to be 
equal and opposite in effect to the ubiquitous computing we now live amongst. Mobile 
                                                        
19 Roman Zakharov v Russia [2015] ECHR, App no 47143/06 (4 December 2015): http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
159324 
20Szabó and Vissy v Hungary [2016] ECHR, App no. 37138/14 (12 January 2016): 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-160020 
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, 8 March 2016. 
22  The future of Internet, Privacy & Security by Bruce Schneier (October 2013). Tedx Cambridge. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZnKcDnapuY Last accessed 15 January 2015. 
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computing is a permanently power shifting technology that permanently empowers the 
security services.” (Steinberg, 2015) 
 
The technology now exists to enable companies and governments to monitor our conversations, 
commercial transactions and movements and to make predictive decisions about us based on this 
data. Not only are there more technologies to surveil citizens, but also more entities that want to do 
so. The internet’s business model has become one based on surveillance (Richards, 2013: 1936). It 
used to cost states money and resources to spy on its citizens, now thanks to technology we have a 
variety and scope of surveillance that is “unprecedented in human history” (Richards, 2013: 1936). I 
will turn to that now. 
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Chapter 5: Surveillance 
 
In his essay, ‘On Publicity’ Bentham focused on transparency of the state rather than the citizen: 
“Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular government.” 
Although he is best known for his epistolary essays on the panopticon, an imagined prison where 
“the essence of it consists in the centrality of the inspector’s situation, combined with the well-
known and most effectual contrivances for seeing without being seen.” (Bentham, 1995: 43), the 
power of the inspector is checked by the public. Bentham makes the case for the sort of public 
disclosure that is common today. The prison official, he writes, would be required to “disclose and 
even to print and publish his accounts - the whole process and detail of his management…” and 
that “From the information thus got from him, I derive this advantage [no corruption]. In the case 
of his ill success I see the causes of it, and not only I, but every body else that pleases may see the 
causes of it…In the case of his good success, I see the causes of that too; and everybody sees 
them…” (Bentham 1995:53). We might therefore credit Bentham as being the precursor to 
Transparency International, an NGO whose remit is to use transparency as a means to stop 
corruption. 
 Even so, it is worth taking a further look at the panopticon as it can be credited with inspiring 
more than just transparency of the state. First, we should note that the prison inspector/contractor 
is allowed a good deal more privacy in relation to the public than the powerless prisoners have in 
relation to him. The purpose of the panopticon is to make prisoners believe they are truly 
transparent at all times, the better to control them using their own self-censorship.  The 
fundamental advantage of the panopticon is ‘the apparent omnipresence of the 
inspector…combined with the extreme facility of his real presence.’ (45) More worrying, Bentham 
identified a “new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind”(1995, preface). 
 In the panopticon, Bentham provides a symbolic structure of top down transparency or what 
Heald calls ‘transparency upwards’, which he defines as when “the hierarchical superior/principal 
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can observe the conduct, behaviour, and/or ‘results’ of the hierarchal subordinate/agent.” (Heald 
2006a: 3). This is the opposite of ‘transparency downwards’ which is when the ruled can observe 
their rulers. McStay (2014) calls this type of transparency where the state is transparent and the 
citizens opaque ‘liberal transparency’. This is a feature of democratic life. Heald has two further 
classifications: transparency outwards - when the hierarchical subordinate or agent can observe what 
is happening ‘outside’ the organisation, and transparency inwards - when those outside an 
organisation can see what is going on inside. This type of transparency is relevant to FOI 
(Birkinshaw, 2005: 16-73) but also surveillance. As Heald notes, East Germany under the Stasi was a 
highly transparent society as citizens informed on each other. Privacy involves setting limits on this 
type of transparency. Bakir and McStay (2015) integrate such concerns over control and choice in 
their transparency topology and visibility slider. In addition to ‘liberal transparency described above, 
they use the term ‘radical transparency’ when all are made transparent with the utilitarian aim that 
this will be for the greater good. They posit that in such an environment, resistance to transparency 
is seen as a sign of guilt with arguments that “if you’ve nothing to hide, you’ve nothing to fear”. This 
leads to ‘forced transparency’ where people are made transparent without their knowledge or 
consent. From their consultations with academics and others they found the common view was that 
“we are in a position of forced transparency” (p33).   
 Transparency must enable ‘inward observability’ and Grimmelikhuijsen defines this as “the 
availability of information about an organisation or actor that allows external actors to monitor the 
internal workings or performance of that organisation.” (2013: 576) This is what John Keane called 
‘monitory democracy’ and was discussed in previous chapters. By contrast, the Panopticon 
embodies a long-held desire by those in power for total knowledge of their subjects. The belief rests 
on an idea that if rulers could only identify, mark and watch those they rule, they could control the 
population and thus secure safety and stability for the themselves and state. It is a belief that became 
popular as the police and security services professionalised in the nineteenth century and 
criminology became a discipline that promised scientific identification of criminals (Quill, 2014). 
65 
Such identification required an increase in the data gathered on citizens. It thus became possible to 
“see like a state” (Scott, 1999). Michel Foucault identified the way modern states were increasingly 
turning individuals into scientific cases to be studied, and the least powerful in society were also 
becoming the most transparent: "the child is more individualised than the adult, the patient more 
than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-
delinquent." (Foucault, 1977: 193). Mass surveillance was a more subtle and more effective means of 
controlling people by creating a prison of their own minds. Gilles Delueze called these “societies of 
control” which replaced “disciplinary societies” (Deleuze, 2002: 4). In the disciplinary societies 
“power individualises and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power 
into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body.” (Deleuze, 2002: 5). In the 
societies of control, all are reduced to data. 
Seeing like a state 
 Lawrence Quill contends that modern states have an insatiable desire to know about their 
populations (Quill, 2014:69). At best to better serve their needs by providing efficient services, at 
worst to keep them under control and check any and all challenge to their power. Mass democracies 
combined with industrial capitalism "cemented bureaucracy as the modern form of human 
organization" (Quill: 77), thus an intimate link exists between knowledge production, secrecy and 
bureaucracy. Some academics say that modern societies are by definition surveillance societies 
(Dandekar, 1990; Lyon, 2003).  
 James C. Scott in his book Seeing Like a State sums up the desire of the modern state for 
omniscience into a belief he calls ‘’high modernism’ that is man’s attempt to design society not 
based on practical intelligence, deliberation or debate but rather what are considered to be scientific 
laws. So the first goal is to make the subject population fixed, transparent and readable. Second, to 
fit people into administrative categories for their continuous surveillance. Third to mould people 
through a process of ‘internal colonisation’. “The builders of the modern nation-state do not merely 
describe, observe, and map; they strive to shape a people and landscape that will fit their techniques 
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of observation." (Scott, 1999: 82). There is an inherent conflict with the principles of democracy in 
this way of thinking. As Quill writes:  
"The state's 'desire to know' the lives of its citizens and the officially sanctioned knowledge 
that is developed and promulgated throughout the institutions of society produce an 
irresolvable tension between a commitment to scientific improvement and management of 
that society and those of publicity, the principles of individual liberty, and deliberative 
democracy." (Quill:76) 
 
With such a powerful structure Quill asks: “Can ‘publicity’ make any inroads within this technocratic 
fantasy?” (76).  
 There is a ‘reason of state’ tradition put forward initially by the sociologist Max Weber, which 
views the state as having a life of its own with its own desires for survival and growth that can put it 
in opposition to the demos. Weber identified ‘the internal dynamic of specific power structures’ that 
manifest in a political culture that emerges in all institutions. He characterised this culture as 
competitive, paranoid and insecure, and posited that institutions will react just as any organism in 
nature would, to feelings of endangerment by seeking to protect itself at all costs: usually through 
the mechanism of secrecy, deception and lies. Weber believed war illustrated this dynamic most 
clearly as there was always an ‘official’ version of events that was inevitably laden with secrets and 
lies that hid the true reality, but that this practice was common, if less obvious, even in peacetime.  
"Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by 
keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to 
be an administration of the 'secret session'; in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and 
action from criticism." (Weber, 1946: 233).  
 
For Weber, secrecy was utilised anywhere "the power interests of the dominant structure towards 
the outside are at stake,” which grants to the powerful wide latitude. Quill writes of how, “state 
officials came to recognize that states possessed interests independent of their populations," and as a 
result they set themselves apart from the rest of society (Quill: 73).  Also, in Weber's view the often 
conflicting interests of politicians versus bureaucrats came together in their common desire to 
carefully manage the demos. Both had a tendency to view themselves as superior to the masses who 
were seen as emotional, politically naive and easily manipulated by secrecy and lies, which if done in 
the interests of the state was deemed morally justifiable. (Weber, 1946).  
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 Quill also makes the case that secrecy is part of the “epistemic project of statehood” (10), and 
that the state’s desire to know about its inhabitants is matched only by an equal compulsion to 
remain hidden from them. I came to a similar view from my journalistic investigations into the 
British state, summing up these opposing desires of making citizens transparent while remaining 
cloaked in secrecy, with the title of my second book The Silent State. The power of the state derives 
not just from its monopoly of force, but also its monopoly over secrets and secret collection. This is 
in contrast to the citizens’ powerlessness to keep secrets from the state or discover those the state 
doesn’t want the people to know. (Quill: 69). The state views the disclosure of its own secrets as a 
matter of the utmost seriousness, as an existential threat and this is the reasoning behind the often 
brutal and disproportionate response which I saw first-hand while reporting on Wikileaks and 
subsequent leaks. In 2013 Boston hacktivist Aaron Swartz who features in my Revolution book, 
committed suicide after he was arrested for downloading academic articles from JSTOR and facing 
up to 35 years in prison23 for this crime.  
 Attitudes toward official secrecy are paradoxical. Pozen says, “The use of state secrets appears 
both more pervasive in practice and more discredited in the public mind than at any point in 
history.” (Pozen, 2010: 260) The openness and spread of FOI that developed after the Cold War 
came to an abrupt end after September 11th. Ironically, while politicians pronounced that terrorists 
would not destroy our democratic values and way of life, they simultaneously began to dismantle the 
very policies that set democracies apart from dictatorships. Peter Hennessy described the years 
following 9/11 as an “unprecedented extension of the legal and technical capacity of the state as a 
result of its counter-terrorism strategies” (Hennessy, 2010). Quill makes the point that the state’s 
ability to collect and analyse information gives it power over the production of accepted and 
acceptable knowledge in a process he calls ‘political epistemology’.  Thus the state can determine 
and entrench orthodoxy. It makes certain ideas unthinkable in the same way Orwell describes in his 
novel 1984:  
                                                        
23 See my blogpost about this: http://heatherbrooke.org/2013/a-few-thoughts-on-the-death-of-hacktivist-aaron-swartz/ 
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“The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-
view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of 
through impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all 
and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging from the principles 
of Ingsoc - should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. 
(Orwell:312) 
 
Surveillance scholars agreed that while surveillance by government and others can have many 
purposes, a recurrent purpose is to control behaviour. Reviewing the vast surveillance studies 
literature, David Lyon concludes that surveillance is primarily about power, but it is also about 
personhood.  Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as “the focused, systematic and routine 
attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon, 
2007:14). Gathering information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched, 
giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveillance. This is because 
personal information is powerful. Lyon identifies three main dangers of systematic, focused and 
routine surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion. (Lyon, 2007 also cited in Richards, 
2013: 1937, 1953). 
Surveillance and democracy 
 There are benefits to surveillance, otherwise people would not accept it. All three reports 
commissioned after the Snowden disclosures – the Intelligence and Security Committee (2015), 
Anderson (2015) and RUSI (2015) – accepted the position of the security services and government 
officials that bulk surveillance is an important and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism and 
cyber crime.  Recommendation 8 in the RUSI report of which I was a member notes: “The 
capability of the security and intelligence agencies to collect and analyse intercepted material in bulk 
should be maintained with stronger safeguards as set out in the Anderson Report. In particular, 
warrants for bulk interception should include much more detail than is the case currently and be the 
subject of a judicial authorization.”  I had reservations about this blanket acceptance (Brooke, July 
2015) but it was difficult to argue a contrary case in the absence of data that could either verify or 
disprove officials’ claims that bulk surveillance was an essential tool in the fight against crime and 
terror.  
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 In the commercial arena, we have a seemingly ‘free’ internet and online services that people 
can enjoy. By tracking our preferences and location, companies can offer convenience and more 
relevant services. However, often customers are not aware, nor have meaningful choice, of what 
personal information is collected and how it is used and shared. Why should this matter? 
 Several scholars have examined the relationship between surveillance, particularly large-scale 
surveillance, and democracy. Not only does surveillance impact on individuals but also liberal 
democracy. Cohen argues that a society that permits “the unchecked ascendancy of surveillance 
infrastructures cannot hope to remain a liberal democracy.” (Cohen, 2013: 1912). Richards (2013) 
identifies two main harms resulting from surveillance: 
1) It chills human thought 
2) It leads to abuse of power 
Psychological studies have shown that humans resort to more conformist and compliant behaviours 
when they think they are under surveillance (Richards, 2013). They make decisions based less on 
their own thought processes and agency but rather on what they believe is expected of them. Two 
recent studies have provided empirical evidence of the ‘chilling effect’ of surveillance. Elizabeth 
Stoycheff (2016) found that a majority of participants, when made aware of government 
surveillance, were significantly less likely to speak out in hostile opinion climates. Jonathon Penney 
(2016) found a large, statistically significant, and immediate drop in total views for privacy-sensitive 
Wikipedia articles after June 2013 (the publication date of Snowden articles), and that the drop 
continued long-term. What these studies show is that the chilling effect is not imaginary. If people 
are deterred from informing themselves or researching matters of law, security and policy related to 
‘terrorism’ or other controversial subject matter, they will inevitably be less informed and “our 
broader processes of democratic deliberation will be weakened” (Penney: 51). Surveillance also 
threatens a value Richards calls “intellectual privacy”, which is the breathing space people need in 
order to experiment with new, controversial, or subversive ideas. The thinking is that “free minds 
are the foundation of a free society” (Richards, 2013: 1946).  
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 The second harm Richards identifies results from the inherent power dynamic between 
watcher and the watched. This disparity increases the likelihood of a variety of harms occurring, 
including discrimination, coercion, and the “threat of selective enforcement, where critics of the 
government can be prosecuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the 
surveillance.” (Richards, 2013: 1935). Surveillance is routinely used to sort people into categories and 
this is a major theme among surveillance scholars. The danger arises because sorting isn’t restricted 
to targeted ads or marketing; it aids internment, concentration camps and targeted killing (Richards, 
2013: 1957). Due to these dangers Richards proposes four principles to guide surveillance law 
(p1935-6) which guided my work as both investigative journalist and panellist on the Independent 
Surveillance Review:  
1. An awareness that surveillance transcends the public/private divide and that much 
surveillance is outsourced to corporations.  
2. Secret surveillance is illegitimate. “In a democratic society, the people, and not the state 
apparatus, are sovereign.” (Richards, 2013: 1959). 
3. Total surveillance is illegitimate.  
4. Recognize that surveillance is harmful. 
 As technology has made it easier, cheaper and more convenient for states and corporations to 
conduct large-scale surveillance operations, so too, has their power increased “to blackmail, 
selectively prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals” (Richards, 2013: 1961). It is for these 
reasons that surveillance must be constrained by strong legal and social rules. Whether the laws and 
rules are up for this challenge remains to be seen.  
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Part 2: My Contribution  
 
My work evolved over time with one idea and action leading to the next. It is for this reason that I 
present my contribution in chronological order. Each chapter focuses on one main publication as 
well as selected articles that best illustrate the summation of my work.  
 An introductory chapter on methodology outlines general motivations, processes and 
difficulties, followed by ‘Your Right to Know’ which was the title of my first book and my first 
interaction with the British state as an active citizen and journalist. In it, I attempted to discover and 
comprehend the British political system: how power flowed and how and where decisions were 
made (Chapter 7). I subsequently took action based on my research, specifically I began making 
many hundreds of FOI requests. The responses I received from public bodies led me to form a 
hypothesis that the British political system was elitist. This was based on witnessing the way 
information was parsed and controlled. I then researched around my hypothesis by conducting 
numerous interviews, made various targeted and ‘meta’ requests to discern more detail about how 
the machinery of government operated, and litigated these requests (Chapters 7 and 8). This work 
culminated in my legal case against the House of Commons for the disclosure of MPs’ expenses 
(Chapter 9). Although I won my legal battle against Parliament (High Court 2008 [2008] EWHC 
1084 (Admin) Case No: CO2888/2008). Parliament nevertheless delayed and obstructed 
publication, creating a black market for this information. The market demand was met by an inside 
whistleblower who, because of digitisation, was able to make a copy of the entire dataset of MPs’ 
allowances. This person then offered the disc to various national newspapers and finally sold it to 
the Daily Telegraph for a reported £110,000. I learned several interesting things from these events, but 
most pertinent to this PhD was the realisation that digitisation made it much more difficult for those 
in power to control information. This led me to begin work on my third book The Revolution Will Be 
Digitised (2012) (see Chapter 10) in which I researched the people at the forefront of digitisation and 
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technology, specifically hackers and technologists. As a result of my reporting on Wikileaks, I was 
leaked a copy of the entire set of US diplomatic cables and thus had a front-row seat on their 
publication and impact. Initially, I was optimistic about this new era of ‘radical transparency’ but 
soon my utopian view changed as it became increasingly clear that traditional political institutions 
were able to harness the same new technologies that promised democratisation and use them to 
conduct mass surveillance of entire populations. My work for this thesis ends with my appointment 
to the Independent Surveillance Review Panel in which I conducted with my colleagues a year-long 
investigation into modern surveillance and intelligence agency oversight (Chapter 10). This is the 
narrative arc of the second half of this thesis.  
73 
Chapter 6: Methodology 
 
In this chapter I will explore general elements of my overall methodology; specific examples are 
contained in subsequent chapters. I will discuss my main motivations, journalism tradecraft, the 
difficulties I encountered and the processes and techniques I used to overcome these difficulties 
within a journalistic framework.  
Motivations 
Aufklärung um andere wieder aufzuklären, giebt Freyheit - only Enlightenment to enlighten others 
generates freedom - Adam Weishaupt, 1786. 
 The above quotation encapsulates the political philosophy that drives my journalism. In his 
book A Revolution of the Mind, Jonathan Israel gives a description of an ideology that came to 
prominence in the Radical Enlightenment of the 18th Century and that informs my work:  
Radical Enlightenment is a set of basic principles that can be summed up concisely as: 
democracy; racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, 
expression, and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and 
education; and full separation of church and state. It sees the purpose of the state as being 
the wholly secular one of promoting the worldly interests of the majority and preventing 
vested minority interests from capturing control of the legislative process. Its chief maxim is 
that all men have the same basic needs, rights, and status irrespective of what they believe or 
what religious, economic, or ethnic group they belong to, and that consequently all ought to 
be treated alike, on the basis of equity…and that all deserve to have their personal interests 
and aspirations equally respected by law and government.’ (Israel, 2010: viii) 
 
These principles were “broadly accepted nowhere in the world before the American Revolution” 
(viii) and even today are not always accepted in practice. I agree that democracy requires informed 
citizens (Dahl, 1989: 25) and that without information, citizens cannot meaningful contribute to 
government nor hold it to account. If they are unable to do so, then we cannot call such a society a 
democracy. It is at best a benevolent guardianship, with an elite class deciding what is best for the 
public rather than the public meaningfully contributing to ideas about what is the ‘public good’.  
 Enlightenment requires truth. I believe truth is desirable and also possible. To see clearly the 
world around us is the ultimate civic act, a responsibility shared by everyone. And everyone is 
capable of it. Truth-seeking is profoundly democratic. The largest events and most important people 
74 
can be examined for consistency and held to account. Transparency creates a set of conditions that 
ensure reality and perceptions accurately mirror each other. By having a clear understanding of 
reality we have a clear idea of what works and what doesn’t and can set to work fixing or improving 
flaws, injustices or abuses.  
 For me the appeal of journalism is that it is a profession of discovery and truth-seeking. One 
of my first jobs was working as a crime reporter in Spartanburg, South Carolina. This was a city 
which on the surface was full of upright and righteous people, loudly proclaiming the Bible and 
godly virtue, in the churches, in schools, on the streets, in garden parties and clubs. As a crime 
reporter, I saw the ‘secret’ city. A city where the local corporate park - filled with family picnics 
during the day - turned at night into a cruising ground for closeted homosexuals, who continued to 
exist despite a county law making their activity illegal. I saw in police incident reports, a city where 
violence against women was endemic, alcohol and drug abuse common and rape and sexual 
offences frequent. These things may not have been caused by secrecy and hypocrisy, but they were 
certainly not helped by it. Secrecy and self-deception, says the academic Lawrence Quill are 
“curiously wedded together.” (Quill, 2014: 4).  
 My view is that for problems to be fixed they first need to be seen clearly. Only then can the 
hard work to find solutions begin. An example can be seen in the way child sex abuse in the 
Catholic Church was kept hidden for decades, which ensured its continuation.  Secrecy and wilful 
blindness meant the problem remained unidentified and thus unfixed. Only after victims spoke out, 
making their experience known to others, was the problem finally identified. Once identified, calls 
for action followed. Colm O’Gorman a child abuse victim of a priest who went on to head Amnesty 
International in Ireland speaks of the danger of succumbing to secrecy:  
 “For fear of the worst of ourselves, what we do or people close to us do or institutions do, 
is we deny the best of ourselves - which is our capacity to respond. We make ourselves 
powerless by pretending we don’t know…If a whole society is in denial, you are really in 
trouble - because you believe your survival depends on turning a blind eye to the truth. So 
the thing that we feared most as a society - that our sense of self would come crashing down 
- that turned out to be valid. But what we didn’t question at the time was whether that might 
be a good thing. We had a sense of ourselves as a good pure Catholic society, where good 
exists and always wears a collar. But when we finally understood the cost of that illusion, 
then we had to let it go.’ (O’Gorman cited in Heffernan, 2011: 38).   
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Journalism at its best seeks to follow and tell the truth no matter what interests it disrupts or 
disturbs, and it will disturb and disrupt.  
 I formed an initial hypothesis about British democracy as a result of my personal dealings with 
a local council soon after moving to London. My hypothesis was that the British political system was 
hierarchal and elitist, at best a benevolent guardianship. In order to test my hypothesis in a more 
empirical fashion I decided to investigate the British state for my first book Your Right to Know.  
Uncovering what we don’t know  
 Writing about political power is not easy. As discussed earlier, power is naturally drawn to 
secrecy, and state power all the more so. Max Weber’s ‘reason of state’ explains the inevitable turn 
bureaucratic administrations make toward secrecy, eager to go into ‘secret session’ to preserve a 
monopoly on knowledge (power) and avoid criticism. Thus there were many times during my 
reporting when I found “not even the darkness is visible” (Quill, 2014: 2), that is to say I often 
wasn’t sure what questions to ask because I did not know what I did not know. New York Times 
reporter Nina Bernstein summed up this state of affairs in her 2010 acceptance speech for a 
journalism award: “The best stories,” she said, are “the stories nobody knows they want or need 
because they don’t yet know that they exist” (Cited in Schudson, 2011: 216). This is often as true for 
the reporters of those stories as anyone else. What a reporter relies on in these instances are 
indicators or ‘clues’ and a gradual accretion of knowledge using a mixed methods approach. 
 The world of investigative reporting is not navigable by clear signposts or citable references. 
The former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld described this territory in a news conference 
when he was asked about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. He described a world where there are 
known knowns (things we know we know), known unknowns (things we do not know) and 
unknown unknowns (things we don’t know we don’t know.24) The majority of my investigations 
delve into known unknowns but also unknown unknowns. Sometimes I ‘know’ because I’ve had 
                                                        
24 Department of Defense news briefing 12 February 2002 with Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers. 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636) (Accessed 16 December 2015) 
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privileged access to partial information. For example, in the case of my investigation into MPs’ 
expenses, I was aware of the type of documentation that underlay politicians’ expense claims 
because I had seen similar expense claims with my own eyes as a reporter covering the Washington 
State legislature. I had an awareness and expectation of what I wanted to see. I have seen various 
types of documents such as police incident reports, arrest logs, autopsy reports, fire reports, and 
line-item budgets for police and local authorities while reporting in the US. British reporters (like 
British citizens) rarely see this ‘machinery of government’. American journalism (both daily and 
investigative) is based largely on public records. In fact, so common is this way of practicing 
journalism in the US that one speaks of a ‘document state of mind’, that is, to think always of what 
public documents lie at the root of any story. Such a state of mind was of no use to a reporter in the 
UK prior to the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act in 2005, and arguably even 
today, due to the continued difficulty accessing official information. British journalists, I discovered, 
had different methods of obtaining information, some more illegitimate than others25.  
 When reporting on the ‘deep state’ (the heart of power and especially the security services), I 
was dealing with unknown unknowns. Here historians and journalists agree that sourcing is difficult, 
often impossible (Fung & Weill, 2007; Roberts, 2006). I found this particularly so in the UK where 
the security services have an absolute exemption from FOI, meaning there are few legitimate ways 
to gather or confirm information. Former investigative journalist and now academic Paul Lashmar 
writes of the particular challenges covering the secret state, specifically the UK intelligence agencies 
where the “information flow takes place almost entirely outside of the public sphere and is not 
attributed” (Lashmar, 2013: 1027). He gives an informative account of the accreditation system that 
intelligence agencies use to liaise with specific journalists and the conditions for these relationships. 
The primary condition is non-attribution which creates problems not just for the reporter and public 
but in the case of the 7/7 suicide bomber 7/7 Mohammed Sidique Khan, he shows how it hurt the 
agencies as well. Non-attribution also leads to reporters presenting information from these 
                                                        
25 For an extensive look at the inner workings of British journalism see Davies 2008, 2014. 
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unattributed briefings as independently verified evidence rather than simply something someone 
said, which misleads the public. An example of this is Tom Harper’s article in The Sunday Times26 in 
which he passed off anonymous briefings that the Chinese and Russians had obtained and ‘cracked’ 
the Snowden documents as ‘fact’. There was no evidence this was true as Harper admitted on CNN: 
“that’s not something we’re clear on, so we don’t go into that level of detail in the story. We just 
publish what we believe to be the position of the British government at the moment.” 27 This raises 
the other danger that journalists in this cosy arrangement quickly become co-opted or seduced by 
their high-level access and “it can be hard to resist the danger of ‘going native’ (Lashmar, 2013: 
1032).  
 When the “focus of journalism shifts from objective, verifiable ‘facts’ to myth: in effect, there 
is a crucial epistemological shift” (Keeble, 2004: 49). To report in this difficult terrain I used a 
‘mixed methods’ approach drawing on various sources to build up a picture of reality.  
Understanding Reality 
 Schudson writes in The Sociology of News that “journalists not only report reality but also create 
it.” (Schudson, 2011: xiv). He makes clear this does not mean they ‘conjure’ the world from 
imagination, they work with the material real people and real events provide, but “through the 
process of selecting, highlighting, framing, shading, and shaping what they report, they create an 
impression that real people - readers and viewers - take to be real and to which they respond in their 
lives.” (2011:xiv). This is very similar to the motivation and methods of historians. They, too, are in 
the business of telling stories that are meant to be read and so also focus on being “interesting, well 
written, dramatic and compelling” (Brennan: 104). They can similarly fall prey to the dangers of 
story-telling that can beset journalists: exaggeration, making up facts for the sake of a better story, 
simplifications or dumbing down complexity.  
                                                        
26 ‘British spies betrayed to Russians and Chinese’. 14 June 2015.  
27 ‘Sunday Times reporter on Snowden story: We don’t have a clue!’ The Washington Post. Erik Wemple. June 15, 2015. 
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 My definition of reality is the ability to see things as they actually are. The difficulty in much of 
my work is that because institutions have incentives to perpetuate themselves and protect their 
reputations, they often manipulate or restrict information to shape public opinion in ways that 
favour their continuation. There are many people pushing out information with a vested interest in 
shaping public perceptions: public relations (PR) firms, press officers, political spin doctors, the 
publicity and marketing staffs of corporate, charitable and government institutions.  Schudson 
(2011) calls such people ‘parajournalists’ and they play an increasingly central and powerful role in 
today’s journalism. In ‘The invasion of corporate news28’ the Financial Times pulled together a 
number of findings to paint a grim portrait of modern news: US newsrooms had lost a third of their 
employees since 2006, global PR revenues increased 11 per cent in 2013 to almost $12.5bn, and for 
every working journalist in 2014 in America, there were in 4.6 PR people. 
 Information is not put into the public domain by PRs in an even-handed manner but 
weaponised to serve the interests of the institution as I discuss in The Silent State. Information that is 
critical or challenging is held back or, if it must be put into the public domain, is done so in a limited 
or ‘spun’ manner. PR makes not just dissent but alternative views heretical. When public bodies are 
obsessed with ‘lines to take’ and refuse to admit the variety of options and divergent opinions that 
exist in reality, it shuts down possibilities. It is for this reason that I chose to rely on FOIs, 
interviews and documentation for my methodology, the better to get my information ‘raw’ and 
unspun.  
Using FOI 
 Information from FOI requests provides the type of previously unpublished primary source 
documents that historians agree can give “a more detailed record of an issue or event than published 
reports or official documents” (Brennan: 101). This can be seen in my FOI for the minutes of the 
BBC Governors meeting (see next chapter) and certainly for the information on MPs’ expenses (see 
chapter 9). Primarily I used FOI (where organisations were covered by the law), both for the 
                                                        
28 Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2014. 
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empirical evidence it could provide but also as a means of testing how officials responded to queries 
from the public. Journalists innovate with the Freedom of Information Act: “They push boundaries, 
they put through the case law, they do all sorts of interesting things with it” (Ben Worthy 
interviewed in Burgess, 2015: 137). I was one of the first and primary journalists doing this.  I chose 
to specialise in FOI because it produces evidence of a high standard - the institution’s own 
documentation. This means the institution cannot disprove what the documentation reveals without 
calling itself either incompetent or a liar. Even so, some public bodies are so attached to the tactic of 
trying to shut down a journalist’s story by discrediting her source material that they do exactly that. 
For example, when I asked for a quote from Cleveland Police to accompany an investigation I did 
into public liability payouts, they responded by saying my information was factually incorrect. I told 
them it came from their own office so could I quote them as saying they gave out incorrect figures? 
They admitted the initial figures they’d given me were incorrect (see Appendix).  
 A media analysis done by Worthy found that across a diverse range of subjects “FOI had been 
used to obtain an explanation.” (Worthy 2010b: 9). He adds that through FOI “we can go behind 
political rhetoric to see the true state of affairs” (p4) and that “requests are often used to put 
together a wider series of information, like a jigsaw, or as a lever to obtain influence in a campaign, 
frequently alongside other mechanisms. (Worthy 2010b: 16). Responses to FOI reveal officials’ 
views of democracy and uncover what Tant calls 'traditionalists’. This is key to understanding the 
vehement obstruction to some FOI requests such as the 10-year FOI battle The Guardian’s Rob 
Evans fought for Prince Charles’s lobbying letters to government departments. Evans said the case 
(which he eventually won but which prompted yet another government FOI review) was worth 
fighting because, “what it does show…is how society works really. It shows the lengths they want to 
go to protect his letters.” (Interview Rob Evans, cited in Burgess, 2015: 141). 
Interviews and case studies 
 The goal of good journalism is to reflect reality as accurately and truthfully as possible. In 
order to do this, reporters seek sources close to the action. Just as a detective seeks to interview 
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those people who actually witnessed a crime rather than those who read about it in a newspaper, 
reporters seek to interview those people with immediate and direct knowledge of events or actions 
rather that rely on second-hand accounts. It is not surprising that journalists, as the producers of the 
‘first draft of history’, share many similarities with historians both in method and motivation. 
History is “the oldest qualitative method” (Brennan: 93) and historical documentation is presented 
as evidence using names, dates and places for corroboration and credibility. As with journalism it 
also uses many types of primary and secondary source material. Traditional historians define primary 
sources in a way that matches journalism: an eyewitness or observer of an event or action. 
(Brennan:100, Smith, 1989: 321). 
 An interview is simply “a focused, purposeful conversation between two or more people” 
(Brennan: 27). There are many ways to conduct an interview but the preferred method in journalism 
is face to face and the majority of my interviews were done this way with follow-up questions 
continued either by telephone or electronic communication. I document in more detail how I found 
my interviewees and verified their claims in the chapters that follow. Through in-depth semi-
structured and unstructured interviews I was able to gain expertise, context and perceptions, and 
with more in-depth case studies (for example in The Silent State and The Revolution will be Digitised) to 
see how policy impacted people’s lives. It seems obvious to say it, but “the best way to find out what 
the people think about something is to ask them” (Bower, 1973: vi). In my work I have both an 
inductive approach - going from real-world example (a case study) to general point - and a deductive 
approach where I go from the principle to find real-world examples. My goal was to blend the 
British emphasis on human interest (primarily scandal-based or personality) stories with the social 
science techniques found in the best American investigative reporting. 
 I usually prepare for interviews by reading about the person and their work and possibly 
interviewing people in their circle. It is often the case that I have been given an introduction by one 
source to another. This is how I managed to track down the associates of Chelsea (formerly Bradley) 
Manning, which I outline in chapter 10. I usually prepare a few thematic questions with one or two 
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specifics then let the interview range widely. I have found from being on the receiving end of several 
academic ‘structured’ interviews that sets of rigid questions usually fail to get the full story or 
establish any meaningful source relationship. The assumptions made to formulate a rigid list of 
questions leaves little opportunity for the interviewer to understand that his or her assumptions were 
wrong. Nor is it conducive for an interesting or lively conversation. I am an intensely curious person 
and from my experience this is what draws people out so they can articulate what they may not have 
before. For example it was through interviews that I learned about the trade in personal data as well 
as mass online surveillance by states and companies, a topic we came to know much more about a 
few years later in 2013 with Snowden’s disclosures. It was also through interview that I first 
established a relationship with the source who would leak me the entire set of US diplomatic cables.  
 I cultivated a number of sources. Some were specific to the books or articles on which I was 
working, others were regulars whose knowledge I respected and trusted. All journalists must develop 
trusted sources (Randall, 2011). These people could be  “sounding boards” (Weitkamp, 2003), such 
as the lawyers who helped me interpret the law, or people who were on the rock face of reality, such 
as the volunteers of MySociety who were trying to build civic technology tools using official data. 
There is a dependency relationship between journalists and their sources, especially where sources 
are slim or the reporter needs to file regular stories. I had arranged my career so that I did not have 
to file regular stories, thus I could remain independent. I also sought to corroborate my sources’ 
claims either through other sources or documentation, which I outline in detail in subsequent 
chapters.  
Attribution 
 One aspect of interviewing that appears to differ between journalism/history and media 
studies/social science is in relation to attribution. Journalists and historians eschew anonymity as it 
introduces unverifiability into a narrative. This makes the narrative less credible and for this reason 
pseudonyms are actively discouraged. The gold-standard of responsible reporting is ‘on the record’ 
where a source is identified with their full real name so the reader knows who is saying what and can 
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judge the statement accordingly. Journalism, if it is to be considered professional, should offer the 
audience access to independently existing reality not a secret reality that only the reporter and source 
can verify. Of course there are exceptions: 
1) where the source will face some actual harm (either to their livelihood or person) if they are 
identified;  
2) where the information is of such importance that there is a strong public interest in 
publishing it and no other way to do so.  
Basically anonymity is a privilege and not a right and a reporter needs to explain to the reader the 
reason for granting anonymity29. However, one need only read a British newspaper to see that 
anonymous sourcing with no explanation is commonplace. I address this issue in some detail in 
chapter 4 of The Silent State. Suffice to say that anonymous sourcing (outside of the exceptions noted 
above) has a tendency to be associated with partisan reporting or propaganda as with the Tom 
Harper article mentioned above.  
 Media studies and social science interviewers must “protect the person’s identity when he or 
she requests it” (Brennan: 29) and if the person does not want to be named then “ask the person to 
choose a synonym in place of his or her real name” (p29). This easy use of pseudonyms would be 
frowned on in journalism. There is more common ground around the interviewer’s  “moral 
responsibility to protect their respondents from physical and emotional harm” (Brennan: 29).  I 
would argue this is similar to journalistic ‘source protection’ and shield laws. Brennan lists informed 
consent as another important principle. I believe this is similar to the journalistic practice of setting 
the ground rules with the source at the beginning of the interview for how it will be conducted: on-
the-record, off-the-record for attribution (e.g. a vague type of attribution such as ‘Whitehall source’), 
or off-the-record no attribution. Usually the journalist has to negotiate getting a source on the 
record. Anecdotally I have noticed that in the US where anonymous sourcing in the media is less 
                                                        
29 Jack Schafer discusses journalistic use of anonymous sourcing in ‘Ratting out the Anonymice’. Slate. 15 June 2004. 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2004/06/ratting_out_the_anonymice.html (Last accessed 
7 July 2016).  
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common interviewees are more likely to agree to an on-the-record interview, whereas in the UK 
where the media routinely use anonymous sourcing, interviewees are more reluctant to be named. I 
can make no causal claim about this but it is noteworthy. It is considered a professional and ethical 
breach for a journalist to promise anonymity and then name the source. However, if someone 
knowingly speaks to a journalist and then later says ‘but this was all off the record’, that journalist is 
usually considered within their rights to publish. For the more sensitive aspects of my reporting such 
as in TRWBD I conducted quite a number of off-the-record, not-for-attribution interviews in order 
to gain knowledge and the trust of a source. Once I had established this, if I wanted to cite 
something, I would either corroborate the information elsewhere or return to the source and 
negotiate further. In journalism which operates in a more political and ‘high-stakes’ environment, 
there is a distinction made between being fair to a source and granting ‘copy approval’. Agreeing to 
copy-approval can quickly move a journalist from independent reporter working for the public 
interest to co-opted propagandist working for a private interest. I would sometimes show small 
sections of my work to a source if the material was particularly sensitive or technical but I did not 
grant full copy approval of an article or book to any source.  
Archival and documentary research and content analysis. 
 Although there remain different ways of doing journalism,  “what reporters young and old 
take to be journalism’s gold standard” is holding the powerful to account through original, fact-
based, well-sourced and analytically sophisticated reporting (Schudson, 2015: 267). I would argue 
that the ‘analytically sophisticated’ aspect has been missing in British journalism due in large measure 
to the lack of access to official data and information. This is where I made my biggest contribution 
to British journalism and British civic life by opening up whole tracts of previously secret civic 
information, which I document in the chapters that follow.  
  Evidence is ‘particles of reality” (Kellner, 1989: 10) and this can either be uncovered or 
found. In addition to finding and publishing much new information, I also made extensive use of 
existing information stores. For Your Right to Know I trawled through public inquiry reports, global 
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laws on FOI and privacy, newspaper cuttings and directories. I examined the content of inquiries, 
for example, to see whether secrecy was identified as a cause or exacerbation of the scandal 
investigated. I made FOIs for documents but also for large civic datasets such as restaurant 
inspections, public prosecutions and London Underground incidents and did some of the first large-
scale data reporting based on my analysis of these datasets. I sought out court documents and other 
official documentation to verify interview claims. For example, I obtained a copy of the Common 
Assessment Framework to see what information it collected on children to verify what my source 
had told me it contained.   
 Journalistic and historical verification are similar: both collect material and then “analyze the 
evidence they have obtained for its authenticity and credibility” and “assess the creator of the 
evidence as well as his or her intention, original purpose and intended audience.” (Brennan: 102-3). 
Reporters call this process ‘standing up a story’.  The method Brennan outlines for historians is 
identical to that of reporters: “They evaluate evidence for inconsistencies, omissions, contradictions 
and/or distortions and attempt to verify the information from other sources… they look for 
accidental and intentional errors of fact, forgeries, and cases of plagiarism, and worry about the 
misuse of evidence and information that is taken out of context…also consider the loss and/or 
suppression of evidence and problems with identify, motives and the origin of documentary 
evidence” (p103). An example of this is my attempt to ‘stand up’ the oft-quoted statistic that the 
average Londoner is caught on camera 300 times a day. Eventually, I traced this back to Simon 
Davies who was then director of Privacy International. When I interviewed him, he told me this was 
just a rough guess based on extrapolation and not at all a scientific fact. One of the main problems 
with ‘facts’ made about national security such as Theresa May’s claim that “in the past twelve 
months alone six significant terrorist plots have been disrupted here in the UK, as well as a number 
of further plots overseas”30 is that the claim cannot be independently verified or ‘stood up’. It is 
                                                        
30 Oral Statement to Parliament. 4 November 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-
publication-of-draft-investigatory-powers-bill. Last accessed 7 July 2016. 
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similar to allowing drug companies to put forward claims without mandating they publish the 
underlying clinical trials data on which the claims are based.  
 Sociologist Gaye Tuchman, defines news as “a depletable consumer product that must be 
made fresh daily” with the main ingredients facts. Facts he defines as “pertinent information 
gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the relationship between what is known and 
how it is known…In news, verification of facts is both a political and a professional 
accomplishment.” (Tuchman, 1978: 82-3). News is therefor something manmade. This is certainly 
true in my experience. Facts don’t fall from the sky, nor are they always willingly handed over. A 
journalist’s credibility and reputation is based not just on her ability to find a good story, but also on 
her tenacity to ‘stand it up’, that is, to substantiate claims or allegations. In my mind this is the real 
craft of journalism. Rumours, gossip, accusations and claims are numerous and easy to find, the 
difficulty and the craft of journalism is substantiating claims or hypothesis with provable evidence 
that stands up to public scrutiny. It is also worth mentioning that due to the challenging material of 
The Silent State and TRWBD both books were checked for libel by a London law firm. A folder of 
evidence accompanied the manuscripts to document and support claims. 
Mapping exercises and network analysis.  
 Cultural historians seek to study their own cultures as alien: “We constantly need to be shaken 
out of a false sense of familiarity with the past, to be administered doses of culture shock” (Darnton, 
2009: 325). For me this was no thought experiment. I suffered very real culture shock when I moved 
to the UK and I believe it was for this reason I was able to see aspects of British culture that went 
unseen by those for whom it was all too familiar. I set about researching the British state for my first 
book Your Right to Know and my research (documented in detail in the following chapter) enabled me 
to create some of the first citizen-friendly organigrams of British bureaucracy including all 
departments, executive agencies and quangos along with their affiliations and powers. I created a 
directory of nearly 200 public bodies with direct contact details for their FOI officers. In The Silent 
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State I read and interviewed widely to create one of the most accurate and comprehensive maps of 
secretive and unaccountable government databases of citizens’ personal information.  
Strategic litigation 
 Strategic litigation is useful for achieving broad systemic change, either through the success of 
the action and setting legal precedent or by publicly exposing injustice and raising wide public 
awareness of an issue such as FOI. However, it is also a high-risk strategy with no guarantee of 
victory and one that demands a good deal of resources (both time and money). During most of my 
British journalism career I worked as a freelancer so finding these necessary resources was 
challenging. I supplemented the costs of my investigations by writing commentary pieces and books, 
teaching, and providing consultancy and training services. Additionally I was able to find lawyers to 
represent me pro bono as I was at the vanguard of an emerging aspect of law, however I did write a 
large amount of my case documents myself including my skeleton arguments and grounds for appeal 
(see appendix). Litigation involves bringing a case against a party. I appealed about a dozen cases to 
the Information Commissioners Office. Of these, I took two to the Information Tribunal: one 
seeking the minutes to a BBC Board of Governors Meeting after the Hutton Inquiry (Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd and Heather Brooke v IC and the BBC (2007) EA/2006/0011; EA/2006/0013) in which 
I represented myself and did all of my own court filings, and my notable legal victory against the 
House of Commons for details of MPs’ expenses (Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v Information 
Commissioner & Heather Brooke, Ben Leapman, Jonathan Michael Ungoed-Thomas [2008] EWHC 1084 
(Admin) (16 May 2008). This case went further to the UK’s High Court where I was represented by 
Hugh Tomlinson QC. This victory in the High Court fundamentally changed law and policy, and for 
the first time in its history Parliament had to account to an outside body over how MPs’ claimed 
expenses.  
‘Clean-hands’ journalism 
 I strive to conduct ‘clean hands’ journalism where I am not beholden to anyone for the 
information I need to investigate an issue or tell a story. What I discovered in the UK was a system 
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where this was not possible. There was no statutory law giving the public access to official 
information prior to 2000 even when it was collected in the public’s name and with public money. 
As a result, journalists had to find other ways to obtain information that in the United States would 
have been available as a public record. For example, as a crime reporter working in South Carolina, 
my reporting relied heavily on access to police incident reports and arrest logs. Additionally, I 
listened to a scanner that broadcast communications from 911 dispatch to all emergency services, 
which is how I knew where to go to report the crimes that were happening. Access to these 
documents and listening to police dispatch are illegal in the UK. I wondered how British crime 
journalists did their jobs. Veteran investigative journalist Nick Davies provides a detailed account of 
the panoply of techniques in his books ‘Flat Earth News’ (2008) and ‘Hack Attack’ (2014) from 
phone hacking to bribing, blagging, buying information and sponsoring police events. These are not 
techniques that contribute to ‘clean hands’ journalism.  
 When I worked as a reporter in the US, hospitality was considered unethical, if not forbidden 
as per the Society of Professional Journalist’s Code of Ethics31. The two newspapers I worked for, 
like most American newspapers, had signed up to the SPJ code and there was a prohibition on 
offering or accepting any hospitality above $25. This restriction did not in any way deter me from 
finding stories, as the information I needed was either publicly available or gained through (unpaid) 
interviews. Most of the English national press, and particularly the Westminster Lobby, was run on a 
patronage system where informal deals were continually made to access information (I’ll scratch 
your back if you scratch mine32). For example, I saw and was told by other journalists that it was 
common practice for British journalists to “wine and dine” sources and to accept gifts and junkets 
offered by companies and PRs in exchange for coverage.  
                                                        
31 The Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics was borrowed from the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors in 1926. The code was updated in 1973, 1984, 1987, 1996 and 2014. It specifies that journalists work for the 
public so must not be seen to work for private interests. This means refusing all  “favors, fees, free travel and special 
treatment, and avoid[ing] political and other outside activities that may compromise integrity or impartiality, or may 
damage credibility. http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (Last accessed 22 December 2015. 
32 This is from my own experience. For a more academic study see Tunstall, 1970.  
88 
 To be dependent on a leak or source in such a compromised way means one is made 
complicit not only in potentially illegal activity but also it is more likely the information itself will be 
“‘contaminated’ by human needs and desires as well as moral and political positions.” (Birchall 2014: 
78). Even so, few British officials seem to understand the benefits of FOI as an “enlightening, 
honourable mode of disclosure” (Birchall, 2014: 77), instead preferring to condemn themselves to a 
continuation of what Birchall calls “narrative-interpretive forms of disclosure” such as scandal, 
gossip and conspiracy theories. They seemed ignorant that by obstructing legitimate disclosure they 
were encouraging the illegitimate, which might then “‘pollute’ the rationality and knowledge 
necessary for citizens to be counted as ‘well-informed’ and capable of making a valuable 
contribution to the public sphere.” (Birchall, 2014: 78). As well as being morally suspect, these 
illegitimate forms of disclosure are more likely to be subjective, unproven and unreliable, in a legal 
grey area or outright illegal and also lack legitimacy.  
 I did not want to take sources out to lunch, get them drunk, go under cover or practice 
deception. That is not how I was trained to be a journalist. But I did want to write in-depth stories 
that examined and challenged the powerful and tested official spin against reality. Therefore, I used 
FOI because it has a legitimacy and authority that other forms of disclosure lacked.  As part of the 
judicial/legal process it has an authority and legitimacy anecdotal sourcing lacks. As Birchall writes 
“such illegitimacy can work at an ideological-discursive level so that contentious ideas are belittled as 
‘just’ conspiracy theory, or gossip” (2014: 81). She notes the way Tony Blair tried to “align dissent 
with a stigmatised, inferior way of thinking” when faced with criticism over the decision to invade 
Iraq.  
 I encountered this attitude myself while doing an anti-corruption survey for the Open Society 
Institute in 2007. I made an FOI request to the Olympic Delivery Authority for their registers of 
gifts and  hospitality. They claimed it would cost too much to provide these, but in my request I had 
said I would come and ‘inspect the record’. So after half a dozen phone calls and chasing emails, I 
set up a time to do just that. On the appointed day, my assistant and I showed up ready to inspect, 
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only to be told we had no more than 90 minutes to inspect several hundred records. I had a digital 
camera and began taking photographs of the pages but was stopped by the employee tasked with 
watching us. She threatened to evict us from the building if we made any effort to make a duplicate 
of the pages. No legitimate reason was given for this prohibition, but the reason became clear later. I 
transcribed with my colleague as much of the registers as we could and gave our findings to Sunday 
Times reporter Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas who wrote an article about it (“2012 chiefs take 
contractors' junkets”, Sunday Times, 14 October 2007) When Ungoed-Thomas phoned the ODA 
asking them for comment, they claimed my copy of the material was inaccurate. They refused to say 
what precisely was inaccurate, however, and fortunately the Sunday Times trusted me and my note-
taking and so went ahead with the story. What this made clear to me was the importance of getting 
the actual record itself. Without it, bureaucracy has deniability.  
 In the next chapters I detail precisely how I used FOI, among other techniques, to test and 
challenge political systems. 
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Chapter 7: Your Right to Know 
 
My interest in collective decision-making and the exercise of power began at the University of 
Washington’s daily student newspaper (The Daily) run by and for students. I covered both the 
Associated Student Body of the UW and the Board of Regents (the university’s governing body).  
Meetings and decisions were open and my experiences watching these political systems at work 
complemented the double degree in political science and journalism that I obtained in 1992. This 
formed my early understanding of political systems both in theory and in practice.  
 As part of my studies, I did a three-month internship with the Spokesman-Review newspaper 
covering the 1992 Washington state legislative session. This experience would be formative. As I 
wrote in The Times: 
“Nearly 15 years ago I found myself in a small office digging through boxes of receipts 
looking at the expense claims of local politicians. Everything was laid bare: all the trips, all 
the meals, all the hotel bills, all the contracts. I was a young trainee reporter covering the 
Washington State government, and my editor had suggested I look at these claims to see if 
there were any instances of corruption or personal enrichment.” (Witch-hunt? MPs just don't 
get it, Feb 28, 2008).  
It is worth going into some detail about why I was in that small office, digging through boxes of 
receipts as it materially influenced my subsequent journalism career and my ideas about the 
informed citizen and democracy. In 1992, I was in my final year of university, ambitious and anxious 
about finding a job as a newspaper reporter. Such jobs were thin on the ground and the way to get 
them was to have gained professional experience through internships and published articles. These 
published articles, or ‘clips’ made up your portfolio and a compelling portfolio showed an ability to 
report both daily or breaking stories (what the British call ‘on diary’), and Sunday investigative or 
entrepreneurial (‘off diary’) stories. In the US, daily newspapers are published seven days a week and 
investigative or ‘off-diary’ stories are scheduled for Sunday (or sometimes Monday) because the 
weekend advertising revenue meant an increased number of pages while only a skeleton staff were 
on duty.  As a young journalist, it was important to have Sunday pieces in your portfolio to show 
you were up to the challenge of filling the Sunday/Monday newspapers. Additionally, these stories 
most often win awards, so a paper likes to hire reporters who can both fill the paper and bring it 
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prestige. As such, while I was busily learning the ropes of the legislature and writing daily stories for 
the Spokesman-Review, I was also keen to publish a Sunday story. One of my editors at the paper, Joe 
Fenton, was an experienced newsman so I asked his advice on finding a Sunday story. He suggested 
I look into the expense claims of our local politicians. As he recollected some years later: 
“Fenton recalled giving Brooke, as a student, one of his favorite assignments — digging up 
documents on something. In this case, it was expense documents for the Washington 
Legislature. Her story wasn’t earth-shattering because, as she recalls, the legislators did little 
more than take advantage of their frequent-flier miles. But it planted a seed. She was 
surprised that the expense records were handed to her almost immediately, on the first visit.” 
(Kaufman, Ben L. “Maureen Dowd's Plagiarism, Cincinnati's Connection to a British Scandal 
and Problems at NPR33” Cincinnati CityBeat, 27 May 2009). 
 
 Indeed I was surprised to get the records. I learned that Washington state had a strong 
democratic ethos that was evident in its public records law, a law that was made even stronger 
during my time at the statehouse when amendments strengthened the people’s right to know by 
adding this preamble which remains in the law today: 
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The 
people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is 
good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on 
remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have 
created. This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to 
promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected. In the 
event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other act, the provisions of 
this chapter shall govern. (Preamble to Washington State Public Records Law RCW 
42.56.030 [2007 c 197 § 2; 2005 c 274 § 283; 1992 c 139 § 2. Formerly RCW 42.17.251.]) 
 
This sentiment is directly opposed to the British political tradition where sovereignty rests in 
Parliament rather than the people and the role of government (whether performed historically by 
the Monarch alone or in combination with Parliament) is to weigh particular interests and decide 
what is good for the people. “Government and only government was arbiter of the ‘national 
interest’” in Britain (Tant: 6). Politics in the UK, I came to discover, is ‘top down’, whereas in a 
participatory democracy like Washington state it is ‘bottom up’.   
 When the Labour party was in opposition, its leader Tony Blair shared similar democratic 
ideals to those expressed in the Washington state law. Speaking at the Campaign for Freedom of 
                                                        
33 Last accessed 23 December 2015: http://citybeat.com/cincinnati/article-17897-
maureen_dowds_plagiarism_cincinnatis_connection_to_a_british_scandal_and_problems_at_npr.html 
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Information’s annual awards ceremony in 1996, Blair denounced the Whitehall and Westminster 
culture of official secrecy: 
“What is needed is a change in culture and a statutory obligation on government to make it a 
duty to release information to the people who elect the government…Freedom of 
Information is not some isolated constitutional reform . . . it is a change that is absolutely 
fundamental to how we see politics developing over the next few years. It is part of bringing 
our politics up to date.” (Blair, 1996).  
 
A strong FOI white paper was introduced soon after the election in 1997. Unfortunately, in the two 
years it took to become a bill, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, and his fellow MPs had lost much of 
their enthusiasm for the people’s right to know. A radical white paper was replaced by a watered 
down version, the Freedom of Information Act 2000.34 As a further indication of the 
Establishment’s view of FOI, it would be another five years before the law came into force, one of 
the longest implementation times of any country (Banisar, 2006). This is not surprising in light of 
the “uniform, elitist and top-down approach” of the British political system (Richards and Smith, 
2015: 45). As discussed earlier, such a system is dependent on secrecy for its survival.  My intent was 
to expose and challenge this elitist system and make the case for a properly democratic alternative. 
Your Right to Know 
 The first edition of YRTK was published at the end of 2004 before the Freedom of 
Information Act came into force, so I relied on research and judgment (my own and other people’s) 
to predict how the law would work in practice. I researched parliamentary debate to fill in the gaps 
of how the law would be used and enforced (Brooke, 2007: 48). Subsequently I amended and 
expanded my book by an additional 47 pages in a second edition published in 2007 and it is this 
version that accompanies this thesis and to which page numbers refer. During the time between 
editions, I busily made my own requests, following my advice that, “The next few years will set the 
boundaries for openness in our society. If you make a request now it is likely that you will be 
determining those boundaries.” (286). I set about, and succeeded in large measure, establishing 
formative case law that would shift Britain from a culture of secrecy to openness (Arlidge, 2010, 
                                                        
34 A summary of the law can be found here: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-freedom-of-
information/what-is-the-foi-act/ 
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Worthy, 2014a). I used five main methods for Your Right to Know. Reading and research; mapping 
and network analysis, original investigation (including filing FOIs); litigation and public awareness.  
Researching the British state 
 To begin, I had to do a tremendous amount of reading to become familiar and knowledgeable 
with the British political system to authoritatively guide the reader through it. I had to know how 
decisions were made, who did what and where information was stored. I read relevant public 
inquiries of the time which I reference in YRTK such as the Hutton Inquiry (Brooke: 99; Hutton, 
2004), Scott Inquiry (31, Scott, 1996), an inquiry into the deaths of 31 people at a fire in Kings Cross 
(177, Fennell 1988), the death of Stephen Lawrence (154, McPherson, 1999), the BSE Crisis (215, 
Phillips, 2000), the Marchioness ferry disaster (Clarke, 2001), the deaths of children undergoing 
heart surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary (183, Kennedy, 2001), and the serial killings by Dr Harold 
Shipman (184, Smith, 2004). In all these inquiries, official secrecy was a common theme. In the Scott 
Inquiry that investigated the government’s secret sale of weapons to Saddam Hussein, the judge 
concluded there was “consistent undervaluing by government of the public interest that full 
information should be made available to Parliament.” (Scott, 1996: 211). In the BSE crisis, the 
government’s failure to release accurate and timely data to the public was held to be directly 
responsible for extending the crisis. This all showed a pattern that in Britain “the government’s 
privilege to conceal…[is] valued above the public’s right to know” (Michael, 1982: 18 cited in Tant: 
13). I clipped articles from various newspapers related to official secrecy and FOI. I also had a clip 
file for each of the chapters in my book and collected articles on structure, operation, information 
stores, and possible sources. From these I was able to gather various real-world examples such as 
the Birmingham Post’s battle to get details of city councillors’ taxi and first-class rail journeys (p227).  
 I closely read a number of laws, not just the FOIA, but the Data Protection Act 1998, the EU 
Data Protection Directive on which it was based, the Human Rights Act 1998, Access to Medical 
Records Act 1990, and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. I read all the legal books 
on FOIA that were available at the time, some of which are listed on page 54 of YRTK. In order to 
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fully comprehend the implication of laws, I consulted a number of lawyers who specialised in 
Information Rights. Jonathan Griffiths, senior law lecturer at Queen Mary University and co-author 
of Blackstone’s Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Blackstone Press, 2001) kindly agreed to 
read and correct my proofs for the legal chapters. Gareth Crossman, author of Your Rights (Pluto 
Press, 2000) and policy director at Liberty35 at the time, read and commented on the entire 
manuscript. I consulted barrister Hugh Tomlinson QC on the interface between FOI and the law of 
privacy and confidence. Additionally I read FOI, privacy and contempt of court laws from countries 
such as the U.S. (federal and various states), Canada, New Zealand and Australia so I could provide 
a comparative view. I read all the books I recommended in the sections ‘For More Information’ 
such as Courts (pp152-3), Health (p196) and Local Government (p250). Additionally, I also read the 
information stores I referenced such as the Electoral Commission’s index of donors, and register of 
campaign expenditure (p73), or Parliament’s staff handbook known as the Green Book (made 
available for the first time using FOIA: 70) in order to better identify what was most useful to 
readers. I read two years’ of back issues of Which? Magazine to glean examples of public service 
performance issues citing, for example, their investigation into ambulance response times (p192) and 
problems with civil defence (p181). I also read sector specific trade magazines such as Public Finance, 
Local Government Chronicle, Municipal Journal to gain an institutional understanding of various 
bureaucracies.  
Mapping and network analysis 
 As much as YRTK is a guide to accessing information it is also a guide to understanding the 
British state, how it is organised, how decisions are made and where information resides. This is 
because one first has to know where and how the information is stored in order to direct one’s 
query to the right place. To understand the complex and unwieldy beast that is British bureaucracy, I 
consulted a number of reference materials, most of which were prohibitively expensive (government 
websites were very minimal at this time) so I accessed them at the British Library. These included a 
                                                        
35 The UK’s leading civil and human rights organisation: https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/ 
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multitude of directories such as the Civil Service Yearbook, the Municipal Yearbook, Shaw’s Directory of 
Courts, The Whitehall Companion, Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, The Solicitors and Barristers Directory, The 
NAPO Probation Directory, Binley’s Directory of NHS Management, and Institute of Healthcare Management 
Yearbook. Simply understanding the scale and scope of British bureaucracy was daunting, which is 
perhaps why so few, even within government itself, knew its full extent. I would no sooner research 
one government department then I would find a vast number of executive agencies, non-
departmental public bodies, committees, or other affiliated quasi-autonomous non-governmental 
organisations (quangos) hidden within. That these fiefdoms were allowed to grow and spend public 
money with few being aware of their existence was an example of the cost of secrecy. My book 
marked one of the first instances where these quangos, their affiliations and powers, were mapped 
out. It was during my research that I came across, for example, the Government Car and Despatch 
Agency, a division within the Cabinet Office responsible for providing chauffeur-driven cars to 
central government. In 2004, I filed a request under the precursor to FOI, the Open Government 
Code, and wrote a subsequent story about my findings for the Daily Telegraph (Brooke, 31 December 
2004) which helped shine a light on this little known agency. I interviewed Nigel Bennett, the 
GCDA’s director of corporate and business affairs, who told me this was the first time his office 
had ever been asked to collect the information in a way that showed the full cost charged to each 
department.  
 I created some of the first citizen-friendly organigrams of British bureaucracy such as the 
health system (p195), police (p161), local government (p240) and military (p106). Distilling down all 
the necessary history, law and policy was not easy due to frequent re-organisations. Local 
government reform, for example, had created a system where authorities had been in ‘perpetual 
motion’ for the past 30 years (Wilson and Game 2006: 11). The same was true of the NHS.  
 I was not the only one demanding more openness and scrutiny of these public bodies, and I 
sought to make allies where I could. The Taxpayers’ Alliance, a low-tax campaign group, was also 
interested in stripping away bureaucratic secrecy (Elliott & Rotherham, 2006) and together we filed a 
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number of FOIs to various public bodies to better shine a light on the true cost and scope of 
bureaucratic sprawl. Our combined campaigns raised public awareness and as a result of this 
consciousness-raising about bureaucratic sprawl and waste, one of the first reforms of the 
Conservative government in 2010 was a so-called ‘bonfire of the quangos’. In Public Bodies Reform –– 
Proposals for Change36 the government outlined how these myriad and sprawling public bodies so long 
operating under the radar, were to be put under the spotlight, their functions and role examined so 
they could be streamlined and merged.  
 One of the most challenging parts of the book proved to be something I had imagined would 
be simple: creating a directory of nearly 200 public bodies with direct contact details for their FOI 
officers. My goal was to list every FOI officers’ name, email, direct telephone number and postal 
address. There was almost no direct contact information available online so my first port of call was 
again the British Library and their stock of public and private directories. After finding as many 
names and telephone numbers as I could, I then began telephoning into the government edifice, 
speaking to whoever answered the telephone and asking to be put through to an FOI officer. After 
a series of phone calls, emails and constant chasing, I tracked down and spoke to the majority of all 
central government FOI officers and many of those in executive agencies and other public bodies. 
Some FOI officers were very helpful and told me about preparations for FOI (for the first edition) 
and how it had worked (for the second edition), yet they all had a great reluctance to have their 
names and direct contact details published in the book. When appeals to democratic accountability 
failed, I shifted to an argument found by closely reading the legislation: Section 16 of the FOIA 
mandates that officials have a statutory obligation to provide advice and assistance to requesters to 
help them formulate their request. Obviously if officials refuse to provide any contact details, they 
are in effect failing this statutory duty. I found most officials wanted to abide by the law and so they 
agreed. Where they did not and I knew their names, I published these regardless, judging that their 
expectation of privacy was minimal and, in any case, over-ridden by the public interest. One or two 
                                                        
36 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-bodies-reform-reports. 
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were so “mired in secrecy they refuse[d] to even disclose the name of their openness officer.” For 
example The Highways Agency refused even to put me through to their FOI unit claiming the 
public had no business knowing who this person was (p3). 
 To individually identify someone is to make them accountable for their actions. This is all the 
more relevant if the person is a public official working on behalf of the public and paid for with 
public funds. It is customary in the USA for staff directories of public bodies to be publicly 
available37. The obstruction I encountered from FOI officials alerted me to a power differential 
between British citizens and their public servants. It told me that officials were well aware that 
naming made them directly accountable and answerable to the public, and that they viewed such 
accountability as unacceptable. I discovered that even official spokespeople in the UK objected to 
being named (Brooke, 2011: 92-117). Bureaucracies and the people working in them have an 
inherent bias for secrecy as it enables them to maintain and expand their power base. By pushing for 
and publishing the names of FOI officials, I had unexpectedly set a new precedent, one that 
challenged the Establishment orthodoxy of collective responsibility and official anonymity.  
Original investigation and analysis 
 My investigations relied primarily on information gathered through interviews and FOIs. I 
identified a number of useful sources. For example, I contacted MySociety (www.mysociety.org), a 
non-profit group building civic technology tools such as TheyWorkForYou 
(www.theyworkforyou.com) and Pubilcwhip.com (www.publicwhip.org.uk). I spoke frequently with 
then-director Tom Steinberg and developers Francis Irving and Julian Todd, hearing about their 
difficulties accessing the Hansard data feed and other official records. I used their stories in the 
book (64, 135) but also wrote longer articles about Irving’s unsuccessful attempt to create a statute 
law database (see Brooke, 23 May 2006 and 17 August 2006) and parliament’s obstruction to 
Hansard (Brooke, 8 June 2006).  
                                                        
37 See for example (Brooke, 1996) for which I compiled a list of all state and local officials and their exact salaries.  
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 Having read David Leigh’s book The Frontiers of Secrecy (1980), I phoned him up and asked to 
meet. Through this meeting I also met other Guardian reporters such as Rob Evans who were 
interested in FOI and once the law came into effect, I cited their experiences in YRTK (68, 100, 
103). I cultivated relationships with many other journalists I identified as ‘prominent users’ of FOI 
such as Michael Crick, then at the BBC now at Channel 4 News (136), Tony Collins at Computer 
Weekly who used FOI to seek contracts secretly tendered for multi-million pound government IT 
projects (p186), and Matthew Davis who ran his own news agency (p14). I also identified and 
cultivated a relationship with Phil Michaels of Friends of the Earth as they vigorously used FOI and 
its sister law the Environmental Information Regulations (15, 208). Of course, some of my main 
sources were freedom of information officers (72, 86) such as the clerk of records at the House of 
Lords (p72) or those tasked with dealing with FOI such as the Church of England’s spokesman or 
Queen’s press secretary (p93). I also kept in regular contact with the UK and Scottish information 
commissioners. 
Testing for Truth 
 Skepticism is an essential element of good journalism. Just because someone says something is 
true - even if (especially if) that person has authority or power - that doesn’t mean it is. Journalists 
are not stenographers, and we are supposed to question what is said and test it for truth. As such, I 
tested a number of claims in YRTK, for example that the five-year delay from the law’s passage to 
implementation was necessary ‘preparation’ time. My hunch was that this was bogus, and when I 
made my calls in 2003 and 2004 to the various FOI officers I found very few public bodies were 
prepared. Some agencies did not even know who was handling FOI and had never heard of the law. 
Often I had the impression that preparations began only after I made my inquiries.  
 I speculated that one of the ways public bodies might be ‘preparing’ was by eliminating 
embarrassing or controversial documents. As such I made requests to central government 
departments before the act was in force using the voluntary Code of Practice of the Open 
Government Initiative. My findings are detailed in a package of articles in the Daily Telegraph that I 
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did with Ben Fenton (Brooke, Fenton, 29 November 2004). I tested the government’s purported 
‘commitment’ to FOI by asking UK and Scottish Information Commissioners for their promotion 
spending and discovered that just £218,000 was spent by the UK commissioner compared to 
£369,000 in Scotland. Both are small amounts for a national public awareness campaign. I tested the 
then Lord Chancellor Charlie Falconer’s promise that new organisations would be frequently added 
to the list of public bodies covered by FOIA and found that none had (p35). When in 2006, 
Falconer claimed public bodies were being ‘overwhelmed’ with vexatious FOI requests so that fees 
would need to be introduced (Cracknell, 2006), I sent his office an FOI for a listing of these 
‘vexatious’ requests. In response, they cited just six (out of a total of 150,000 requests) and these 
were ones that had been written about in newspapers (p1038). When the minister in charge of FOI 
told a parliamentary committee that “there’s nothing that is a systemic problem in relation to delay” 
(p11), I tested this out by making my own FOI requests, interviewing other requesters and studying 
official figures. The minister’s claim was categorically not true. Delays were systemic and debilitating. 
As I state in YRTK, “Out of seven cases I put through to the Commissioner, just one had been 
processed after more than a year.” (p12) Other requesters told me they’d had similar experiences 
(p12). The public interest extension was a common ruse used to delay. I waited four months for the 
Metropolitan Police to respond to my FOI for their shoot-to-kill policy. Testing the ICO’s claim of 
rigorous enforcement, I found instead that he had issued zero practice recommendations and zero 
enforcement notices. It was not until ICO Richard Thomas was replaced by Christopher Graham in 
June 2009 that these delays were dealt with and practice recommendations and enforcement notices 
started appearing.  
Using FOI 
When the necessary information to test claims was not available, I asked for it using FOI. By using 
the act, I could both gather empirical data and also witness the government’s attitude toward the 
                                                        
38 Baroness Ashton of Upholland giving evidence to Constitutional Affairs Committee, 18 April 2006. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/991/6041803.htm. Last accessed 16 March 
2016. 
101 
public’s ‘right to know’. I made approximately 50 requests in the first six months of the law’s 
implementation and around 500 in the first four years. Several of these were ‘national’ requests, for 
example to 40+ police forces, asking, for example, for costs spent paying out public liability claims 
(Brooke, 3 December 2007), for PR and propaganda (Brooke, 23 May 2008) and chief police 
officers pay and perks (Brooke, 10 August 2009). As I told the Observer : “I am trying to set 
precedents for public authorities and change the culture of secrecy in the UK” (Robins, 24 July 
2005). I successfully requested waste management contracts in the London borough where I lived 
and crime statistics for Victoria Park in East London where Margaret Muller, an American artist, 
was fatally stabbed while out jogging. “I used to be on the neighbourhood committee and a 
policeman would come to our group,” I told the Observer. “When I asked him about it he gave me 
no information at all and then I asked a question under the Freedom of Information Act and they 
gave me the answer straightaway.” (Robins, 24 July 2005). 
 Importantly, I was watching how the law was being used in Scotland, particularly by Paul 
Hutcheon, political editor of the Sunday Herald. I phoned him and he became a useful source and ally 
in my own subsequent battle for MPs’ expenses. Hutcheon’s tenacious pursuit of detailed taxi 
receipts of Scottish politicians revealed numerous abuses in that system and led to the first 
resignation resulting from FOI in October 2005 of Scottish Conservative Leader David McLetchie. 
This inspired my own battle to open up parliament.  
 My FOIs flagged up current and future problems such as secrecy in food safety regulation 
(Brooke, 22 November 2004) which I identified by making the first FOIs to London’s local councils 
for restaurant inspections. I donated this data to the Centre for Investigative Journalism and it was 
the first relevant UK data trainers had used to train British journalists in data analytics.  I received 
three-year’s worth of prosecutions data in response to my FOI to the Crown Prosecution Service 
and, after analysing the data, produced a series for The Times revealing for the first time the 
disparities in conviction rates nationally (O’Neill, Gibb, Brooke, 23 November 2005). This was also 
the first time I had received a large digitised data set in response to my FOI and it forced me to 
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quickly learn Excel, Access and various data analysis programs.  I did another data story after 
receiving a large database from Transport for London of all incidents on the London Underground 
(Singh, Brooke, 20 March 2006). I also began making FOIs to parliament (Brooke, 27 March 2005) 
and for their expenses and allowances. Judging that getting contracts would be tough, I made a 
number of FOIs for these which I cited in my chapter on Private Companies where four of the five 
contracts I list were released as a result of FOIs I filed.  
 By making so many FOIs I was also testing out the appeals process. I made approximately a 
dozen appeals to the Information Commissioner. I also appealed an FOI request for the minutes of 
a BBC Board of Governor’s meeting to the Information Tribunal. Usually these minutes were 
published but the minutes from meetings after the Hutton Inquiry, from January 16-31, 2004 were 
not. Director General of the BBC Greg Dyke resigned on 29 January 2004.  I represented myself at 
the Information Tribunal (p90) and won the case39 (Brooke, 11 January 2007).  
Public awareness 
 In the first year of FOI, I wrote many explanatory articles about the law with the aim of 
educating various audiences (Brooke, 13 January 2005, 4 December 2005, 11 January 2005, 26 
January 2005). For people to exercise their right to access information they must first understand 
they have such a right. This is what academics call ‘citizenship literacy’ (Breit et al 2012: 12). 
Therefore, for a right to be effective people have to know of its existence and how to use it. As 
such, public awareness was an important aspect of my work. With YRTK I gave people “some 
understanding about what types of matters are administered by the different levels of 
government”(Breit et al: 13). As Ian Hislop, editor of Private Eye, wrote in the introduction to the 
second edition of YRTK: “Brooke does not merely want to conduct investigations herself. She 
wants you, the general public, to go out and find out about issues that concern you” (vii). 
 It was for this reason I contacted the National Union of Journalists to offer to teach a series 
of courses on using FOI. As I wrote in YRTK: “Journalists have an important role in representing 
                                                        
39 Guardian Newspapers Ltd and Heather Brooke v IC and the BBC (2007) EA/2006/0011; EA/2006/0013 
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and expanding the rights of the public, but in Britain too few take this responsibility seriously. They 
are the final check on state power, but too often the noble goals of public enlightenment are 
forsaken for an easy story.” (vii). I trained hundreds of working journalists who went on to publish a 
great many revealing articles such as Adele Waters, the campaigns editor at Nursing Standard who 
used FOI for their investigation into attrition rates of student nurses (Kirby, 2010; Cook, 2006) and 
David Gordon, the Belfast Telegraph’s investigations reporter who used the Act to dig into Ian Paisley 
Jr’s business connections (Gordon, 2008). Gordon’s revelations ultimately let to Paisley’s resignation 
as a Northern Ireland minister. Apart from my courses at the NUJ, I also trained journalists at the 
BBC, Channel 4, Trinity Mirror and the Centre for Investigative Journalism. My classes on FOI 
were used by the researchers and producers of shows such as Watchdog, Rogue Trader, Panorama, 
Dispatches, Inside London. British journalism academic Tony Harcup recommended YRTK as an 
‘extremely helpful book’ for practical advice on using FOI. (Harcup, 2015: 109). Many of the 
journalists I trained sought advice and/or sent me examples of their work. The cumulative effect 
was that a new norm was created, one in which stories were based on verifiable official information 
rather than unverifiable anonymous personal sources. In this way YRTK and my teaching around 
the YRTK methodology was instrumental in shifting British journalism toward a practice of using 
documented evidence to get to an objective truth.   
What changed? 
 When it was published, YRTK was the first and only book on access to information in the 
UK written for citizens. YRTK was a reference book but it was also infused with a political 
philosophy: that in a democracy the citizen is paramount and public servants are precisely that, there 
to serve the public not the other way around. Many of the issues I campaigned for in the first 
edition came to pass. Restaurant inspections began to be released (albeit not proactively but in 
response to individual FOIs) and ‘scores on the doors’ were published (Worthy 2010b: 14). 
Contracts for public services were released, some information about crime was published, some 
amalgamated information about MPs’ expenses and allowances were released, though another battle 
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loomed for the detailed receipts (see Chapter 9). My legal research had identified some 400 existing 
laws prohibiting disclosure, which I wrote about in The Times (Brooke, May 24, 2005). This 
pressured the Department of Constitutional Affairs (now the Ministry of Justice) to review these 
laws, repeal or amend them (Coppel, 2007: 921). As a result of my own campaigning, FOIs and 
research regarding the deleterious effect of imposing fees, the Government dropped its plans to do 
so in 200740. I identified a problem with proprietorial copyright and how that was obstructing the 
free flow and re-use of official information (Brooke, 27 September 2005) and the law was eventually 
amended to create an open public licence for official information41.  
 YRTK presented an alternative to the elitist model of politics. This was based on my own 
experience with public records as a journalist in the US where I saw the difference it made both in 
the practice of journalism but also citizens’ relationship to the state. Citizens in England were made 
impotent by their lack of information. They were in no position to have a conversation of equals 
with officials. They were kept wilfully ignorant. YRTK was designed to usher in not only a new way 
of doing journalism but also a new way of being a British citizen.  
                                                        
40 Press notice No. 35 of Session 2006-07, Constitutional Affairs Committee, 21 June 2007. 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/conaffcom/cac35-240607/ 
41 An overview of the licence can be found here: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/re-
using-public-sector-information/licensing-for-re-use/ 
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Chapter 8: The Silent State 
 
The Silent State is a collection of political essays and investigative reports inspired - in the words of 
Thomas Hobbes – “by the disorders of the present time”. (Hobbes:  496). I wrote the book in the 
immediate aftermath of the MPs’ expenses scandal as an angry riposte to a political system that had 
proved to be elitist and paternalistic. I used a collection of case studies and evidence to illustrate the 
problems inherent in such a system and boldly made the case for substantial democratic reform. 
 From 2003 to mid-2010, I had filed about 500 FOIs and written more than 60 newspaper and 
magazine articles (approximately 45,000 words) about democracy and/or FOI. I had witnessed first-
hand official propaganda and obfuscation and heard stories from scores of citizens who, like me, 
had been obstructed by a truculent state from exercising their democratic right to be enlightened 
and informed. The philosophical drive of the book was to boldly challenge what I saw as the state's 
distrust and suspicion of citizens and its overarching belief in its own superiority. This was the very 
opposite of the democratic ethos I had witnessed in Washington state.  
   I had long wanted to write a political treatise, being a great admirer of George Orwell (his 
Tribune columns, essays and books), Bernard Crick's In Defence of Politics (2005), Karl Popper's The 
Open Society and its Enemies (2003), Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776) and Rights of Man' (1791) and 
Mary Wollstonecraft's A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). I presented a Channel 4 Dispatches, 
“The Westminster Gravy Train” on 19 April 2009 detailing expense abuses of some MPs, but the 
expenses story did not take off until the Daily Telegraph began publishing articles based on a leaked 
disc of the unredacted expenses. On 15 May 2009, I published a 2,000-word article about my battle 
with parliament in The Guardian (Brooke, 15 May 2009) and a few days later, the BBC approached 
me about doing a docu-drama about this story. I signed a contract for The Silent State in June 2009 
with publishers William Heinemann (Random House), delivered the manuscript six months later 
and it was published April 2010 with a second edition in 2011 (it is the second edition to which page 
numbers refer).  
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What changed? 
The secret state was a bit less secret after I did my work. In the course of my activities I opened up 
parliament, Transport for London, the police and attempted to do the same for the courts (though 
less successfully). I also shined a light on intrusive state databases. The Silent State was a bestseller 
going into a second print run within its first weeks of publication and selling more than 30,000 
copies. I believe it tapped into a nationwide discontent with 'politics as usual'. I offered not only a 
take-down of the existing system but also a 'Manifesto for a new democracy' (254-260). The 
Conservative Party reflected the nation's mood with a manifesto titled ‘Invitation to Join the 
Government of Britain.' Transparency, democratic reform and citizens' rights all featured in their 
election rhetoric. On 19 May 2010, the new Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg gave a speech on the 
Big Society in which he promised, “this government is going to trust the people”. He criticised the 
‘intrusive’ nature of the state and pledged to govern in an “open, transparent [and] decent’ manner.” 
Clegg's speech exactly mirrors all the concerns identified in The Silent State, notably he announced 
that the state would no longer be silent; the citizen no longer serf:  
"This government is going to transform our politics so the state has far less control over you, 
and you have far more control over the state. This government is going to break up 
concentrations of power and hand power back to people, because that is quite simply how 
we can build a society that is fair. (Nick Clegg, 19 May 2010. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8691753.stm Last accessed 27 January 2016) 
 
 Political promises are one thing, but I outline some practical results from the democratic push in 
the introduction to the second edition (ix-xii). Notable among these: the abolition of ContactPoint, 
the National Identity Register and ID card. The campaign to ‘Free Our Data’ was taken up by the 
new government, proprietorial licenses abolished and a new system of public licenses created along 
with various open data initiatives such as creation of the London Data Store, Data.gov.uk and the 
Open Data Institute all tasked with making official information more readily accessible to the public. 
Mandatory publication of all government contracts above £25,000 and local government spending 
above £500 was introduced. The COINS database was opened. Crime maps became more timely 
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and detailed and senior salaries were proactively published. The UK went from being an open data 
backwater to ambitious world leader (Moss and Coleman 2014).  
Methodological approach  
 Although the manuscript was written at speed with an intensity that matched the political 
turmoil of the time, I had been accumulating sources and stories over the past six years. My 
methodology for this work was more heavily weighted towards case studies as I saw them as 
essential in showing the costs inherent in an elitist political system. I did about 30 in-depth 
interviews (plus a dozen or so inquiries to press officers) that fed into the book. These interviews 
were supplemented or corroborated by secondary sources to ensure accuracy. For example, my 
interview with Jane Clift (209-220) was supplemented by court documents used in her libel case 
against Slough. Interviews with Mark Kearney and Sally Murrer (188-202) were supplemented with 
material from the criminal case brought against them by Thames Valley Police. This material was 
not available from the courts but rather I obtained it from the lawyers involved in the case. This in 
itself provides more evidence of the patronage-based system endemic in England, whereby 
important civic information is not readily accessibly to the public who pay for it and in whose name 
it exists but instead relies on 'elite' connections and patronage. Luckily Sally Murrer and I had 
lawyers from the same firm. The same was true of Jane Clift who I came across by chance on a visit 
to the High Court. Slough's violent incident form (re-produced on page 217) was part of Clift's libel 
case but this documentation was unavailable to the public despite being part of the 'bundle' used in 
court. Instead, I relied on the patronage of her lawyers. Dependence on personal patronage for civic 
information is not consistent with a democratic regime. Britain may be the 'mother of all 
parliaments' but as I state in the introduction to The Silent State the reality is that it trades on a 
"mythical view of itself, because basic information paid for by the public and collected in our name 
is off-limits to the very people it is meant to benefit." (p2).  
 I found my sources in various ways. Those mentioned above were facilitated through lawyers. 
Simon Briscoe (73-5) and Rupert Collins-White (34-5) had attended my FOI training courses. I 
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conducted a long, in-person interview with Chief Statistician Michael Scholar (80-83) in order to get 
a full account of government influence of official statistics. Through my news cuttings, I identified 
other stories of interest and contacted the reporters directly by telephone for a more detailed 
account of the behind-the-scenes activities. Journalists such as Ben Leach of the Sunday Telegraph 
(p78), Sam Coates of The Times (108-112), Simon Walters of the Mail on Sunday (108-112), Paul 
Staines of Guido Fawkes website (112-115), Matthew Davis (p89), and Rob Evans of The Guardian, 
provided a detailed description of the events and incidents discussed.  
 Other sources included Tom Loosemore and Stefan Magdalinski (119-133) of UpMyStreet; 
Julian Todd and Francis Irving who had joined MySociety; Richard Pope and Harry Metcalfe (135-
141) who were technologists interested in democratic reform. From Pope and Metcalfe I learned 
that Royal Mail had sued the directory company 192.com over the postcode database and so 
interviewed CEO Alastair Crawford (138-141) to hear his full account of that litigation. 
 Stories about people are effective because they illustrate the real impact of policy and political 
systems. The cost of reputation management is made clear reading about how West Yorkshire police 
silenced Philip Balmforth because he was too successful at raising public awareness about forced 
marriage and honour killings (39-44). In order to preserve the intensity and pace of the book it is 
not laden with excessive footnotes or endnotes. Instead, I cite my sources or evidence in the body 
copy where I can. It is worth mentioning, too, that due to the challenging material in this book it 
had to go through a libel read and a folder of evidence accompanied the manuscript to support all 
my claims. The lawyers examined the manuscript and approved it with only a few small changes, 
mostly relating to the police. I was told the police are extremely litigious and well funded by the 
Police Federation so great care is needed when writing about them.  
What I found out 
 The Silent State documented, among other things, the state’s collection of citizen data in the 
form of secretive and unaccountable databases. I focused particularly on databases that collected 
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intrusive data on children such as ContactPoint. Partly as a result of publication and subsequent 
publicity, the worst of these overly intrusive databases were scrapped including ContactPoint.  
 My list of state databases in Chapter 1 was compiled based on interviews with experts and 
sources, and extensive reading of news articles and reports such as the Foundation for Information 
Policy Research and the Lords Report Surveillance: Citizens and the State from the 2008-9 session. I 
went back to the Cabinet Office's 2002 Privacy and Data-sharing report and saw the early desire to 
collect data on children and their families (p27). In order to get to the bottom of school pupil 
surveillance (19-23) I had to read across the parliamentary record to see how the same unsuccessful 
policies had been recycled and re-branded into 'Every Child Matters'.  Terri Dowty, director of 
Action on Rights for Children, was an important source, as she had been campaigning in this area 
for years and had an institutional memory of the legislative changes. I checked her statements 
against the parliamentary record and confirmed, for example, the recycled re-branding of the 
ContactPoint database. I obtained a copy of the Common Assessment Framework (24-5) to see 
what information it collected from children and found it exactly matched what Dowty had told me.  
 I wanted to challenge state surveillance both on moral and practical grounds. Some ideas I 
expanded from articles I had written earlier (such as Brooke, 13 October 2005, 30 October 2006 and 
4 September 2007) and for CCTV I wrote an in-depth investigation on the effectiveness of CCTV 
for Wired magazine. I wanted to test state officials' claims that surveillance made us safer. As I wrote 
in Wired:  
"The UK has more CCTV cameras per capita than any European country, yet figures 
released in July 2009 by the European Commission and United Nations showed Britain's 
recorded rate of violent crime surpassed any other country in Europe. Does CCTV do 
anything to make us safer? If so, at what cost?" (Brooke, 1 April 2010).    
 
I tracked back to find the original source for the oft-quoted statistic that the average Londoner is 
caught on camera 300 times a day to Simon Davies who was then director of Privacy International. 
He told me it had been just a rough guess based on extrapolation. Yet it was treated as scientific fact 
by most journalists. I challenged the idea that the state knows best by juxtaposing it against 
examples of how it does not. I looked at the targeting of Haringay social worker Nevras Kemal (32-
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33) and the tragedy of Baby P's death as well as Rupert Collins-White's Kafka-esque argument with 
his council to give him back his identity (34-36). 
 I continued to test what officials said against reality. So when they claimed FOI was a burden, 
I checked to see how much they were spending to tell the public what they wanted us to know. 
Expanding on from my investigations into police PR (Brooke, 23 May 2008), I collaborated with the 
Taxpayers’ Alliance to collect and analyse local government spending on PR and external 
communications (45-56). I also looked at central government PR and discovered unlike the 
mandated registers of PR and marketing expenditure local governments had to keep, central 
government had exempted itself from this requirement. Therefore, to get these figures I put in 
FOIs, the results of which I include in pages 53-57. Scholars agree that government web sites are 
historically rose-tinted (Davis, 1999; Etzioni, 2010: 398; Porumbescu 2013) and the same was found 
with local freesheets (Gilligan, 2009). An informed public need access to the information they want, 
not only what officials want them to know.  
 In Chapter 5 of The Silent State, I examine cost as a means of restricting access to information 
and what effect this has for democracy and innovation. I cite case studies showing the economic 
damage, for example, of the government’s use of proprietorial copyright for information collected 
or stored on behalf of the public. Words like 'protected' and 'safeguarded' were often used by 
officials in relation to official information, revealing an attitude of entitlement and ownership. They 
reveal a belief that official information ‘belongs’ not to the people but to officials and as such it is 
their prerogative to decide what is good for the people to know and not to know. Again, this is 
directly counter to the democratic philosophy expressed in the Washington state public records law 
mentioned earlier.  
 My investigation of public access to court information comprised interviews with court 
journalists such as Guy Toynes and Scott Wilford (Central News), James Brewster (Strand News) 
and court sketcher Priscilla Coleman as well as lawyers who advised me on policy and procedure. I 
then tested the principle of open justice against reality by visiting both the High Court and Central 
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Criminal Court (The Old Bailey) as a member of the public, attempting to both see justice being 
done and obtain court records. My experiences are related in Chapter 6 of The Silent State.  
From FOI to data journalism 
 By the time I came to write The Silent State, I was frustrated with the obstructive attitude I 
encountered when asking for even basic civic information such as the salary and perks of the top 
public servants. For example, City of London Police, along with many forces, refused to disclose the 
full pay and perks of their Chief Constable stating in their FOI response: "We do not believe that 
disclosing the exact value of the commissioner's bonus will add significantly to the public interest”. 
(Brooke, 10 August 2009). I had to fight even such basic requests through to the Information 
Commissioner.  Twice the Government had attempted to scale back FOI and/or introduce fees. 
The Royal Family was secretly lobbying ministers to give them an absolute exemption from FOI, 
which they received in May 2010. (Brooke, 25 May 2010). Even after my High Court victory, MPs 
voted against implementing reforms. It was clear that parliament was not going to reform willingly.  
 Journalistically, I was also becoming disillusioned with FOI. I had invested large amounts of 
time and resources trying to base investigations on solid facts gleaned through FOI. While these 
were often successful at shedding light on important aspects of civic life such as the criminal justice 
system or transport, payment did not reflect the effort involved. I spent hours analysing Transport 
for London's incident database obtained using FOI. I had to learn Microsoft Access and SQL in 
order to analyse and query a database that comprised 38, 448 rows of incidents, yet I received less 
then if I had written a comment piece. Similarly my large-scale investigations for The Times such as 
“Justice by Postcode”, Police PR, and “Police misconduct costs forces £44m” (23 November 2005, 
23 May 2008, 3 December 3, 2007) took months yet I made the same amount as for a quick 
comment piece and had to share bylines with staff reporters. These perverse incentives have only 
increased as news organisations cut back on news staff. Apart from Chapter 8 (Brooke, 2011) about 
my FOI battle with parliament, I used FOI sparingly in The Silent State.  
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 My work had also evolved. YRTK was a reference book about FOI so by necessity it entailed 
making extensive use of the Act in order to gain experience and knowledge of it. I also did a lot of 
training and for YRTK as discussed earlier. By now this was paying off. Many other journalists were 
using FOI to break their own stories. The Taxpayers’ Alliance was now well versed in the Act and 
had created its own system for making targeted and nationwide requests, the results of which were 
successfully getting on the front pages of national and local newspapers. Director Jonathan Isaby 
told me recently that it now routinely teams up with the Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday to do FOIs 
for public sector rich list investigations (7 March 2016).  
 As a result of being one of the first practitioners of data journalism in the UK, I set up a 
three-week course in data journalism at City University London’s graduate journalism department. 
Through this class and my lecturing on FOI, I was able to educate a new generation of journalists 
about FOI and data journalism. Many of them became the first data journalists in British 
newsrooms such as James Ball (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Wikileaks, Guardian, Buzzfeed), 
George Arbuthnott (Sunday Times) and Sebastian Payne (Spectator, Financial Times). My student and 
intern James Ball became Data Editor at The Guardian and was part of the team that won the Pulitzer 
Prize for reporting on the Snowden stories.  
 Another great dissemination came with the creation of the website What Do They Know.  
In 2004, I met with Tom Steinberg and Francis Irving of the newly formed MySociety. I pitched to 
them the idea of a Freedom of Information filer and archive modelled on the National Security 
Archive at George Washington University. I had visited the Archive and met Director Thomas S. 
Blanton who talked me through its origins and operation. I explained all this to Steinberg who took 
it back to his team and they voted to create it. I then worked with developer Francis Irving while he 
built the website: http://whatdotheyknow.com. There are now 311,706 FOI requests to 16,883 
authorities on the site. 
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British ‘democracy’ exposed 
 The strongest chapters of The Silent State are 5 and 8 illuminating the elitist attitudes held by 
those in power toward citizens. The way the Department of Education stymied public access to 
school test results or MPs blocked access to the parliamentary record to hide from constituents how 
they voted is illustrative. “There was no sense of this being a collaborative effort between the 
electorate and those they elected."(Tom Loosemore, creator of TheyWorkForYou.com cited in 
Brooke, 2011: 131). If not for the work of the civic volunteers detailed in chapter five of The Silent 
State, the British public would have little to no idea how to contact their MP, how they voted or 
their attendance in parliament. And instead of official information being used to incentivise start-up 
businesses, the state used all its might to maintain an absolute monopoly not just on the collection 
of official information but also its presentation. In no way was this stranglehold of public 
information consistent with the criteria of democracy laid out by Dahl (1989). The dissonance 
between democratic rhetoric and reality was clearly untenable. Something had to give. For state 
copyright of public information there could be no compromise. "The law simply had to be changed" 
(p121) which it did with the election of a new government and creation of public licenses. 
Parliament, however, was far from willing to give up its sovereignty and share power with the 
people.  
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Chapter 9: MPs’ expenses 
 
The scandal that resulted from the disclosure of MPs’ expenses has been described in superlative 
terms both for its journalistic and political impact. It was “one of the biggest stories in modern 
British history”, a story that “rocked cultural, political and journalistic spheres” (Burgess, 2015: 138). 
Politically, it was an “incendiary device thrown directly at the political establishment” (Kelso 2009: 
334) and produced a scandal that “shook Westminster to the core” (VanHeerde, 2014). It led to 
reform of the system of MPs’ allowances and, with the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, the 
establishment of the Independent Standards Authority. According to Worthy (2014a) and Hazell et 
al (2012) the scandal also led to “intense discussion of constitutional reform” with Gordon Brown 
and David Cameron vying in the General Election of 2010 over who could offer the most. 
Cameron’s reform platform included public recall power of MPs (which became the Recall of MPs 
Act 2015), a decrease in the number of MPs42, and after the election, a move to change the voting 
system (which contributed to the 2011 Alternative Vote referendum). Most notably, the Commons 
Fees Office was replaced by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA). The Times 
summed up the changes with a front page article headlined ‘New order’: 
Parliament was forced to surrender its ancient right to run its own affairs on a momentous 
day in which the Speaker, Michael Martin, paid for the scandal over MPs’ expenses with his 
job. The Prime Minister announced that the financial affairs of MPs would be taken over by 
independent regulators.” (Philip Webster, ‘New order’ The Times, 20 May 2009: 1) 
 
 This scandal resulted directly from my five-year investigation into MPs’ allowances and 
expenses outlined in Chapter 8 of The Silent State and the articles attached in the appendix (Brooke, 
15 May 2009; Barkham, 29 May 2008). My work eventually led to a High Court case against 
parliament that fundamentally changed law and policy (High Court [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin) 
Case No: CO2888/2008), and for the first time in its history, parliament had to account to an 
                                                        
42 The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 called for the abolition of 50 constituencies. However, 
in January 2013 MPs voted to delay this decision. It was back on the table by February 2016. See: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/12/number-of-mps-to-cut-from-650-to-600 
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independent judiciary and then to a regulator over how MPs’ claimed expenses.  The court ruling 
and subsequent leak of the data led to a number of high-level political resignations as well as full-
scale reform of the parliamentary expense regime.  
 While some credited the Daily Telegraph for this sea change, others credited my work, stating 
that I “did more to rid us of a corrupt, anachronistic and unjust system of governance than anyone 
and, if there is a hero of our troubled political times, it is her” (Arlidge, 2010). The net result was 
that a new government was elected in May 2010 on a mandate of transparency, which they have 
delivered in part. The title of their Manifesto, "Invitation to join the Government of Britain" reveals 
an understanding that elitist politics were no longer acceptable to the British public.  
FOI wins the day 
 As Worthy notes, “Far from being a ‘simple’ story of ‘information disseminated’, the expenses 
scandal represents FOI working within a complex chain of events in very particular circumstances.” 
(2012: 2)  While the Freedom of Information Act directly led to the scandal (it was through this Act 
and my High Court victory that parliament was forced to collate and digitise all MPs’ expenses into 
one record), Worthy notes how FOI “also worked alongside other, more old-fashioned 
accountability instruments; investigative journalists doggedly pursuing an issue” (2014: 20). 
 What was unusual about my FOIs to parliament was that I targeted the entire system rather 
than a few ‘bad apples’. As mentioned previously, British journalists focus primarily on individual 
cases of wrongdoing. I had wider ambitions and preferred to focus on whole systems. As such, I 
asked for the expense receipts for all parliamentarians not just one or two whom I suspected. From 
my research doing YRTK, I gained access to the rulebook of parliament (the Green Book) and by 
reading this, it was clear to me there was very little accountability for how MPs spent public money. 
As I noted in an interview with the Guardian,  "If any of us were faced with a huge bag of free 
money and very little accountability, it would be human nature that you would make the most of 
it.”(Barkham, 29 March 2008).  It was on this hunch that I began to target parliament. As there were 
no public records laws similar to the one I’d used in Washington state, I relied on FOI as my lever 
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to prise out data.  One of the key purposes of FOI is to prevent and detect corruption and the abuse 
of power. FOI has “long played a part in uncovering expenses misuse and other dubious activities in 
many other regimes” (Worthy, 2014a: 11), and once the UK Act came into force, requests to 
parliament overwhelmingly focused on the House of Commons, specifically the activities of MPs. 
(Worthy and Bourke, 2011). 
 The way in which the scandal unfolded is not solely a story about FOI, however. There are 
other factors involved including the coincident publication of the claims at the height of the ‘age of 
austerity’ during an economic crisis, as well as news values. Even so, the most obvious cause for the 
escalation and catastrophic consequences of the scandal was parliament’s trenchant and continued 
resistance to reform based on an attitude that the public did not have a right to know.  
 The House of Commons was locked in a textbook vicious cycle. The more they maintained 
secrecy, the more mistakes were made. “With more mistakes, public officials become more 
defensive; to protect themselves, they seek even more secrecy, narrowing in the circle still further, 
eroding still further the quality of decision-making.” (Stiglitz, 1999: 15). To change the vicious cycle 
to a virtuous one required either reform and regular release of information or, if secrecy were 
continued, a dramatic disclosure. Sir Christopher Kelly, Chairman of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life lamented parliament’s inability to reform itself: “Speaking as a citizen, I would have 
much preferred parliament to sort out this issue for itself some years ago so democracy would not 
have been damaged in the way it has.” (Evidence given to the Public Administration Committee, 4 
February 201043), I take issue with the contention that transparency damages democracy (an idea we 
have not heard the last of), but the main thrust of what Kelly says is true: that all the energy spent 
trying to stop the public seeing reality, would have been better spent ensuring reality could withstand 
public scrutiny.  
 A fuller narrative of the MPs’ expenses investigation is found in Chapter 8 of The Silent State. I 
detail here aspects of my main methodologies: the use of sources, FOI and litigation.  
                                                        
43 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmpubadm/332/10020406.htm). 
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FOI as crowbar of reform 
I was aware of the work of Paul Hutcheon, political editor of the Sunday Herald who made FOI 
requests for Scottish MSPs' expenses. I corresponded and eventually met Hutcheon in person and 
we shared advice and tips. While I learned from the Scottish example, the UK parliament did not. 
As Kevin Dunion noted when he was Scottish Information Commissioner, “rather than resist 
further disclosure, the presiding Officer of the Scottish parliament agreed to the extensive 
publication of all expense claims, which occasioned no further scandal” (Dunion 2011: 440). Resist 
is exactly what the UK parliament decided to do, which energised and intensified the issue. As 
Stiglitz notes, “secrecy raises the price of information” (1999: 13), however, it is also the case that 
political institutions tend to be resistant to change as formal rules ‘lock in’ the status quo, making 
reform almost impossible (Pierson 2000, 490–491). Historical institutional theory, for example, 
“conceives of public policymaking and political change as characterized by extended time periods of 
considerable stability, referred to as ‘path-dependency’, interrupted by turbulent ‘formative 
moments’” (Peters et al 2005: 1276).  
 I understood from my experience in Washington state that an open system incentivised good 
behaviour, so I surmised the opposite must be true of a secret system. Every defensive reaction 
from parliament further signalled an internal anxiety that the parliamentary system could not 
withstand public scrutiny. As such it increased my own, and eventually others’, interest in seeing 
what was so exhaustively fought to conceal. Some academics take the view that “parliament was 
already a very open institution” (Worthy, 2014a: 15) and cite examples such as 
TheyWorkForYou.com. However, as discussed in previous chapters, parliament was in no way 
friendly to the creators of that website and this obstruction also served to attract my attention.   
 On 2 February 2004 I began an email correspondence with Judy Wilson who was in charge of 
FOI in parliament at that time. I asked about MPs’ expenses and she told me that they would be 
published in October 2004 in preparation for the passage of the Act. I waited and in the meantime, 
made a few requests using the Open Government Code. What came out in October 2004 was only 
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bulk and amalgamated figures which are useless for determining if claims are legitimate or not. In 
order to determine a claim’s legitimacy, one has to know the details and this was precisely what 
parliament refused to publish. So I sent my first official FOI to parliament in January 2005 for the 
names and salaries of MPs’ staff. I chose this query after interviewing political reporter Michael 
Crick (then at BBC Newsnight) who said it was an ‘open secret’ in the parliamentary lobby that MPs 
had family members on the payroll, some of whom did little or no work. This request was refused 
by parliament. I appealed internally and then to the Information Commissioner. However, my case 
eventually came to a dead end on 4 September 2006 when the Speaker of the House issued a 
certificate providing an absolute exemption on the grounds that the release of this information 
would be ‘likely to prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs’. The certificate is referred to in 
Information Commissioner Decision Notice FS50073128: Heather Brooke vs House of Commons.   
 I moved on and began asking for details of other types of allowances. According to the Green 
Book, the Additional Costs Allowance (ACA) “reimburses Members of Parliament for expenses 
wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred when staying overnight away from their main UK 
residence…for the purpose of performing parliamentary duties.” (2006, Green Book: 294). At this 
time the ACA was £23,000 a year in addition to an MP’s basic salary of £60,000. The following is a 
brief synopsis of the journey for this particular FOI request (see Appendix for supplementary 
documentation). 
March 20 2006 I file FOI for a breakdown of all MPs’ ACA claims 
28 April 2006 HoC rejects my request stating “disclosure of 
anything more detailed than a bulk figure would be 
‘unfair’ to MPs.” I ask for internal review. 
12 June 2006 My internal review is rejected and I appeal to the 
Information Commissioner 
Sept-Oct 2006 In internal correspondence with the ICO, the 
Commons now add an additional exemption that my 
request goes over the cost limit. This leads the ICO 
to instruct the Commons to assist me in formulating 
my request so that it falls within the cost limit.  
7 November 2006 The Commons write to me saying my request would 
fall within the cost limit if it ‘required the House to 
examine no more than 25-30 files.’ 
30 Nov 2006  I submit an amended request for the detailed ACA 
claims for 2005-2006 of Tony Blair, David Cameron, 
Ming Campbell, Gordon Brown, George Osborne, 
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John Prescott, George Galloway, Margaret Beckett, 
William Hague, Mark Oaten. 
18 May 2007 David Maclean MP’s Private Members’ Bill passes in 
the Commons. It would exempt parliament from 
FOIA. It fails to find a sponsor in the Lords. 
Maclean is later found to have claimed more than 
£20,000 under the ACA to improve his farmhouse 
before selling it for £750,000 (Patrick Hennessy and 
Melissa Kite, Sunday Telegraph, 16 May 2009).  
13 June 2007 ICO issues their decision that rejects my demand for 
detailed receipts but orders disclosure broken down 
by artificial categories. Both myself and the House of 
Commons appeal this decision to the Information 
Tribunal.  
 
Litigation 
 From the ICO decision notice I learned there were three other people with similar FOIs.  I 
contacted them all to see if they were going to appeal and if not, try and persuade them to do so. I 
had been at the Information Tribunal before (to fight for disclosure of the BBC minutes in January 
2007) so I knew the importance of having allies when taking on the state. I emailed the other 
requesters suggesting we should appeal together so “it would show we were all in it for the public 
interest, not for our own scoops.” (Brooke, July/August 2009).  I had met Nicola Beckford from my 
BBC training courses. She told me she would not be appealing. Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas from the 
Sunday Times also told me he was unlikely to appeal. That left Ben Leapman from the Sunday 
Telegraph. He was not sure but we arranged to meet for lunch. I laid out our case as I saw it and told 
him I had obtained the services of Hugh Tomlinson QC. He said his newspaper would not pay for 
legal representation but if he and I could proceed together he would go to the Tribunal. I agreed. 
 I wrote the first draft of my grounds for appeal and gave them to Tomlinson who put it into 
legal language (see Appendix) and shared this with Leapman who used it as a model for his own 
filing. I arranged for a statement from David Banisar, a noted expert on global FOI and privacy law, 
and compiled evidence on the case law from Scotland and the United States. At the last minute, 
Ungoed-Thomas was granted an ‘out-of-time’ appeal and joined our case with his own legal 
representation paid for by his employer. The hearing took place over two days in February 2008. 
The main witness was Andrew Walker, Director General of Resources at the House of Commons 
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(otherwise known as the Fees Office). It was the first time I was able to interrogate (through my 
lawyer) such a senior official responsible for information control. His responses revealed the 
entitlement I had suspected existed among the privileged elite. Walker was taken aback by the very 
idea that the public should have a right to look at MPs’ receipts.  
“What you are doing is preparing a peephole into the private lives of a member, which will 
either distract them or lead them into additional questions which they feel they have to 
defend themselves.” (Brooke, 2011: 240). 
When he said,  “MPs should be allowed to carry on their duties free from interference” it was an 
encapsulation of the “narrow and elitist nature of the British political system” described by Tant 
(1993: 1), and a political ideology that “legitimates the concentration of nearly all of the power in the 
Executive, very little in the legislature, and practically none at all with the people; a kind of 
'retrospective' democracy at best." (Tant: 30). Walker made this perfectly clear when he said: “Public 
confidence is not the overriding concern per se ..." Finally he used the oft-repeated claim made by 
defenders of an elite political system:  “Transparency will damage democracy.” (Brooke, 2011: 240-
24344) 
 As stated previously, it is in the details that one gets to the truth, so this was an excellent 
opportunity to probe the detail of the expenses system. We asked Walker how the receipts were 
checked.  
 “There is checking where there are receipts. Where there are no receipts there is no checking.” 
(p241) 
 We asked about the Green Book, which stated that receipts were required but only for claims 
greater than £250. Why £250? 
 Walker: “If it’s below £250 the assumption is that it’s going to be reasonable.” (p242) 
 We asked for more detail about the ‘food rule’ allowing members to claim £400 without a 
receipt. Was that daily, weekly, monthly?  
                                                        
44 I made this transcript during the Tribunal hearing. No official written or oral record was made public and I was 
refused permission to record my own hearing. 
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 “My understanding is that members are well aware. I am unable to tell you how they are well 
aware of it,” Walker said. Under cross-examination he admitted that he had no idea.  
 We learned about the ‘John Lewis list’ and asked to see it but Walker refused on the grounds 
that “if it was made public, the maximum price we’ll allow for an item, that would become the going 
rate.”  
 My lawyer made the obvious point: “What you seem to be saying is that you don’t trust them. 
And yet this entire system is based on trust.” (p243) 
 A contentious part of our case was asking for the second and main home addresses of MPs 
along with their detailed claims for those homes. Leapman and I decided these were essential for 
without these addresses one could not determine whether the claims made for the ‘second home’ 
were legitimate or not. We put forward evidence of how ‘flipping’ from main to second home was 
one way ACA claims had been abused in the past, citing such cases as that of former MP Michael 
Trend who was exposed in a Mail on Sunday investigation December 15, 2002: “MP took £100,000 
in Bogus Home Claims”. A report by the Select Committee on Standards and Privileges in February 
2003 found Trend did not have a second home and had been using the ACA to pay the mortgage on 
his own family home in Windsor. This abuse only came to light due to the journalist following 
Trend for days.   
 On 26 February 2008 the Tribunal ruled in our favour that the parliamentary expense system 
was ‘deeply unsatisfactory’ and the: 
 “laxity of and lack of clarity in the rules for ACA is redolent of a culture very different from 
that which exists in the commercial sphere or in most other public sector organisations 
today…in our judgment these features, coupled with the very limited nature of the checks, 
constitute a recipe for confusion, inconsistency and the risk of misuse…the shortfall both in 
transparency and in accountability is acute.” (Information Tribunal EA/2007/0060 and 
others, 26 February 2008). 
 
 I thought that was the end of it. However, on the last day allowed, the Commons filed an 
appeal to the High Court. Parties are obliged to have formal representation at the High Court and 
must pay costs if they lose. While the Commons were funded by the public purse, I was not. I would 
have to cover my own costs and would be personally liable for all costs if I lost. After speaking with 
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my lawyers, I took out legal insurance and switched from a pro bono agreement to a conditional fee 
arrangement. On 7 May 2008 we began our hearing before three of the most senior High Court 
judges. I was not overly optimistic. But, after hearing parliament’s case, the Court upheld the 
Tribunal’s ruling and issued a strong judgment of their own ordering the disclosure not only of 
detailed expense claims but also MPs’ second and main addresses.  
“We have no doubt that the public interest is at stake. We are not here dealing with idle 
gossip, or public curiosity about what in truth are trivialities. The expenditure of public 
money through the payment of MPs’ salaries and allowances is a matter of direct and 
reasonable interest to taxpayers ... In the end they bear on public confidence in the operation 
of our democratic system at its very pinnacle, the House of Commons itself. (High Court 
2008 [2008] EWHC 1084 (Admin) Case No: CO2888/2008) 
 
 I received the details of the MPs involved in my case and worked with the Sunday Times on a 
multi-page splash. Of more interest to me, however, was seeing the full workings of the entire 
system. Parliament had committed to digitising and publishing all MPs expense receipts by October 
2008 as a result of the High Court ruling. The scale of this publication was set out in the following 
parliamentary answer by Nick Harvey to a question about the digitisation process: 
It is therefore planned that the scanning of some 1.3 million documents and first stage 
redaction to remove details such as addresses, telephone numbers, banking details and 
account numbers will be undertaken under secure conditions by a contractor familiar with 
providing services to Government and Parliament whose staff have been security cleared. 
(HC Deb 1 July 2008 c741W) 
 
MPs were particularly adamant about withholding their home addresses. Although we had been 
through all this in the High Court and won the argument, that didn’t stop MPs from using 
secondary legislation to exempt their addresses. The Freedom of Information (Parliament and 
National Assembly for Wales) Order 2008 was passed 17 July, 2008.  
 In spite of this, the October deadline came and went without publication. A new date was 
given of December 2008. I grew suspicious that too much was being redacted in spite of the narrow 
constraints provided by the High Court ruling. My previous dealings with parliament led me to 
conclude they were up to something. This turned out to be accurate. On 15 January 2009, Leader of 
the House Harriet Harman announced that motions would be brought forward on 22 January to 
exempt parliament from the FOIA in a repeat of MacLean’s earlier failed bill. 
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TheyWorkForYou.com and WriteToThem.com started a Facebook campaign against the proposals 
while I briefed all the lobby journalists I had come to know over the years. As with the Maclean bill, 
this one capsized under the weight of its own negative publicity.  
 On 19 April 2009, I presented the Channel 4 Dispatches documentary about MPs’ expenses 
titled ‘The Westminster Gravy Train’. During the previous two months of research we had pieced 
together as much as we could from the public record. However, we could only tell a very partial 
story because we did not have MPs’ addresses or the actual claim forms. What this evidences is how 
whole areas of public life are made unaccountable because the information needed for checking and 
verification is unavailable. This closed system creates a type of journalism reliant on patronage and 
leaks, traded for favour or money.  
Leak & publication 
 Leaks are often committed with the hope of ‘destabilizing the epistemic space’ (Quill, 2014: 
84). They create an existential challenge for the secret state but can act as a restorative for 
democracy. John Wick, the middleman who brokered the deals between an unknown parliamentary 
insider and various newspapers, explained the source’s motivation for leaking:  
“critical information—particularly the removal of addresses from the files—would lead to 
many of the scams never being publicly exposed. The source was adamant that the key thing 
was that both the information and the way in which it was handled should be in the public 
domain and that its release was in the public interest.” (Wick, 22 May 2009).  
 
 A few newspapers picked one or two items from the discs but it wasn’t until the Daily Telegraph 
paid for the entire dataset and proceeded to roll out weeks of stories from its investigations that the 
scandal reached critical mass. Media and public attention focused on high-profile and unusual claims 
such as a duck house and Douglas Hogg’s moat cleaning, however there were many more serious 
abuses such as Elliot Morley’s claims for a mortgage he’d paid off two years prior, and other 
instances of fraud. He along with former MPs Jim Devine, David Chaytor, Eric Illsley and Denis 
MacShane and former Lords John Taylor and Paul White went to prison for fraud. A review of the 
expenses system by Sir Thomas Legg reported a system that was ‘deeply flawed’ and ordered MPs to 
return £1.3milion. Legg noted a “prevailing lack of transparency” and that officials had a “culture of 
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deference” to MPs (Legg Report: 5, in House of Commons Members Estimate Committee, First 
Report of Session 2009–10).  
 The Commons did not release the official data until June 2009 but so much was blacked out, 
or redacted, that this, too, fanned public distrust and disdain as it provided concrete evidence of 
how parliament was using privacy to avoid accountability. According to Daily Telegraph reporters 
Winnett and Rayner, “none of the scams uncovered by the newspaper would have ever come to 
light if there had not been a leak of the uncensored version” (2009: 347). The removal of home 
addresses hid the practice of ‘flipping’ first and second homes to maximise claims and tax avoidance 
(2009: 347). 
 It is worth mentioning that without the FOI and subsequent court battle there would have 
been no disk to leak. “Only the total claimed by each MP is kept in electronic format,” stated the 
Commons’ FOI Officer Bob Castle and “very little information relating to a detailed breakdown of 
the ACA is held electronically.” (Letter, 10 October 2006 from Nicole Duncan to Bob Castle, See 
Appendix). Even the Daily Telegraph accepts it was my FOIA case that “led to the expenses data 
being compiled electronically” (Winnet and Rayner, 2009: 11). 
Aftermath 
 The long, drawn-out process of publishing MPs’ expenses served to stoke public interest in 
the issue and make parliament look secretive. As Kelly noted: “One of the more shameful aspects of 
the whole episode is the way in which the House of Commons fought for so long against the notion 
that the Freedom of Information Act should apply to them in the same way as it does to everyone 
else in public life.” (2009: 2)   
 The main political impact of the scandal was stated at the beginning of this chapter but I will 
add a few final thoughts. Worthy writes that the “release of MPs’ expenses destabilized the 
government” (Worthy, 2010: 562). It led to a wave of resignations (the Speaker plus six Ministers) 
and nearly a fifth of MPs (120) stepped down at the 2010 election. Eggers and Fischer (2011) found 
the decision to retire was influenced not so much by public opinion but an MP’s judgment that the 
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public “would shoulder less of the cost of his or her second home in the future” (p2). Some 
academics have pointed out that those MPs who did stand again were not always punished for their 
expense abuse. Research has shown how the institutional makeup of British politics works against 
voters learning about the conduct of their specific MP (Cain et al., 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995; 
Pattie and Johnston, 2004; Kam, 2009). However Vivyan et al (2012) showed this was not the case 
with the MPs’ expenses scandal where voters did know about their MPs’ behaviour yet, “the British-
style party-centric political system works against voters conditioning their vote choice on MP 
behaviour” (p762). Open lists or primaries, they suggest, would allow voters to separate voting for 
party from voting for their MP. Eggers and Fischer (2011) note the degree MP’s were punished for 
expense abuses was modest in comparison to voters’ responses to corruption in the US and other 
settings. 
 I agree that in the current political system, citizens have limited options. Their power is 
restricted to voting for a pre-selected party candidate. Transparency only shows what is there, it 
cannot guarantee how people will feel about what is there and indeed De Licht finds that, “knowing 
more about what one’s representatives do without being able to do anything about it—should one 
so wish—may instead lead to stronger feelings of powerlessness” (2014:116). De Licht calls this the 
‘frustration effect’. We can see in the recurrent ‘theme’ of MPs expenses a generalised expression of 
frustration with a system that people feel is unsatisfactory but are unable to change in any 
meaningful way.  
 In terms of the creation of IPSA, I gave evidence to the Committee on Standards in Public 
Life’s Review of Members’ Allowances on 30 June 2009 stating that IPSA was not my preferred 
solution to the problem. I wanted a direct link between ruler and ruled, so anyone could look at an 
MPs’ expense receipts as I had with my politicians in Washington state. That is still not possible. 
Tony Wright MP, then chairman of the Commons Public Administration Committee, picked up on 
my criticism of the creation of IPSA saying: “you do not make a system more effective by increasing 
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the number of regulators; you improve it by making the lines of authority clear, simple and 
transparent so everyone knows exactly who is responsible for what” (Hearing, 4 February 201045). 
Journalistic Impact 
 
 Expenses have become a trope in modern investigative journalism. It continues to be an 
evolving story. Even after the initial round of resignations, investigations, sanctions, paybacks and 
retirements, parliament has continued to find itself in the news for all the wrong reasons. In May 
2011 David Laws resigned as Chief Secretary to the Treasury after it was revealed that his rent 
payments went to his partner (Guardian, 29 May 2010). In October 2012, Speaker John Bercow 
wrote to IPSA asking them to keep secret the details of MPs’ landlords citing ‘privacy’. The press 
noted this would allow the continued cover up of MPs renting from each other. Minister of State for 
Europe, Denis MacShane resigned in November 2012 after he was found to have submitted false 
invoices for expense claims. The Standards and Privileges Committee46 investigating the case said, 
“this is so far from what would be acceptable in any walk of life that we recommend that Mr 
MacShane be suspended from the service of the House for twelve months” (Standards and 
Privileges 2012: 24). Culture Secretary Maria Miller resigned in April 2014 over her second home 
allowances claims. Expenses have been investigated in other sectors too. Lords’ allowances were 
reformed and changes made to peers’ tax status (Hazell et al. 2012). Other public officials’ expenses 
have similarly been investigated such as vice chancellors47, police chiefs, and local authorities48. 
Other jurisdictions, too, have been inspired by the success of the MPs’ expenses investigation to 
conduct their own. One example was Belfast Telegraph’s David Gordon who came on one of my early 
FOI courses and subsequently used the Act to dig into Ian Paisley Jr’s business connections. His 
revelations ultimately led to the Northern Ireland minister’s resignation.  
                                                        
45 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmpubadm/332/10020406.htm) 
46 At the beginning of 2013, the Committee on Standards and Privileges was split to allow the Committee on Standards 
to employ lay members and is now a former Committee of the House of Commons. It has been replaced by the 
Committee on Standards and the Committee of Privileges. 
47 ‘University vice-chancellor spent £42,000 of taxpayers' money jetting around the world in BUSINESS class in just one 
year’ and ‘Pay row over university chiefs on £260,000 a year’, Daily Mail, 5 March 2015  
48 Worthy et al, 2011, recounting testimony from local councils that a ‘wave’ of FOI requests hit local government asking 
for allowances and salaries. 
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 In my view, the solution to ending this cycle of expenses scandal is simply to proactively 
publish these figures. Yet there appears to be a cultural dislike among a majority of English public 
officials to tell the public how public money is spent. What one has to take into account is “the 
durability of the elitist British political system” that “derives not from inherent merit, but rather, 
from a capacity for self-defence against contrary, participatory challenges which amounts to effective 
self-perpetuation.” (Tant, 1993: 199). This system has seen off many challengers before me. It is the 
reason it took the optimistically named 1984 Campaign for Freedom of Information until 2005 to 
get a law into force.  
 The ingrained elitist mentality that still exists within parliament exacerbated the damage of the 
scandal and continues to provide a regular stream of expense abuse stories. It feeds into a widely 
held view that the political class works for its own elite interests rather than the public interest. In 
my view it is the elites’ continued refusal to adapt to a more egalitarian and democratic ideology that 
is most damaging to democracy. It feeds into an anti-politics, populist agenda (Flinders, 2015). If the 
institutions are unable to adequately reform they will be seen as part of the problem rather than the 
solution. “Decision makers need to understand why they are now so often besieged with demands 
to disclose” (Florini, 1998: 337) but the British parliament has less a desire to understand, as fight 
against what is viewed as an upstart demand from a public who ought to relearn its place. 
 The change that is needed may be structural but it is also cultural. We have not yet moved to a 
culture that believes in the people’s right to know.  
Data.gov 
 One of the biggest impacts from the expenses scandal was to bring in a new Transparency 
Agenda. I have discussed some of the main aspects of this agenda in the previous chapter but it is 
worth noting the emphasis the government placed on ‘open data’ rather than freedom of 
information. The stated goal was to create ‘an effective Open Data ecosystem’ (Cabinet Office 
2011a: 12). The UK’s Transparency Agenda comprises a whole series of different legal changes, 
codes of practice, recommendations, and experiments (Worthy, 2014b). It has led to publishing 
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contracts, officials’ salaries, further development of the data portal data.gov.uk, online crime maps 
and tax transparency letters (Cabinet Office 2012, p. 5; Shakespeare Review 2013: 7; HMRC 2014; 
PASC 2014: 7). Companies House documents were opened up free for public access, and as part of 
the Open Government Partnership, Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to publish data on 
beneficial ownership so that from April 2016 there will be a public register of who owns or exercises 
‘significant control’ over all UK companies. These are all great improvements, but by now I was 
looking beyond Britain. Having witnessed the ease with which the expenses database could be 
copied and removed from parliament, I had a new hypothesis - that the digitisation of information 
was about to massively disrupt political power structures worldwide.  
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Chapter 10: The Digital Revolution 
 
Seeing the disruptive effects of digitising parliamentary records gave me a deep understanding of the 
impact of digitisation on political power. In this next stage of my work I took what I had learned 
and expanded it to the wider world of transparency and technology. Put simply, my previous work 
could be classed as transparency 1.0 – using existing journalistic techniques, some technology and 
national laws to affect a nation state. Version 2.0 was an expansion both in geographical and 
technological scope. I could see how new technologies would make it easier to copy important 
information and broadcast it to the world (Roberts, 2006; 73; Roberts, 2008: 167). Freedom of 
information exists on a continuum with mega-leaks at the far end. The revelations from Wikileaks in 
2010 and Edward Snowden, a former systems administrator for the US National Security Agency, in 
2013 can be seen as larger versions of MPs’ expenses.  
 I began by researching hackers and information activists at the forefront of this new 
transparency vanguard, attending various hacker conferences in Germany, Scandinavia and America 
seeking out sources and tracking down the founder of Wikileaks when it was an unknown 
organisation. The culmination of my research became my third book, The Revolution Will be Digitised 
(Brooke, 2012, 2nd edition, to which subsequent page numbers in this chapter refer). In this book I 
presented my investigations into what I identified as the most pressing issues of the emerging 
digitised world: digitisation and why it is revolutionary, hackers and hackerspaces, the law in a 
globalised world, the role of journalism in an information free-for-all, information ownership, 
privacy, anonymity and internet surveillance, and national security.  All of these issues have now 
moved solidly into the mainstream but at the time I was writing this book awareness was minimal. 
Raising public awareness of these issues was the main impact of my work as discussed below. My 
thesis in this book was that digitisation and technology have an awesome potential for disrupting 
elite political systems and enabling global enlightenment, but that the tide was turning and elite 
systems were harnessing this technological power to create a global Panopticon the likes of which 
had never been seen before.  
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Sourcing 
 The book is written in two parts woven together: factual investigations on the topics 
mentioned above, and a narrative account of the Wikileaks mega-leaks of 2010. I explain in the 
Foreword (xiii-xiv) how I constructed the narrative. The portrait of the leaker is based on US court 
records, media accounts and my interviews with people in Boston who knew Chelsea (nee Bradley) 
Manning49. Chapter Two is based on interviews with David House and Jim Stone from Boston 
University. The Icelandic sections are based on interviews with Birgitta Jónsdóttir, Smári McCarthy 
and Herbert Snorrason who worked on the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative and with Wikileaks. 
The Boston chapters are based on interviews with David House, Danny Clark (MIT student and 
friend of Manning), Aaron Swartz (Harvard academic, hacker and information activist), Benjamin 
Mako Hill (MIT scholar and information activist) and a few others who I spoke to off the record. 
The chapters about the Guardian’s publication of the mega-leaks are based on my own interactions 
with staff and further interviews with investigations editor David Leigh, editor Alan Rusbridger, 
reporter Nick Davies and deputy editor Ian Katz. I also interviewed Wikileaks founder Julian 
Assange, Daniel Domscheit-Berg (Assange’s right-hand man), Dutch technologist Rop Gonggrijp, 
reporter James Ball, and Jacob Appelbaum (hacker, Tor activist and Wikileaks supporter). 
  In the course of my research, I travelled from Scandinavia to Silicon Valley, Berlin to Boston, 
while based in London. In addition to the sources mentioned above, I sought out and interviewed 
various experts including technology writer Danny O’Brien in Palo Alto, California (31,44-5, 131, 
195);  Computer security researcher Ben Laurie in London (134-40, 159); Brian Alseth, who had 
been on the data team of the first Obama campaign, in Seattle about data dealing (152-7); Professor 
James Boyle of Duke Law School for my potted history of copyright law in the US and UK from 
the 17th century to the present day (84-89); Phil Zimmerman, military policy analyst and creator of 
PGP encryption and John Gilmore in San Francisco for the section on the ‘Crypto wars’ of the 
                                                        
49 Manning was a US Army intelligence officer convicted in July 2013 of violating the Espionage Act and sentenced to 
35 years imprisonment. Even while writing the second edition, Manning was still awaiting trial so I used the construct of 
‘the kid’ to tell his side of the story as I understood it. 
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1990s (97-110). At the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School I met the lawyer for 
Iranian journalist Isa Saharkhiz (107-9) whose case I used in the section on communications 
surveillance. I interviewed and drew on the work of Christopher Soghoian, academic and 
technologist specialising in wiretapping and the history of communications surveillance. I 
interviewed the staff at the Electronic Freedom Foundation in San Francisco including senior lawyer 
Kevin Bankston to inform my section on surveillance law and history. To illustrate the section on 
digital jurisdiction I interviewed Dan Matthews in Boston, Wikileaks’ first volunteer, who bore the 
brunt of the 2008 lawsuit filed by Swiss bank Julius Baer against Wikileaks for publishing leaked 
documents (170-6). 
 My visit to Norway as recounted in Chapter Four of TRWBD marked my meeting with Julian 
Assange and here I became a more active participant in the story. It was in Norway that Assange 
told me about secret footage he’d obtained that showed, he said, “collateral murder by a major 
Western government” which he later said was the United States. This was the ‘Collateral Murder’ 
video (Wikileaks, 5 April 2010, https://collateralmurder.wikileaks.org). However, Assange’s actions 
and statements were very inconsistent (as I document in the book) and alerted my skepticism. Even 
so, I was impressed with Wikileaks because their publication of previously secret information 
indicated to me a willingness and boldness to push the limits of transparency. I interviewed Assange 
in Norway and twice more in the summer of 2010 with subsequent interaction via email and 
encrypted messaging. As documented in the book, I discovered his actions did not match up with 
his ideology. As such, I came to view him as an inconsistent and unreliable source.   
Impact 
 As a direct result of my reporting, I was leaked a copy of the US diplomatic cables, described 
by Wikileaks as “the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public 
domain” (Wikileaks, 2011). Initially, I tried analysing the dataset myself but at 251,237 records, it 
was too vast. Also the material was of a sensitive nature and as such I needed legal, editorial and 
institutional support. I therefore partnered with The Guardian newspaper and together we worked on 
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a months-long investigation that culminated in a series of articles from November 28, 2010 to 
January 2011. We worked in teams according to interest and expertise. I went through cables related 
to the Vatican, Saudi Arabia, the UK and UK royal family as well as covering the unfolding Bradley 
Manning story (see for example Brooke, 30 November 2010; 7, 10, 11, 16 December).  
 The impact of this reporting and disclosure marked a definitive shift toward what some called 
“radical transparency”  (Sifry 2011a) and others called “massive, vigilante disclosure” (Fenster, 
2012). Some credited the cable publication with the Tunisian uprising of January 2011, which led to 
the Arab Spring50. An article in Foreign Policy magazine headlined ‘The First Wikileaks Revolution?’ 
claimed the site’s disclosures “acted as a catalyst: both a trigger and a tool for political 
outcry”(Dickinson, 13 January 2011). However, Wikileaks itself did no reporting on the data. That 
was the job of the journalists. And it was the source who provided the information. Wikileaks was 
the middleman between source and media, similar to the role John Wick played as middleman for 
the MPs’ expenses leaker. In time, the breathless over-excitement about this novel, leaking site was 
replaced with a more tempered view of its actual impact. “Wikileaks only created the illusion of a 
new era in transparency” said Roberts, and early advocates had  “overstated the scale and 
significance of the leaks” (Roberts, 2011: 2).  
 I agree the significance of Wikileaks as a thing in itself was overstated, however, the leaked 
information and subsequent articles did radically change public views about politics, diplomacy and 
corruption. I argue it gave people a greater understanding of the reality of all three.  For this reason 
it may have had an impact on the protests, in Tunisia especially, because it gave people an 
unvarnished view of their rulers as real, fallible human beings. Amnesty International’s secretary 
general, Salil Shetty, has said that:  
                                                        
50 The publication of the following cable in particular was credited with radicalising an already angry and disenfranchised 
Tunisian population (Fenster, 2012): Cable o8TUNIS6yç, Corruption in Tunisia: What's Yours Is Mine. Wikileaks.  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TUNIS679_a.html (Last accessed 17 March 2016). 
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“The year 2010 may well be remembered as a watershed year when activists and journalists 
used new technology to speak truth to power and, in so doing, pushed for greater respect for 
human rights.” (Peter Walker, Guardian, 13 May 201151) 
 
So much of elite political systems depend on an illusion of superiority. Publishing the diplomatic 
cables was like the moment in the Wizard of Oz when the little dog Toto pulls the curtain to reveal 
the wizard is just an ordinary man with the usual human foibles and weaknesses. Among the 
revelations we reported were many instances where elites were shown to be fallible humans (Brooke, 
29 November; 7, 11 December 2010). The cables also revealed the US government’s routine attempt 
to gather intelligence on senior United Nations diplomats, and numerous examples across the world 
where an elite few were privately benefiting from public resources.52 I believe these revelations 
illuminated the costs of secrecy. Secrecy aided elite structures of governance and hindered public 
accountability. Our publication also challenged authoritarian views that tend to maximise the risks of 
disclosure while minimizing those of secrecy. Officials claimed publication would result in “untold 
incalculable damage to the nation’s military personnel, national security, and diplomatic efforts” 
(Fenster, 2012: 806), however as no clear evidence emerged of significant damage they had to retreat 
from this position. Perhaps as a result, courts may be more skeptical in future of officials’ claims of 
the catastrophic consequences of disclosure.  
 In addition to this reporting, in my book I revealed the trade in personal data (130-160) as well 
as online surveillance by states and companies, a topic we came to learn much more about due to 
the Snowdon mega-leaks in 2013. In numerous interviews and talks I spoke about the digital 
revolution to raise public awareness about the important issues of privacy, surveillance and their 
impact on democracy.   
Hacking power 
 The hacker community may be small in number but as I state in the book, “it sits atop the 
technologies that are driving the global economies of the future”(p30). As we have shifted from an 
                                                        
51 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/13/amnesty-international-wikileaks-arab-spring 
52 An entire list of articles related to the US embassy cables can be found on the Guardian website: 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-us-embassy-cables. As of 6 March 2016 there were 1,491 articles listed. 
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industrial to a knowledge economy, “those who build the infrastructure and products of this 
economy have made their fortunes and found their values moving into the mainstream” (p30). It 
was for this reason I visited a number of hackerspaces to meet hackers and understand their culture 
including HACK (the Hungarian Autonomous Center for Knowledge) in Budapest, Sprout and 
BUILDS in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Noisebridge in San Francisco, the Chaos Computer Club 
and C-base in Berlin, and London’s Hackspace. This first-hand reporting led me to understand 
hackerspaces as the digital age equivalent of English Enlightenment coffee houses and as with their 
17th century counterparts, it was in the hackerspaces that “information previously held in secret and 
by elites was shared with an emerging middle class” (p22 and Brooke, 25 August 2011). It was from 
speaking to scores of hackers both in person and online that I distilled down the four basic 
principles of the hacker ethos: freedom of information, meritocracy of ideas, joy of knowledge, and 
anti-authoritarianism (p24). I interviewed one of the founders of Noisebridge, Jacob Applebaum, in 
Seattle where he was working as a researcher at the University of Washington who explained a 
political ideology that many hackers espoused. It was a kind of libertarian democracy based on 
computer structures that he called ‘sudo leadership’. ‘Sudo’ is an abbreviation of ‘substitute user do’ 
and means that people take the lead on things in which they have an interest but without being the 
leader forever (p29).  
Information in a globalised world 
 In Iceland I met the architects of a consortium of laws known as the Icelandic Modern Media 
Initiative. The aim was to take the strongest laws on freedom of speech, information and the press 
from around the world and implement them into Icelandic law thus creating the most advanced 
digital democracy. The resolution was passed by parliament on 16 June 2010. Then a process of 
editing the 13 pieces of legislation began53. The goal, as outlined to me by Icelandic MP Birgitta 
Jónsdóttir, was to “market ourselves as a country with a principled, holistic and modern set of laws 
                                                        
53 This was part of Iceland’s new constitution, drafted and approved October 2012 by 67% of voters in a public 
referendum. However, the government's term finished before the constitution could be passed and so far it has not been 
tabled by the current government.  
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fit for the digital age.” (p37). Transparency was not a luxury but an imperative for Icelanders who 
held secrecy to be directly responsible for the country’s financial crisis. I investigated the crash in 
order to make sense of this. During my research, I also reported and presented a BBC Radio 4 World 
Tonight documentary “Internet Free Speech Under Attack” broadcast on 16 Sept 2010. I interviewed 
various Icelandic politicians including the culture minister and Reykjavik mayor. Iceland was taking 
an idea from science fiction and making it fact. In the sub-section ‘data havens’ I explain the history 
of data havens in fiction and the physical world, which I based on news cuttings, wide reading and 
talking to experts and my sources in Iceland. In order to get the full story on how IMMI began and 
its passage in the Icelandic parliament, I conducted hours-long interviews with my sources, which I 
recorded, supplemented by notes and follow-up emails and online messages.  
 In the section ‘Journalism’s USP’ I explore what happens when in-depth reporting decreases 
while the volume of information increases exponentially. I draw upon the work of Nick Davies in 
Flat Earth News (2008) to highlight the dangers to democracy when journalism of verification is 
replaced by ‘churnalism’.  Norway’s solution is government subsidy. Assange, like many of the 
hackers I met, had a naive view of politics and journalism. One simply had to publish raw data 
online, which would easily find an audience, this audience would easily make sense of the 
information and their collective outrage would force law or policy change. This view failed to 
understand the importance of intermediation and journalism, which is described by Roberts as “the 
tasks of organizing, interpreting, and drawing attention to information” (2011:9).  I saw first-hand 
how Assange struggled to accept the idea that in order for the information to have impact or 
meaning it couldn’t just be dumped online but “data need to be interpreted, studied, made into a 
story" (Lanchester, 2010). This is the practice of journalism.  
 In California I visited Google and Facebook, meeting with managers and developers (140-50) 
and discovered that despite both companies making a living from harvesting personal information, 
they actively protected their own privacy by requiring visitors to sign non-disclosure agreements. I 
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also met with independent technologist Moxie Marlinspike, the founder and CEO of Open Whisper 
Systems, a leading encryption communications service.  
 My first insight into the booming trade of ‘data dealing’, that is the buying and selling of bulk 
personal data came from a personal experience I relate on page 150. From this and my 
conversations with various sources I understood this trade was vast and undocumented. I therefore 
set out to document it. This was easier to do in the US where such trade is legitimate and as such 
can be documented and reported. That is not to say it does not happen in the UK, but in the UK 
the trade, being mostly illegal, is cloaked in secrecy and criminality. As Richards (2013) points out, 
governments can “sidestep many legal restrictions on the collection of data by buying it from private 
databases” (p1959). For this reason, I thought it important to know what was available in the 
personal data marketplace and how it worked. At that time, I could only speculate how governments 
were using the data they purchased. But one of my sources, Brian Alseth, accurately predicted the 
Snowden revelations when he told me the US government was, “further along than we would ever 
imagine, especially the National Security Agency.” (p157).  
Digitisation & Democracy 
 Due to my experience with MPs’ expenses, I understood the world was on the brink of 
realising Manuel Castell’s idea that,  
“When resistance and rejection become significantly stronger than compliance and 
acceptance, power relationships are transformed: the terms of the relationship change, the 
powerful lose power, and ultimately there is a process of institutional change or structural 
change, depending on the extent of the transformation of power relationships.” (2013: 11)  
 
 Digitisation was a means to shake the pillars of elite rule, not just in the UK but the USA, 
middle east and around the world.  How successful these attempts have been is very much open to 
debate. What is certain is that political elites felt increasingly challenged and fought back. In some 
instances, such as the Arab Spring, the successful challenge of autocratic regimes did not lead to the 
promised expanding of the democratic franchise but rather a shift only to a different group 
operating in a similarly autocratic tradition (Morozov, 2013; Taylor, 2014). What I said at the time 
was prescient: “In the digital age we have the technological tools for a new type of democracy but 
139 
the same technology can also be used for a new type of totalitarianism. What happens in the next 
ten years is going to define the future of democracy for the next century and beyond (p15).     
For our own good? National security vs public security 
 In the lead-up to publishing the US diplomatic cables, the UK Government issued a Defence 
Advisory (DA) notice asking editors to seek advice before publishing any of the materials. The D 
Notice may appear gentlemanly and informal but is in fact another way for government to widen its 
control even beyond the law. If the law were used it could be scrutinised in the courts. This 'back-
channel' censorship is particularly insidious. As The Guardian's Investigations Editor David Leigh 
described in his 1980 book Frontiers of Secrecy: “Unpublished bullying beforehand is always a more 
effective censorship tactic than efforts at revenge after the event. Those inevitably have to be 
conducted more or less in the open, in a courtroom, and be unsympathetically reported by the 
professional colleagues of the people in the dock.” (Leigh, 1980: 26). In the US such practices would 
be unconstitutional and this was a leading factor in The Guardian partnering with the New York Times 
and accelerating efforts to start its own US office.  
 The culture in the UK has undoubtedly changed radically since I began my work in 2004. 
Opposing openness or freedom of information now carries a political cost as evidenced by the 
outcry when the government most recently attempted to scale back the law in 2016. However, that 
is not to say the elitist political tradition is vanquished, rather arguments have shifted (Richards and 
Smith, 2015). Transparency is accepted on its face but still resisted in its administration. Smart 
officials are unlikely to claim, as Andrew Walker did, that “transparency will damage democracy,” 
however, they continue to claim it is a burden and make little effort to streamline, expedite or 
expand the law.  Most notably in the UK, “freedom of information has barely touched the national 
security state” (Banisar and Fenucci, 2013: 179). There is an absolute exemption in the FOIA not 
only for the security services but any information that in any way passes through or relates to the 
named agencies. (I discuss the term ‘national security’ in TRWBD: 213-8). The danger is that 
without adequate information, democratic oversight diminishes and the secret services become 
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“virtually a law unto themselves” conducting surveillance on both “real and imagined enemies of the 
state”. As such, “the security services represent a major worry for those concerned about the 
erosion of civil liberties in Britain” (Dearlove and Saunders, 1991: 545). Security services have the 
potential, more than any other part of the state, of subverting the democratic process. Thus, “the 
challenge to our law posed by the Age of Surveillance is immense” (Richards, 2013:1964). 
Snowden revelations and the Independent Surveillance Review Panel 
 It was to bring scrutiny to the security agencies that I agreed to sit on the Independent 
Surveillance Review Panel. Former Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg set up the panel to investigate 
the allegations by Edward Snowden that the UK and US governments were conducting mass 
surveillance programmes and lacked adequate oversight. There were 12 on our panel assisted by the 
secretariat of the Royal United Services Institute: Jonathan Evans, former Director General of MI5; 
John Scarlett former Chief of MI6; tech entrepreneur Martha Lane Fox; former director of GCHQ 
David Omand; Computer Science professor Wendy Hall; historian Peter Hennessy; philosopher 
Onora O’Neill;  former director of intelligence for the Metropolitan Police, John Grieve; Ian 
Walden professor of information and communications Law, and Lesley Cowley, Chief Executive of 
Nominet. From June 2014 until the publication of our report July 14, 2015 we met, took evidence 
and had site visits to assist our investigation.54  
 There were two other reports done alongside ours that I read to inform my work: the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament’s March 2015 Privacy and Security: A Modern and 
Transparent Legal Framework (ISC 2015) and David Anderson’s A Question of Trust: Report of the 
Investigatory Power Review (Anderson, 2015). The main bulk of our work came in the last two months. 
This involved reading, extensive annotating and debating multiple drafts of the report. These were 
sent back and forth between panel members and the secretariat. With such a varied range of 
panellists, suffice to say there were many differences of opinion. Some battles I won such as adding 
the word ‘democratic’ to the report’s title and pushing the panel to consider Richards’ (2013) four 
                                                        
54 A full list of our site visits and evidence sessions can be found in the appendix. 
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principles of surveillance. I made a strong case that secret surveillance and total surveillance is 
illegitimate by definition for “in a democratic society, the people, and not the state apparatus, are 
sovereign.” (Richards, 2013: 1959). I pushed hard for the security services to be more transparent 
about their activities, writing later: 
“if we are to be an informed citizenry – a prerequisite in a democracy – we need the agencies 
to avow their most intrusive un-targeted surveillance practices. Otherwise, they do not have 
a public mandate for them. In effect, they are acting outside the democratic system (Brooke, 
14 July 2015). 
 
 I moved the panel away from the intelligence-led belief that privacy is only engaged when an 
analyst examines data. Instead, “the ISR Panel consider that our privacy rights as individuals are 
engaged whenever these agencies embark upon such intelligence activity, including when the 
public’s data is accessed, collected, filtered and eventually examined by an intelligence analyst” 
(RUSI: xii). Our report recognised that surveillance transcends the public/private divide and that 
much surveillance is outsourced to corporations (RUSI: 26, 32, 42). I half-won the debate about 
warrantry, getting judges into the process but without the full independent oversight I felt necessary. 
In my view the report did not place enough emphasis on the harm resulting from mass, or bulk, 
surveillance and I did not agree with the statement “we have seen no evidence that the British 
Government knowingly acts illegally in intercepting private communications” (RUSI, 2015: xi). That 
is true only because we didn’t see enough evidence to make a judgment either way. As I wrote 
afterwards, “A good deal of assumptions were made that, in my view, gave the benefit of the doubt 
to those whom we were supposed to be investigating” (Brooke, 14 July 2015). 
  The three reports were intended to inform the government’s Investigatory Powers Bill which 
was laid before parliament on 4 November 2015. I was not enamoured with this new bill and 
outlined my objections in another article (Brooke, 8 November 2015). However, one area of vast 
improvement was that the agencies did avow their most intrusive powers. This marked a shift from 
the agencies’ pervious ‘neither confirm nor deny’ position. In many of our panel sessions we 
debated the competing interests of operational effectiveness (aided by secrecy) versus the need for a 
democratic mandate (requiring openness). I believe these discussions fed back to the agencies and 
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the need for a democratic mandate was reinforced by various lawsuits brought before the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal in 201555. After the IP bill was published, Home Secretary Theresa 
May revealed that the security services had been secretly harvesting data from phone calls, texts and 
emails of a huge number of British citizens since 2005 using powers under national security 
directions hidden in the 1984 Telecommunications Act (O’Neill, 5 November 2015). Nick Clegg 
said he had been “astonished that such a powerful capability had not been declared either to the 
public or to parliament,” and was only known to “a tiny handful” of Cabinet ministers (Clegg, 5 
November 2015). I am not at all happy with the bill as it stands, however, at least now we know 
what MPs are voting on.  
 As I come to the end of this account of my work there is much to cheer but also much to 
provoke anxiety. The secret state is moving into the light on many fronts, but at the heart of power 
there are long shadows. It is in those dark spaces that I worry the political tradition of elitist rule 
goes unchallenged and gains strength. 
   
                                                        
55 See for example IPT/13/77H, Liberty & Others vs. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ;  IPT 14/85/CH, 14/120-
126/CH,  Privacy International and Greennet & Others vs The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs and GCHQ. 
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Conclusion 
 
When US Congressman John Moss retired in 1978 he told his local paper that his main 
disappointment was that he hadn’t made “government totally effective”. He spent decades pushing 
for the Freedom of Information Act and even though he eventually succeeded he was not content: 
“You like to see ready evidence of improvement (but) that’s very difficult. You work a long time on 
something and you back away with a feeling that you’ve punched a balloon and it bounces back.” 
(Cited in Schudson: 63). Similarly, Karl Popper looked back at his earlier work, hearing the “voice of 
one of the hopeful social reformers of the eighteenth or even seventeenth century." (Popper xii). 
These sentiments reflect my own as I look back on my efforts to democratise the British political 
system and introduce a method of journalism based on an eco-system of openness and public 
records rather than patronage and private favours.  
 What I set out to do was a kind of consciousness-raising of the British public. To raise 
awareness of an elitist and paternalistic political system that disadvantaged the public through 
enforced ignorance. “It is only by showing [people] the truth,” wrote d’Holbach in 1772, “that they 
will come to know their most vital interests and the true motives which should incline them towards 
what is good.” (cited in Israel: 197-198). Initially, I wasn’t fully aware of the entrenched tradition of 
elitism in the British political system. However, once I started asking questions, filing FOIs and 
doing investigative journalism it became clear. The philosophical drive of my work was to boldly 
challenge what I saw as the state’s distrust and suspicion of citizens and its overarching belief in its 
own superiority.  
 Democracy is more than just rhetoric. The real test comes in practice. Do officials practice 
what they preach?  Freedom of information is like the canary in the coal mine - it indicates one of 
the key pre-requisites of democracy: transparency. It also indicates who has power in a society and 
who doesn’t. Who has the ‘right’ to know? When FOI is curtailed or hobbled, we should view these 
actions much as miners did when their canaries dropped dead, as an indication that our democracy 
is in fatal danger. Truly empowered individuals don’t passively wait to receive the answers or 
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information officials chose to give them. They are able to ask their own questions - and, 
importantly, get answers. They can then use these answers to hold the powerful to account and take 
meaningful action.  
 ‘It is the longing of uncounted unknown men [and women] to free themselves and their 
minds from the tutelage of authority and prejudice…It is their unwillingness to sit back and 
leave the entire responsibility for ruling the world to human or superhuman authority, and 
their readiness to share the burden of responsibility for avoidable suffering, and to work for 
its avoidance. “ (Popper 1995: xiii) 
 
 My unique contribution through my investigations, campaigning, training and teaching not 
only changed the way FOI and investigative journalism was viewed in the UK but, one could argue, 
had an impact on British culture and the British political system. I wanted to usher in not only a new 
way of doing journalism but also a new way of being a British citizen. Obviously many factors 
converged to create a window of opportunity for widespread cultural and political change during the 
MPs’ expenses scandal. Not least MPs shortsighted decision to fight against reform so that when the 
full dataset of expenses was leaked it coincided with a time of austerity. We can see in the recurrent 
‘theme’ of MPs’ expenses a generalised expression of frustration with a system that people feel is 
unsatisfactory but are unable to change in any meaningful way. It is not the scandal that was the 
problem but rather the reality it exposed, that of an elitist institutional structure. The energy 
parliament spent trying to stop the public seeing reality would have been better spent ensuring 
reality could withstand public scrutiny. It is in this area of state propaganda that my next 
investigations are now focused. 
 The British political system has evolved from sovereignty in the sovereign, to sovereignty in 
parliament. The next evolution is to vest sovereignty in the people. Yet the elitist tradition stands in 
the way of all manner of reforms including the full potential of e-democracy (Moss, Coleman 2014). 
Technology can create spaces for new direct popular power and control but the obstructionist 
attitude evidenced in parliament's reaction to early efforts to digitally democratise Hansard does not 
bode well. The danger is that by not reforming in line with people’s changing expectations of 
participatory, or as John Keane defined it ‘monitory democracy’ (Keane, 2009), the institutions of 
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deliberative democracy become themselves an empty signifier, no longer representing democracy in 
the eyes of citizens.   
  Transparency is a power-reducing mechanism. It matters who is made transparent and who is 
not. Making the citizen transparent through surveillance destroys individual privacy, which is also a 
pre-requisite for democracy. That is why my work paid particular attention to who was made 
transparent.  Transparency downwards, when the ruled can observe their rulers is a feature of 
democratic life. The opposite makes for an anti-democratic surveillance society. Transparency alone 
does not ensure democracy but transparency of the state is certainly a pre-requisite. Citizens are 
made powerless by their lack of information. The next stage in the evolution of democracy is to go 
further and give to citizens not just information but an ability to make meaningful decisions with the 
power that knowledge provides. 
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